Mstislav Kazakov

У статті робиться спроба вирішити питання онтології можливих світів для семантики можливих світів як інструменту сучасної логіки. Автором висувається припущення, згідно з яким у можливих світах допустима будь-яка довільність щодо їх онтології та повноти опису, доки ця довільність не впливає на істинність/хибність суджень у можливому світі. У випадку ж, якщо певного роду онтологічний параметр, який ми вводимо після встановлення істинності/хибності судження для конкретного можливого світу, певним чином змінює значення судження, цей параметр є недопустимим, оскільки можливий світ стає інструментально непридатним для конкретного дослідження, задля якого цей можливий світ змодельовано

The paper explores the argument from introspection as a counterargument for the validity of reductive materialism and, in other cases, of any type of materialism. The author uses methods and conceptual apparatus of analytic philosophy, as well as the instruments of logical analysis to demonstrate falsity of this argument and impossibility of its usage for the defense of dualism and criticism of materialism. Theory of mind, proposed by David Chalmers, is revisited to demonstrate the epistemic asymmetry arises in case of usage of introspection-argument against materialism. The phenomenon of epistemic asymmetry is explained through the discordance between causal and conceptual relations. The author uses thought experiments as well, to demonstrate uselessness of additional sense, which arises in case of ontological postulation of such concepts as “conscious experience” as something to what introspection propositions refer. The argument from “cultural diversity”, holding the support of introspection-argument, is revisited as well. The results of research resulted into conclusion, to which the ontologization of subjective experience as a proof of causal openness of physical world for the dualism of features and properties is illegitimate and beats completely off the mark. Therefore, the argument from introspection, which is considered the ‘protective belt’ of modern dualistic and non-reductive materialistic approaches (from naturalistic dualism to ‘folk-psychology’, cannot suit as an argument in the discussions in philosophy of mind.

The paper explores the argument from introspection as a counterargument for the validity of reductive materialism and, in other cases, of any type of materialism. The author uses methods and conceptual apparatus of analytic philosophy, as well as the instruments of logical analysis to demonstrate falsity of this argument and impossibility of its usage for the defense of dualism and criticism of materialism. Theory of mind, proposed by David Chalmers, is revisited to demonstrate the epistemic asymmetry arises in case of usage of introspection-argument against materialism. The phenomenon of epistemic asymmetry is explained through the discordance between causal and conceptual relations. The author uses thought experiments as well, to demonstrate uselessness of additional sense, which arises in case of ontological postulation of such concepts as “conscious experience” as something to what introspection propositions refer. The argument from “cultural diversity”, holding the support of introspection-argument, is revisited as well. The results of research resulted into conclusion, to which the ontologization of subjective experience as a proof of causal openness of physical world for the dualism of features and properties is illegitimate and beats completely off the mark. Therefore, the argument from introspection, which is considered the ‘protective belt’ of modern dualistic and non-reductive materialistic approaches (from naturalistic dualism to ‘folk-psychology’, cannot suit as an argument in the discussions in philosophy of mind.