Muhammad Asghari

n this article, I try to defend the thesis that imagination against reason, moral progress through imagination not the reason, the emergence of literary culture after philosophical culture from Hegel onwards, contingency of language, the usefulness of literature (poetry, novels and stories, etc.) in enhancing empathy with one another and ultimately reducing philosophy to poetry in Richard Rorty's writings point to one thing: the priority of literature to philosophy. The literary or post-physical culture that Rorty defends is opposed to the Enlightenment and the philosophical and religious culture. Rorty prefers literary culture among the religious culture and philosophical culture. The literary culture Rorty envisages is a radically historicist and nominalist one. Rorty’s romanticised version of pragmatism aims precisely at dealing with this literary or post-physical culture or, in generally, the literature.

open journal of Philosophical Investigations (PI) is an international journal dedicated to the latest advancements in philosophy. The goal of this journal is to provide a platform for academicians all over the world to promote, share, and discuss various new issues and developments in different areas of philosophy. All manuscripts to be prepared in English or Persian and are subject to a rigorous and fair peer-review process. Generally, accepted papers will appear online. The journal publishes papers including the following fields: · Analytic Philosophy · Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy · Art Aesthetics · Comparative Philosophy West and Chinese · Eastern Philosophy . Islamic philosophy · Epistemology · Ethics · Hermeneutics · History of Religious Thought · History of Western Philosophy · Language Logic

In this interview, which took place in July 2020, Muhammad Asghari, an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tabriz, asked eleven questions (via email ) to Professor Susan Haack, a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of Miami. This American philosopher eagerly and patiently emailed me the answers to the questions. The questions in this interview are mainly about analytic philosophy and pragmatist philosophy. This interview was conducted via personal email between me and Professor Susan Haack in July 2020. This interview, which Professor Hawk eagerly accepted, includes eleven questions about her biography and roles of various philosophers in her thought and finally about the influence of the philosophy of pragmatism on her thought. Of course, it goes without saying that the Haack's book Philosophy of Logic in Iran has been translated into Persian and he has published two articles in the quarterly journal of Philosophical Investigations (University of Tabriz) and I also have translated one of her articles into Persian. What was most interesting to me was the influence of pragmatism on Haack's thought that Charles Sanders Pierce, among classical American pragmatists, had as much influence on this philosopher's thought as John Dewey had in Rorty's thought. Here I thank Professor Susan Haack for answering my questions patiently and eagerly.

فلسفههای معاصر غرب به مثابه جنگلی پر از درختان کوتاه و بلند است که چنان درهم تنیده شدهاند که گاهی تشخیص ریشهها، تنهها و شاخ و برگهای آن‌ها از یکدیگر دشوار میشود. این وضعیت فلسفههای معاصر مغرب زمین است که تنها یک صفت برای آن‌ها مناسب است: تنوع و کثرت. بیشک عصر ما عصر استقبال از تفاوتها و کثرتها و دوری از این‌همانی‌ها و وحدتهایی است که از افلاطون تا هایدگر اول فیلسوفان آن را یگانه قلمرویی که حقیقت در آن سکنی گزیده می‌دانستند. البته این تنوع و پیچیدگی از یک سو، محصول بافت تاریخی، اجتماعی، سیاسی، اقتصادی، فلسفی، علمی، هنری و رسانههای جمعی قرن بیستم است و از سوی دیگر، همین بافت نیز بیتأثیر از فلسفهها و اندیشههای فلسفی و علمی به ارث رسیده از قرن نوزدهم نیست. بنابراین، تعامل بین این دو عامل و تأثیر و تأثر از یکدیگر قابل اغماض نیست. تحولات در عصر حاضر را به دو شکل میتوان توصیف کرد. یکی تحولات در عرصة جهان روزمره که میتوانیم آن‌ها را تحولات سختافزاری بنامیم و عبارت‌اند از دو جنگ جهانی خانمان‌سوز اول و دوم، نژادپرستی، ظهور و افول دولتهای کمونیستی، تولید سلاحهای هستهای و استفاده از بمب اتمی، تولید سایر سلاحهای کشتار جمعی، درگیریهای قومی و نژادی و ضد استعماری، جهانیشدن، ظهور جنبشهای زنان، سقوط دولتهای استبدادی و ظهور دولتهای دموکراتیک، ظهور جامعة پساصنعتی، رشد روزافرون تکنولوژیهای کامپیوتری، افزایش قدرت رسانههای جمعی، پیشرفتهای روزافرون در حوزة پزشکی و... . تحولات نرم‌افزاری ‌عبارت‌اند‌ از ظهور نظریههای جدید در حوزة علم مانند نظریة نسبیت و نظریة کوانتوم، پیدایش پدیدارشناسی و فلسفههای اگزیستانس، فلسفههای پساساختارگرایانه، ظهور جنبشهای نوظهور در هنرها، تفسیرهای جدید از مفهوم عدالت در فلسفة سیاسی و... . هم تحولات سخت‌افزاری و هم تحولات نرم‌افزاری در تعامل فزاینده با یکدیگر سمت و سوی تازهای به فلسفههای معاصر نیز داده‌اند که آن را در قالب کثرت و تنوع و تفاوت فلسفهها میبینیم. این کثرت و تنوع به فلسفة معاصر غربی محدود نمیشود بلکه تقریباً شبیه همین وضعیت را در علوم اجتماعی، علوم سیاسی، حوزة هنرها و ‌به‌طور کلی در علوم انسانی و حتی در علوم تجربی مثل فیزیک شاهد هستیم. برای مثال اگر در قرن هجدهم فقط پارادایم نیوتنی غالب بود، امروز پارادایم انشتینی، پارادایم کوانتمیِ هایزنبرگی و سایر پارادایمها غالب هستند. گویی سرنوشت و تقدیر انسان معاصر این بوده که به این کثرتگرایی و تنوع تن دردهد. تنها وحدتی که میتوان با اطمینان خاطر بیشتری در فلسفة معاصر غرب پذیرفت این است که «کثرت» نقطهای است که فلسفههای معاصر به دور آن حلقه زدهاند. انسان معاصر گریز و گزیری از «کثرتگرایی» ندارد؛ لذا سرنوشت خود را باید در این فضا رقم زند. فلسفههای معاصر چه اروپایی مثل پدیدارشناسی، اگزیستانسیالیسم، هرمنوتیک و غیره، چه انگلیسیزبان مثل فلسفههای تحلیل زبانی و چه فلسفههای امریکایی مثل پراگماتیسم قدیم و جدیم در این جادة پر فراز و نشیب کثرتگرایی پا به عرصة هستی گذاشتهاند. یقیناً مبانی این فلسفهها نیز از سایة عظیم کثرتگرایی بیرون نیستند. البته مراد ما از کثرتگرایی صرفاً معنای متافیزیکی آن نیست بلکه به معنای عام کلمه است که دامنة آن تمامی حوزههای دانش بشری در عصر حاضر را شامل میشود. نکتة دیگر این است که این کثرتگرایی از ابتدای قرن بیستم به بعد ابعاد وسیعتری به خود میگیرد، چرا که در ابتدای قرن بیستم هنوز آن تفکر وحدتگرای هگلی در فلسفه و علمیکردن همة ابعاد زندگی و تلقی علمی از ‌جامعه در قالب مارکسیسم ــ به قول لیوتار غلبة روایت‌های کلان بر روایت‌های خرد ــ اجازة تنفس به تفاوتها را نمیداد؛ ولی نقدهای کوبندة نیچه به متافیزیک افلاطونگرا ـ ‌مسیحی سنت غربی، شکستن شیشة شفاف و یکدست نفس به دست فروید، وقوع دو جنگ جهانی، ظهور جنبشهای دادائیستی در عالم هنر و افول مرز هنر والا و هنر پست، ظهور بحران معنا، مرگ مؤلف و مرگ سوژه، جایگزینی زبان به جای ذهن، تقدم عمل بر نظر، استقبال از تفاوتها، سقوط دولتهای غیردموکراتیک و ظهور جوامع دموکراتیک در اشکال مختلف، ظهور جنبشهای زنان در قالب‌های گوناگون فمینیسم، طرح مباحث زیستمحیطی، همه و همه این نوید را داد که تفکر وحدتگرای تمامیتخواه در فرهنگ انسان قرن هجدهم و نوزدهم به بن‌بست رسیده است و اکنون وقت آن فرارسیده که نگاهها به سمت تنوعها، کثرتها و تفاوتها در تمامی حیطههای جامعة بشری قرن بیستم و بیست‌ویکم معطوف گردد. فیلسوفان همة این تحولات را در فلسفههای معاصر به چشم خویش دیدند و اغلب تسلیم این کثرتگرایی به معنای عام کلمه شدند. شاهد دیگری برای این کثرت و تفاوت در فلسفة معاصر، ظهور فلسفهها و مکاتب، جنبشها و جریانهای فلسفی متعدد در این دوره است. ما در هیچ دورهای از تاریخ طولانی فلسفه به اندازة دورة معاصر با کثرت فلسفه و مکاتب مواجه نیستیم. چنانچه در قرن هفدهم دکارت پدر معنوی فیلسوفان است و فیلسوفان این دوره فلسفههای خود را در مسیر دکارتی ایجاد کردهاند، در قرن هجدهم کانت و در قرن نوزدهم هگل و برخی فیلسوفان دیگر نقش پدر معنوی را بازی کرده‌اند. کما اینکه افلاطون پدر معنوی تمامی فلسفة غرب شناخته میشود. وایتهد در جملة معروفی گفته بود: «کل تاریخ فلسفة غرب پانوشتی بر افلاطون است.»

Since time immemorial, due to its metaphysically grounded perspective, western philosophy has not been able to detach itself from the egoistic outlook, and thus, the interaction with the "other” had no role in this philosophy. The world has always been interpreted from the perspective of "self" ignoring the "other". Reviewing this mode of thought from Ancient Greece to Modern Age, one can reveal a kind of repression and forgetfulness of "alterity" and difference which Levinas has well highlighted in his philosophy. The very foundation of this egoism can be traced back to the Socratic slogan "know yourself”. In the same spirit, a kind of self-centered moral philosophy has been developed, the clear example of which is Kant's ethics. In line with Hegelian tradition of recognition, contemporary thinkers have redefined ethics and politics and acknowledged the constitutional dependence of the “self” on the "other." Based on the coordinates of their thought as well as the historical condition of their own time in the formation of subjectivity, these thinkers have criticized the neglect of the “other”. Hegel's role in underlining the importance of the vital status of the “other” is unique. Hegel bridges all post-Hegelian currents on the concept of “Other”. Then, in the present essay, we seek to show that since Hegel’s time up to Derrida, we have been witness to the rise of “Other” and the fall of “Self”.

Since time immemorial, due to its metaphysically grounded perspective, western philosophy has not been able to detach itself from the egoistic outlook, and thus, the interaction with the "other” had no role in this philosophy. The world has always been interpreted from the perspective of "self" ignoring the "other". Reviewing this mode of thought from Ancient Greece to Modern Age, one can reveal a kind of repression and forgetfulness of "alterity" and difference which Levinas has well highlighted in his philosophy. The very foundation of this egoism can be traced back to the Socratic slogan "know yourself”. In the same spirit, a kind of self-centered moral philosophy has been developed, the clear example of which is Kant's ethics. In line with Hegelian tradition of recognition, contemporary thinkers have redefined ethics and politics and acknowledged the constitutional dependence of the “self” on the "other." Based on the coordinates of their thought as well as the historical condition of their own time in the formation of subjectivity, these thinkers have criticized the neglect of the “other”. Hegel's role in underlining the importance of the vital status of the “other” is unique. Hegel bridges all post-Hegelian currents on the concept of “Other”. Then, in the present essay, we seek to show that since Hegel’s time up to Derrida, we have been witness to the rise of “Other” and the fall of “Self”.

I try to show that Richard Rorty, although is not a moral philosopher like Kant, nerveless, has moral philosophy that it must be taken seriously. Rorty has not engaged with moral philosophy in the systematic manner common among leading modern and contemporary moral philosophers. This paper has two parts: first part, in briefly, is concerned with principles of his philosophy such as anti-essentialism, Darwinism, Freudism, and historicism. second part, will be a long and detailed, considers many moral themes in Rorty''''''''s thought such as critique of Kantian morality, solidarity, moral progress, cruelty and concept of other, etc. subsequently, we will try to answer question of the article (namely, has Rorty a moral philosophy?).

In this interview, which took place in July 2020, Muhammad Asghari, an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tabriz, asked eleven questions (via email ) to Professor Susan Haack, a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of Miami. This American philosopher eagerly and patiently emailed me the answers to the questions. The questions in this interview are mainly about analytic philosophy and pragmatist philosophy.This interview was conducted via personal email between me and Professor Susan Haack in July 2020. This interview, which Professor Hawk eagerly accepted, includes eleven questions about her biography and roles of various philosophers in her thought and finally about the influence of the philosophy of pragmatism on her thought. Of course, it goes without saying that the Haack's book Philosophy of Logic in Iran has been translated into Persian and he has published two articles in the quarterly journal of Philosophical Investigations (University of Tabriz) and I also have translated one of her articles into Persian. What was most interesting to me was the influence of pragmatism on Haack's thought that Charles Sanders Pierce, among classical American pragmatists, had as much influence on this philosopher's thought as John Dewey had in Rorty's thought. Here I thank Professor Susan Haack for answering my questions patiently and eagerly.

In this article, we try to show that Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as the patron saint of the body, offers a phenomenological analysis of the body that is neither psychological nor rational, but existential in nature. Influenced by Heidegger's philosophy, Merleau-Ponty presents an existential analysis of man and his corporeality as the corporeal subject relates to the world. In this article, focusing on concepts such as location, body schema, flesh, absent body, and body perspective, we show that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of these existential concepts has important role in understanding of the lived-body. Merleau-Ponty, by criticizing Descartes' body and abandoning his duality of soul and body, turns to the existential union of the two in the form of a bodily subject, showing that human existence can be understood through this bodily. He contrasts this analysis with philosophical analyzes, including Cartesian philosophy, in which he believes that sensory perception and the body as the foundation of human consciousness play an important role in his pre-reflective understanding of himself and the world.

In this article, our aim is to examine the place of “reality” in Richard Rorty’s thought in view of the important and key discussion of language in the philosophy of this thinker. In other words, we know that with the occurrence of the “linguistic turn” in the middle of the twentieth century, the relationship between language and reality has become one of the central debates of philosophy, especially analytical philosophy, and has become of particular importance. Is it language that determines the external reality for us? Is knowing the world outside the mind possible only through the possibilities that language gives us? And to what extent does the structure of language affect our cognitive pattern? These are only a part of the linguistic concerns that have occupied the minds of contemporary philosophers. The main concern and problem of the present article, which has been approached using a descriptive-analytical method, is to examine the relationship between language and reality in Richard Rorty’s thought and to show how he defends the linguistic structure of having reality. Rorty, following an analytical philosophy that, in addition to detailed analyses of traditional philosophical concepts, like the concepts of truth, meaning, necessity, etc. and by changing the discussion from experience to discussion from language in the direction of pragmatizing the basic principles of positivism, believes that it is trans-lingual and trans-temporal. The common denominator that Plato found in the outside world and transferred to man in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition is sought in analytic philosophy in language, and so analytic philosophers continue to pursue the traditional philosophy project of providing a trans-historical and eternal framework for the accurate representation of the world. Rorty tries to overcome this view of analytical philosophers with a Darwinist and pragmatic view of language and under the influence of philosophers such as Wittgenstein.For Darwinists, language is a tool among other tools that gives its users the ability to better and more efficiently adapt to their environment and meet their needs. For the likes of Wittgenstein and like-minded people, despite their many and sometimes profound differences, language had an important and pivotal place with its eventual and possibility feature. Influenced by thinkers such as Wittgenstein, and in the context of his Darwinist and pragmatic approach to language, Rorty attributes certain characteristics to language that can be said to influence his whole thought. Firstly, he considers language as a tool like other tools and, therefore, considers it to have no fixed nature and identity. Given that it is not possible to leave the language and on the other hand language has a poetic and metaphorical character, the function of language cannot be a representation of reality and reality can never be available to us naked and as independent of language and descriptions. Therefore, from Rorty’s point of view, reality is a linguistic and constructed matter of language that we humans have invented in cooperation with each other and in accordance with our historical-cultural situation and needs. Of course, Rorty’s point in saying that reality is made by language is by no means that we create reality arbitrarily and as we wish; rather, what is happening is that we are responding to an external stimulus, a response of various sentence types that manifests itself as linguistic reactions.

The aim of this paper is to analyse opinions of Kierkegaard in his famous book, Fear and Trembling, and Heidegger’s points of view in the great work of thought, Being and Time, in order to present a new meaning of human. And these all going to introduce the new aspect of Ethic. Kierkegaard puts the act of the faith against of the virtue ethics according to the tale of Abraham in the Bible. He claims that the act of the faith transcends from general ethic with achieve its individuality. The actor of the faith can not returns to generality, as the actor of tragedy can. He leaves the generality to make decision in a free manner. on the other hand, Heidegger’s existancial analyses leads into that the human determiner is not an ideal essence, but it’s his existance, in other word it’s his ability-to-be. Human is who he can be. So it is obvious that these two great thinkers believe that human is not a predestined being, but he is facilities. And for this reason we can renew our definition of the ethic.

The aim of this article is to consider Hegel's unity, which is "the Unity of Identity and Difference" Or to examine and explain the "unity of seemingly contradictory features in a single coherent whole" in the light of the main problem of Hegel's philosophy, that is, the overcoming of divisions or dualities, as the solution of her philosophy. Unity (Einheit) is an important ideal, goal and end for Hegel's philosophical system. Hence, in his entire philosophical system and in different periods of his intellectual life, the traces of the search for unity are always obvious, from the beautiful artistic unity in Greece to his desired unity, which is a rational, speculative, philosophical, absolute and Mediated unity. For him, the whole of philosophy is nothing but the study of the definition of unity and its realization in society. A unity that, instead of eliminating or absorbing another, tries to preserve and eliminate pluralities and differences by accepting and recognizing another in a single coherent whole. A unity in which differences and dualities do not disappear but are preserved as necessary and inevitable moments. Unity that is not the result of direct intuition but the product and result of passing through different stages and an intersubjective matter. For Hegel, it is not atomism and excessive individualism in the modern world that lead to rupture, not mere mystical and abstract unions that wipe out all differences, but the unity of the whole in which All distinctions are preserved.