Monika Morkūnaitė

Amidst the array of criticisms levied against Kurt Gödel’s ontological proof, the critique by Randolph Rubens Goldman stands out for its unique emphasis on a hitherto overlooked yet pivotal weakness within the proof – its lack of an adequate applied semantics. Goldman’s perspective underscores a significant need: the connection of axioms, definitions, and theorems in the proof with the intended meanings of properties traditionally ascribed to God. However, as Goldman has shown, this attempt poses formidable challenges. The endeavour to establish such a connection renders numerous sentences under the natural language interpretation of the proof meaningless, thus undermining the principle of bivalence. In this article, we analyse different methods to confront this problem. Our final solution is inspired by Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions: namely, we suggest construing sentences under the natural language interpretation of Gödel’s proof as conjunctions of formulas. In this way, we can eliminate meaningless sentences and uphold the once unsettled principle of bivalence.

The article deals with the charge of irrelevance levelled against D. Lewis’s modal realism, notably known as a reductionist account of modality. The charge of irrelevance is apparently one of the most popular objections to modal realism though it often seems that the debate surrounding this charge is not very fruitful since in this context it is common to appeal, implicitly or explicitly, to different criteria for theory choice. As a result, the article deals with the problem in a slightly different manner. The article addresses arguments aimed to show that, contrary to what is often stated, modal realism does not violate our pre-theoretical intuitions, as well as arguments aimed to respond to the charge of irrelevance without appealing to criteria for theory choice at all but providing different reasons instead. However, the aim of this article is to show that all these arguments are rather unconvincing.