Morten Overgaard

To study whether the distinction between introspective and non-introspective states of mind is an empirical reality or merely a conceptual distinction, we measured event-related potentials elicited in introspective and non-introspective instruction conditions while the observers were trying to detect the presence of a masked stimulus. The ERPs indicated measurable differences related to introspection in both preconscious and conscious processes. Our data support the hypothesis that introspective states empirically differ from non-introspective states

In recent years increasing attention has been given to systematic comparison of theories of consciousness. Laudable practical projects have emerged in this regard, such as adversarial collaboration and the development of databases lending themselves to comparisons of empirical support for theories. In addition to the practical advances, theoretical advances have been made, such as a list of issues a theory of consciousness must address. We propose adding the issue of the ontogenetic emergence (O-emergence) of consciousness to the list of issues we use to evaluate theories of consciousness. O-emergence concerns how and when consciousness emerges ontogenetically in human beings. The underlying assumption is that there exists a point in the development of a human individual before which that individual is not and cannot be conscious. This assumption, in turn, depends on a widely shared assumption of cognitive neuroscience, which is that consciousness somehow depends on — or derives from — brain activity. In this paper, we lay out the O-emergence criterion and investigate whether it can be accounted for within the Global Neuronal Workspace theory, the Self-Organizing Meta-representational Account, and the Reorganization of Elementary Functions framework.

The contrasts between so-called objective and subjective measures of consciousness have been a dominating topic of discussion for decades. The debate has classically been dominated by two positions – that subjective measures may be completely or partially reduced to objective measures, and, alternatively that they must exist in parallel. I argue that many problems relate to subjective reports as they can be imprecise and vulnerable to a number of potential confounding factors. However, I also argue that despite the fact that subjective reports are fallible, all objective measures are derived from subjective measures, and, thus, will never under normal circumstances be more correct. I propose that the best and possibly only realistic way forward is a specific version of a “middle ground”: to attempt to improve subjective reports in a collaboration with objective research methods.

In this Letter to the Editor, we seize the opportunity to respond to the recent comments by Anzulewicz and Wierzchoń, and further clarify and extend the scope of our original paper. We re‐emphasize that conscious experiences come in degrees, and that there are several factors that determine this degree. Endorsing the suggestions of Anzulewicz and Wierzchoń, we discuss that besides low‐level attentional mechanisms, high‐level attentional and non‐attentional mechanisms might also modulate the quality of conscious experiences.

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.

Drawing on neuroscientific research and metacognitive theory, this ground-breaking volume examines the theoretical implications that are elicited when neural correlates of consciousness are identified. The relationship between consciousness and the brain has concerned philosophers for centuries, yet a tacit assumption in much empirically-minded consciousness research seems to be that if we can only develop a map of correlations, no further questions remain to be asked. Beyond Neural Correlates of Consciousness starts where others stop, by asking what these correlations may tell us about the nature of consciousness. The book contains chapters considering the upshots of finding the neural correlates of consciousness in light of the most prominent contemporary theories in the field. This illuminates the theoretical consequences of succeeding in the quest for the neural correlates of consciousness from the perspective of global workspace theory, higher-order thought theory, local recurrency theory, and REFCON models, in addition to considering how this quest is shaped by different conscious phenomena, such as dreaming, altered states of consciousness and different levels of consciousness. This insightful text features sophisticated theories that goes beyond correlational inferences and neural mapping, and will be of interest to students and researchers of consciousness, particularly those interested in interpreting neural correlates.

A number of recent publications have argued that a scientific approach to consciousness needs a rigorous approach to first-person data collection. As mainstream experimental psychology has long abandoned such introspective or phenomenological method, there is at present no generally agreed upon method for first-person data collection in experimental consciousness studies. There are, however, a number of recent articles that all claim to provide a unique contribution to such a methodology. This article reviews these suggestions and extracts their core features. It is argued that the suggested methods are generally overlapping and compatible, and a number of concrete methods that easily are applied to experimental studies are put forward.

When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as functions of stimulus intensity as suggested by Koch and Preuschoff . The estimated lag between the curves describes how much stimulus intensity must increase for awareness to change proportionally as much as accuracy and the slopes of the curves are used to assess how fast accuracy and awareness increases and whether awareness is dichotomous. The method is successfully employed to assess consciousness characteristics on data from four different awareness scales

In a recent paper, Brogaard presents counter-arguments to the conclusions of an experiment with blindsight subject GR. She argues that contrary to the apparent findings that GR’s preserved visual abilities relate to degraded visual experiences, she is in fact fully unconscious of the stimuli she correctly identifies. In this paper, we present arguments and evidence why Brogaard’s argument does not succeed in its purpose. We suggest that not only is relevant empirical evidence in opposition to Brogaard’s argument, her argument misconstrues necessary criteria to decide whether a conscious experience is visual or not visual

Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one’s own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an intentional binding paradigm, in which we distinguished between immediate intention, as usually investigated, and longer standing intention. The results showed that the binding effect was significantly enhanced for distal intentions compared to proximal intentions, indicating that the former leads to stronger sense of agency. Our finding provides empirical support for a crucial distinction between at least two types of intention when addressing the efficacy of conscious intentions

This article presents the view that the “problem of consciousness” – per definition – can not be seen as a strictly scientific or strictly philosophical problem. The first idea, especially, leads to important difficulties: First of all, the idea has in most cases implied some rather superficial reductionistic or functionalistic a priori assumptions, and, secondly, it can be shown that some of the most commonly used empirical methods in these regards are inadequate. Especially so in the case of contrastive analysis, widely used in cognitive neuroscience. However, this criticism does not lead to the conclusion that scientific methods are inadequate as such, only that they always work on a pre-established background of theory, of which one must be explicit.