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42Understanding Others in Social InteractionsPhilosophical Topics 42 (1): 303-319. 2014.The Theory of Mind Debate has seen a recent shift of focus from social observation toward social interaction. Defenders of so-called second-person accounts claim that social interactions reveal an understanding of another person which is different in kind to merely knowing that the other has a particular mental state. The aim of this paper is to specify this new form of understanding. In the first part, I criticize attempts to describe it as the knowledge of how to react to the other’s mental st…Read more
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33Kausales Denken: Philosophische und Psychologische Perspektiven (edited book)Mentis. 2007.Kausales Denken spielt sowohl im Alltag wie auch im wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprozess eine zentrale Rolle. Es erlaubt uns, Phänomene vorherzusagen, zu kontrollieren und zu verstehen. Kausales Denken geht über die Angabe der Ursachen eines Phänomens hinaus: Wollen wir verstehen, warum ein Fahrrad fährt, so versuchen wir, Schritt für Schritt nachzuvollziehen, wie die einzelnen Bestandteile des Fahrrads zusammenwirken, um miteinander die Bewegung zu produzieren. Wir sind an dem Mechanismus inter…Read more
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33Die philosophische Kausaldebatte hat in den vergangenen vier Jahrzehnten eine neue Blüte erlebt. Kontrafaktische, interventionistische, mechanistische und transfertheoretische Ansätze haben sich neben den bislang dominierenden Regularitätstheorien etabliert. Vertreter aller dieser Ansätze sehen sich jedoch mit Gegenbeispielen konfrontiert, keine Theorie scheint allen unseren intuitiven Kausalurteilen gerecht werden zu können. Dieses Buch führt anhand ausgewählter Beispiele in die aktuelle Deba…Read more
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Causal Dualism: Which Position? Which Arguments?In F. Russo & J. Williamson (eds.), Causality and Probability in the Sciences, College Publications. pp. 5--363. 2007.
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873Direct Perception and Simulation: Stein’s Account of EmpathyReview of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2): 333-350. 2013.The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least…Read more
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2182Einfühlung und EmpathieIn T. Breyer (ed.), Grenzen der Empathie. Philosophische, psychologische und anthropologische Perspektiven, Wilhelm Fink. forthcoming.
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660The Second Person in the Theory of Mind DebateReview of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2): 231-248. 2012.It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory of mind debate, they understand …Read more
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93Data-Phenomena-Theories: What’s the Notion of a Scientific Phenomenon Good for?Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1): 125-128. 2009.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |