•  3
  •  6
    Hoe dik is het ik?
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 111 (3): 311-338. 2019.
    How fat is the I? Neuroscience and the elusive self This article explores the concept of self in relation to neuroscience. Four options are discussed on the basis of a key representative. The first is the dualist position where the non-material self controls its brain, as defended by Eccles. Next comes the option of the self as a relatively or completely powerless entity within the brain, as exemplified by Libet’s experiments on free will. The third option is the identity of self and brain, as a…Read more
  •  19
    De persoon met dementie
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 110 (3): 249-271. 2018.
    The person with dementia: A plea for a (non-metaphysical) relational notion of personhood In this article we explore the notions of personal identity and personhood, using concrete descriptions of the experiences of people living with dementia as a case study. From an analytical point of view we argue against memory or psychological-continuity criteria of personal identity as too cognitive. Instead we focus on embodiment. The person with dementia, as an embodied human being, is numerically the v…Read more
  •  17
    What are we, most fundamentally? Two topical answers to this question are discussed and rejected and a more evolutionary account is offered. Lynne Baker argues that we are persons: beings with a first-person perspective. Persons form a separate ontological category, with persistence conditions that are different from those of the body. Eric Ol-son, by contrast, claims that we are human organisms. No psychological property is definitive of what we are. Our persistence conditions are those of the …Read more
  •  16
    De auto kwam van rechts - Kanttekeningen bij Radders notie van waarneming
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 106 (1): 43-48. 2014.
    Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.
  •  19
    Symposium: Cuypers' persoonlijke aangelegenheden
    with Ph Van Haute and St E. Cuypers
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2): 329-343. 1997.
  •  72
    This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger
  •  22
    The whereabouts of pictorial space
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4): 3-4. 2011.
    This paper deals with the perception of depth in two-dimensional pictures. Two indirect theories of perception, the Mainstream Theory and the Projection Theory, are compared with a direct Adverbial Theory. Apart from seeming to be the philosophical counterpart to present-day empirical theories of perception, the first two theories seem to be tailor-made to deal with this phenomenon, where the perceived space is certainly not out there, on or behind the canvas: they claim that pictorial space is …Read more
  •  11
    “Een descriptieve metafysica van de persoon”, (review)
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2). 1997.
  • Connectionisme, plasticiteit en de hoop op betere tijden
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 85 (1): 49-69. 1993.
  • Waarneming tussen representationalisme en enactivisme
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 104 (3): 157-172. 2012.
    In this article an analysis of perception is given that accommodates both the fact that perception is a kind of interaction with the world, and the existence of illusions and hallucinations. This analysis, the Adverbial Approach, is contrasted with Representationalism and Enactivism. I will confront all three theories of perception with three test cases: a ginger cat, a ginger cat hidden behind a picket fence, and a ginger cat as in the Bonnet syndrome. I will argue that Representationalism can …Read more
  •  140
    Real people and virtual bodies: How disembodied can embodiment be? (review)
    Minds and Machines 16 (4): 443-461. 2006.
    It is widely accepted that embodiment is crucial for any self-aware agent. What is less obvious is whether the body has to be real, or whether a virtual body will do. In that case the notion of embodiment would be so attenuated as to be almost indistinguishable from disembodiment. In this article I concentrate on the notion of embodiment in human agents. Could we be disembodied, having no real body, as brains-in-a-vat with only a virtual body? Thought experiments alone will not suffice to answer…Read more
  •  61
    Steen Olaf Welding, Die Unerkennbarkeit des Geistes. Phänomenale erfahrung und menschliche erkenntnis (review)
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2): 407-412. 2007.
  • Cognitie wetenschap zonder functionalisme Science cognitive sans fonctionnalisme
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 81 (4): 304-321. 1989.
  •  186
    Self-consciousness and the body
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6): 34-50. 2000.
    Traditionally, what we are conscious of in self-consciousness is something non-corporeal. But anti-Cartesian philosophers argue that the self is as much corporeal as it is mental. Because we have the sense of proprioception, a kind of body awareness, we are immediately aware of ourselves as bodies in physical space. In this debate the case histories of patients who have lost their sense of proprioception are clearly relevant. These patients do retain an awareness of themselves as corporeal being…Read more