Muhammad FARUQUE

This study deals specifically with one of the most relevant issues in neuro-ethics, namely the philosophical classification of so-called memory dampening, which refers to the attenuation of traumatic memories with the help of medication. Numerous neuroethical questions emerge from this issue. For example, how is a person’s identity affected by using such drugs? Does one still remain the same person? Would propranolol, for example, as a memory-dampening agent lead to a fundamental change in one’s identity? Are not a person’s negative memories also part of their identity and present personality? These questions are examined from the perspective of the seventeenth-century Islamic philosopher, Mullā Ṣadrā. The goal is to shed light on the neuroethical foundations of memory dampening and personal identity from an Islamic philosophical perspective.

Featuring the work of leading contemporary Muslim philosophers and theologians, this book grapples with various forms of evil and suffering in the world today, from COVID-19 and issues in climate change to problems in palliative care and human vulnerability. Rather than walking down well-trodden paths in philosophy of religion which often address questions of evil and suffering by focusing on divine attributes and the God-world relationship, this volume offers another path of inquiry by focusing on human vulnerability, potential, and resilience. Addressing both the theoretical and practical dimensions of the question of evil, topics range from the transformative power of love, virtue ethics in Sufism and the necessity of suffering, to the spiritual significance of the body and Islamic perspectives on embodiment. In doing so, the contributors propose new perspectives based on various pre-modern and contemporary materials that can enrich the emerging field of the global philosophy of religion, thereby radically transforming contemporary debates on the nature of evil and suffering. The book will appeal to researchers in a variety of disciplines, including Islamic philosophy, religious studies, Sufism and theology.

Sculpting the Self addresses “what it means to be human” in a secular, post-Enlightenment world by exploring notions of self and subjectivity in Islamic and non-Islamic philosophical and mystical thought. Alongside detailed analyses of three major Islamic thinkers (Mullā Ṣadrā, Shāh Walī Allāh, and Muhammad Iqbal), this study also situates their writings on selfhood within the wider constellation of related discussions in late modern and contemporary thought, engaging the seminal theoretical insights on the self by William James, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Michel Foucault. This allows the book to develop its inquiry within a spectrum theory of selfhood, incorporating bio-physiological, socio-cultural, and ethico-spiritual modes of discourse and meaning-construction. Weaving together insights from several disciplines such as religious studies, philosophy, anthropology, critical theory, and neuroscience, and arguing against views that narrowly restrict the self to a set of cognitive functions and abilities, this study proposes a multidimensional account of the self that offers new options for addressing central issues in the contemporary world, including spirituality, human flourishing, and meaning in life. This is the first book-length treatment of selfhood in Islamic thought that draws on a wealth of primary source texts in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Greek, and other languages. Muhammad U. Faruque’s interdisciplinary approach makes a significant contribution to the growing field of cross-cultural dialogue, as it opens up the way for engaging premodern and modern Islamic sources from a contemporary perspective by going beyond the exegesis of historical materials. He initiates a critical conversation between new insights into human nature as developed in neuroscience and modern philosophical literature and millennia-old Islamic perspectives on the self, consciousness, and human flourishing as developed in Islamic philosophical, mystical, and literary traditions.

This study investigates the problem of the natural universal in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā. The problem of universals made its way into Arabic/Islamic philosophy via its Greek sources, and was transformed into the problem of natural universals by Avicenna. Weighing in on this problem, Ṣadrā reinterprets the nature of natural universals against the backdrop of his doctrine of “the primacy of being.” As he argues, a natural universal or quiddity qua quiddity is an “accidental being” that requireswujūdfor its existentiation. Thus, Ṣadrā re-envisions the status of natural universals by stripping them of their disputed status as independently existing entities.RésuméDans cette étude je me propose de réfléchir sur le problème de l'universel naturel dans l’œuvre de Mullā Ṣadrā. Le problème des universaux s'est introduit dans la philosophie arabe et musulmaneviales sources grecques et s'est trouvé transformé en celui des “universaux naturels” aux mains d'Avicenne. En contribuant à son tour à l’évolution de ce problème, Ṣadrā réinterpréta le statut des universaux naturels à partir de sa propre doctrine de la “primauté de l’être”. Selon lui, un universel naturel ou “quiddité en tant que quiddité” est un “être par accident” qui requiertwujūdpour son existentiation. Ainsi, Ṣadrā re-envisage le statut des universaux naturels en les privant de leur statut contesté en tant qu'entités “indépendantes existantes”.

This study traces the notion of the internal senses in three ancient authors, namely Nemesius, Plotinus and Galen. It begins with Nemesius, and then by going backward ends with Galen. The textual evidence investigated in this study shows clearly that Galen, after acknowledging the Platonic tripartite soul, locates the various dunameis of the soul in the brain. The “localization” theory of Galen plays a crucial role in paving the way for the foundation of the internal senses, which both Plotinus and Nemesius adapted. Just as with the external senses one can locate various sense-organs in different parts of the body, viz., touch, smell, sight etc., so too with the internal senses, thanks to Galen, one is able to locate them in various organs of the body. Thus philosophers are able to explain the role of all these different senses in their account of sense-perception.

The aim of the present study is to analyze the general outlook of Heidegger and Mullā Ṣadrā with regard to the meaning of metaphysics, occupying as it does a central position in their respective philosophies. It should first be made clear that “metaphysics” refers to First Philosophy or the scientia divina in the philosophical system of Ṣadrā.1 The English word “metaphysics” can be traced back to its etymological source in the Greek plural noun-phrase ta meta ta phusika, which became metaphysica in Medieval Latin. The word was used both as a title for Aristotle’s seminal work Metaphysics and as the name of the “science” that was its subject matter. The term for...