•  152
    Epistemic trust and social location
    Episteme 3 (1-2): 109-124. 2006.
    Epistemic trustworthiness is defined as a complex character state that supervenes on a relation between first- and second-order beliefs, including beliefs about others as epistemic agents. In contexts shaped by unjust power relations, its second-order components create a mutually supporting link between a deficiency in epistemic character and unjust epistemic exclusion on the basis of group membership. In this way, a deficiency in the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness plays into social/epistem…Read more
  •  84
    Skepticism, contextualism, and the epistemic "ordinary"
    Philosophical Forum 33 (1). 2002.
    This paper argues that epistemic contextualism misrepresents ordinary epistemic practices and fails to adequately respond to skepticism. It offers an alternative account of contextual variation in epistemic practices on which epistemic standards are stable, but met differently in different contexts. Contexts are determined by background presuppositions, which vary with types of inquiry. The presuppositions behind some inquiries imply that some standards of knowledge have 'already' been met. This…Read more
  •  6
    In this paper I develop and support a feminist virtue epistemology and bring it into conversation with feminist contextual empiricism and feminist standpoint theory. The virtue theory I develop is centered on the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness, which foregrounds the social/political character of knowledge practices and products, and the differences between epistemic agencies that perpetuate, on the one hand, and displace, on the other hand, normative patterns of unjust epistemic discriminat…Read more
  •  4
    Epistemic Trust and Social Location
    Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1): 109-124. 2006.
  • The Problem of Cartesian Skepticism
    Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. 1991.
    In this study I aim for an understanding of the problem of Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that the skeptical thesis that knowledge of the world is impossible is one 'side' of a paradox, the other 'side' being that we do know about the world around us. I defend that view by defending the skeptical 'side' of the paradox, assuming that we enter a study of skepticism firmly committed to the non-skeptical 'side'. ;I present an understanding of the skeptical philosopher as occupying a relatively 'obj…Read more