Mónica Gómez

In this article I argue that the notion of truth is so closely linked to the notion of justification that it is not possible to access the truth, even with the best reasons upon which a justification is supported. I’ll show that the notions of truth and reality can only be inferred from our experience of the world, in which our social practices can be verified or disproved, and if our hypotheses are accepted or refuted. I maintain that we can only access realities which we constitute in relation to one of several possible conceptual frameworks. These conceptual frameworks are not transcendental entities nor are they established definitively, they are social constructs. This means that the conceptual frameworks are constituted by the social practices of the subjects. We understand that social practices are institutionalized groups of actions undertaken by members of a community and directed toward the consecution of an end. These actions presuppose that the beliefs, norms and values are shared by members of an epistemic community. Olivé (1999: 135-42). This article begins by presenting Rorty’s counter-proposal for the notion of truth, in relation to which I put forward the principal theses of onto-epistemological pluralism. Subsequently, I develop the idea of inter-subjective contextual justification and I show that this posture, although it does depend on specific conditions for justification, is not arbitrary. I demonstrate the relevance of onto-epistemological pluralism and the need to adequately substantiate our beliefs and decision making, by presenting the case of parents guided by a notion of ´post-truth´ who decide not to vaccinate their children against measles based on insufficiently justified subjective reasons. A fact that is having serious harmful consequences to health, particularly among young children.

In this paper, I defend an epistemological pluralism that moves away from universal and absolute rationality, as well as from a radical and arbitrary relativism, where any criterion is valid for decision making. Such epistemological pluralism maintains that subjects know the world in which they live according to different conceptual schemes. We posit a notion of truth linked to the justification process and practical effectiveness. Then we present the importance of traditional knowledge in the socio-ecological field and relative to complex systems. Finally, we explain the relevance of epistemic equity between traditional and scientific knowledges in order to anticipate consequences and to make decisions less uncertain.

From the refusal of some parents to apply some vaccines to their children, in this work we will show that to act properly it is not enough with a good intellectual justification to validate a belief as accurate, it will be necessary to take into account also the systematic actions in relation to which we are constituted, as well as the feelings that accompany those actions. We begin by exposing the notion of belief that Villoro presents from authors such as Braithwaite and Bain. Next, we briefly explain the topic of the justification of beliefs and then articulate it with some of the controversies related to the application of vaccines. Later, we turned to Hume to show the role of imagination in relation to pleasure and pain in decision making. Finally, we present an outline of the discussion about paternalism in the application of vaccines.

This article suggests that an epistemological and ontological pluralist perspective may enable human beings to cooperate each other and live with less injustice. Intercultural cooperation may help for a reformulation of the Human rights in order to consider aspects of different ways of life like the variations of moral, political and judicial norms. I expound that Liberal pluralism does not respond adequately to present day multiculturalism. Additionally, I explain that Human rights are not inclusive norms for all ways of life. I definitely sustain that some communities do not have to agree to live in the same moral world as others, but, that it is indeed necessary to know each other’s differences so as to be able to respect them.

In this paper we discuss whether the thesis of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, from an interpretation, could be read in keys of onto-epistemological pluralism. For this, we begin by exposing Nietzsche’s questioning of the notion of rational truth, as well as the universalist and transcendental positions linked to this concept. In the second section we expose some of the main theses of American pragmatism and show that perspectivism is not close to this current of thought. Finally, we present the proposal of ontological and epistemological pluralism and we refer to why Nietzsche’s perspectivism could be articulated with this position and why not.

Based on onto–epistemological pluralism and social practices this work maintains that the proclamation of cultural neutrality originating in the idea of equality without any distinction of color, sex, language, religion or political opinion, really favors white racism and cultural imperialism of the liberal way of life. This article argues that the process of reasoning which justifies human rights is distorted by particular interests, such as the colonization of American territory in the case of the Declaration of the Good People of Virginia in 1776. As no–one questioned the reasons upon which the false belief that some human beings were classified as inferior or superior according to their physical features, it was reiterated as if it were a truth and, consequently acted upon, thereby fixing this belief in stereotypes. In this article I argue that the present Declaration of Human Rights is the result of continuing inherited presuppositions from the 18th Century. These have not been questioned and have constituted the world in which we live as a racist world in which the liberal tradition has consolidated its political power.

Teniendo en cuenta la intensa migración actual de diversos grupos culturales a otros Estados, en este artículo defiendo la tesis de que miembros de diferentes culturas con normas y valores antagónicos pueden llegar a acuerdos de convivencia intercultural. Comienzo explicando la concepción política de la justicia de Rawls para indicar que esta postura democrática liberal no puede responder de forma adecuada a los contextos actuales de multiculturalidad. Posteriormente, expongo las propuestas principales de la ética universalista de J. Habermas con el fin de contraponerla a lo que llamo la "ética pluralista" de J. Dewey y H. Putnam, y justifico por qué las normas, los hechos y los valores son contextuales. con base en ello, concluyo que es posible establecer acuerdos éticos plurales que pueden variar de una cultura a otra y, no obstante, ser legítimos como normas mínimas de convivencia. Given the intense current migration of diverse cultural groups to other States, in this article i defend the thesis that members of different cultures with norms and values in conflict are able to reach intercultural agreements of coexistence. I start explaining Rawls' political conception of justice to point out that this liberal democratic stance cannot respond adequately to the current context of multiculturality. i show then the main points of J. Habermas' universalist ethics in order to contrast it with what i call the "pluralist ethics" of J. Dewey and H. Putnam, and justify why norms, facts and values are contextual. Based on this, I conclude that it is possible to achieve plural ethical agreements that might differ from one culture to another and yet still be legitimate as minimum norms of coexistence