•  1
    Investigating the validity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale – The effect of task-related difficulty on subjective rating
    with Zuzanna Skóra, Kinga Ciupińska, Simon Hviid Del Pin, and Michał Wierzchoń
    Consciousness and Cognition 95 103197. 2021.
  •  29
    Visual expectations change subjective experience without changing performance
    with Lau Møller Andersen and Frank Tong
    Consciousness and Cognition 71 59-69. 2019.
  •  7
    Editorial: Transitions between Consciousness and Unconsciousness
    with Marcus Rothkirch and Guido Hesselmann
    Frontiers in Psychology 9. 2018.
  •  10
    Early visual processing allows for selective behavior, shifts of attention, and conscious visual experience in spite of masking
    with Sébastien M. Crouzet, Lyudmyla Y. Kovalenko, Simon Hviid del Pin, and Niko A. Busch
    Consciousness and Cognition 54 89-100. 2017.
  •  59
    An integration of first-person methodologies in cognitive science
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5): 100-120. 2008.
    A number of recent publications have argued that a scientific approach to consciousness needs a rigorous approach to first-person data collection. As mainstream experimental psychology has long abandoned such introspective or phenomenological method, there is at present no generally agreed upon method for first-person data collection in experimental consciousness studies. There are, however, a number of recent articles that all claim to provide a unique contribution to such a methodology. This a…Read more
  • Behavioral Methods in Consciousness Research (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2015.
    'Behavioral Methods in Consciousness Research' is the first book of its kind, providing an overview of methods and approaches for studying consciousness. The chapters are written by leading researchers and experts who describe the methods they actually use in their own studies, along with their pitfalls, problems, and difficulties.
  •  38
    Partial awareness distinguishes between measuring conscious perception and conscious content: Reply to Dienes and Seth
    with Bert Timmermans, Kristian Sandberg, and Axel Cleeremans
    Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4): 1081-1083. 2010.
    In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans , Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this reply…Read more
  •  2
    Visual experience and blindsight: A methodological review
    Experimental Brain Research 209 473-479. 2011.
    Blindsight is classically defined as residual visual capacity, e.g., to detect and identify visual stimuli, in the total absence of perceptual awareness following lesions to V1. However, whereas most experiments have investigated what blindsight patients can and cannot do, the literature contains several, often contradictory, remarks about remaining visual experience. This review examines closer these remarks as well as experiments that directly approach the nature of possibly spared visual expe…Read more
  •  108
    On the naturalizing of phenomenology
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4): 365-79. 2004.
    In the attempt to construct a scientific approach to consciousness, it has been proposed that transcendental phenomenology or phenomenological psychology be introduced into the framework of cognitive neuroscience. In this article, the consequences of such an approach in terms of basic assumptions, methods for the collection of data, and evaluation of the collected data are discussed. Especially, the proposed notions of mutual constraint and the second perso are discussed. It is concluded that ev…Read more
  •  168
    Confounding factors in contrastive analysis
    Synthese 141 (2): 217-31. 2004.
      Several authors within psychology, neuroscience and philosophy take for granted that standard empirical research techniques are applicable when studying consciousness. In this article, it is discussed whether one of the key methods in cognitive neuroscience – the contrastive analysis – suffers from any serious confounding when applied to the field of consciousness studies; that is to say, if there are any systematic difficulties when studying consciousness with this method that make the result…Read more
  •  28
    An integrative view on consciousness and introspection
    with Jesper Mogensen
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1): 129-141. 2017.
    The relation between first and higher order mental states is currently unknown. In particular, the relation between conscious experience and introspection is difficult as the same methods are used to investigate them. In order to make progress in the scientific understanding of consciousness, introspection or both, it is fundamental to understand whether their relation is serial or reciprocal. Although the amount of empirical evidence directly addressing this question is sparse, the little that …Read more
  •  86
    Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?
    with Kristian Sandberg, Bert Timmermans, and Axel Cleeremans
    Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4): 1069-1078. 2010.
    What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale , through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings , through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering , in which participants place a monetary wager on their deci…Read more
  •  69
    The electrophysiology of introspection
    with Mika Koivisto, Thomas Alrik Sørensen, Signe Vangkilde, and Antti Revonsuo
    Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4): 662-672. 2006.
    To study whether the distinction between introspective and non-introspective states of mind is an empirical reality or merely a conceptual distinction, we measured event-related potentials elicited in introspective and non-introspective instruction conditions while the observers were trying to detect the presence of a masked stimulus. The ERPs indicated measurable differences related to introspection in both preconscious and conscious processes. Our data support the hypothesis that introspective…Read more
  •  110
    Introspection in science
    Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4): 629-633. 2006.
  •  39
    In a recent paper, Brogaard presents counter-arguments to the conclusions of an experiment with blindsight subject GR. She argues that contrary to the apparent findings that GR’s preserved visual abilities relate to degraded visual experiences, she is in fact fully unconscious of the stimuli she correctly identifies. In this paper, we present arguments and evidence why Brogaard’s argument does not succeed in its purpose. We suggest that not only is relevant empirical evidence in opposition to Br…Read more
  •  20
    The time between intention and action affects the experience of action
    with Mikkel C. Vinding and Mads Jensen
    Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9. 2015.
  •  130
    Introspection and subliminal perception
    with Thomas Zoega Ramsøy
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1): 1-23. 2004.
    Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both…Read more
  •  24
    This article presents the view that the “problem of consciousness” – per definition – can not be seen as a strictly scientific or strictly philosophical problem. The first idea, especially, leads to important difficulties: First of all, the idea has in most cases implied some rather superficial reductionistic or functionalistic a priori assumptions, and, secondly, it can be shown that some of the most commonly used empirical methods in these regards are inadequate. Especially so in the case of c…Read more
  •  37
    A TMS study of the ventral projections from v1 with implications for the finding of neural correlates of consciousness
    with Jorgen Feldbaek Nielsen and Anders Fuglsang-Frederiksen
    Brain and Cognition 54 (1): 58-64. 2004.
  •  33
    Measuring consciousness: Task accuracy and awareness as sigmoid functions of stimulus duration
    with Kristian Sandberg, Bo Martin Bibby, Bert Timmermans, and Axel Cleeremans
    Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4): 1659-1675. 2011.
    When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as functions of stimulus intensity as suggested by Koch and Preuschoff . The estimated lag between the curves d…Read more
  •  77
    Optimizing subjective measures of consciousness
    with Bert Timmermans, Kristian Sandberg, and Axel Cleeremans
    Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2): 682-684. 2010.
    Dienes and Seth (2010) conclude that confidence ratings and post-decision wagering are two comparable and recommendable measures of conscious experience. In a recently submitted paper, we have however found that both methods are problematic and seem less suited to measure consciousness than a direct introspective measure. Here, we discuss the methodology and conclusions put forward by Dienes and Seth, and why we think the two experiments end up with so different recommendations.
  •  37
    Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency
    with Mikkel C. Vinding and Michael N. Pedersen
    Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3): 810-815. 2013.
    Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one’s own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an in…Read more