Syracuse University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2008
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Law
  •  1036
    Socrates and Superiority
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2): 251-268. 2007.
    I propose an alternative interpretation of the Crito. The arguments that are typically taken to be Socrates’ primary arguments against escape are actually supplementary arguments that rely on what I call the Superiority Thesis, the thesis that the state and its citizens are members of a moral hierarchy where those below are tied by bonds of obligation to those above. I provide evidence that Socrates holds this thesis, demonstrate how it resolves a number of apparent difficulties and show why my …Read more
  •  1011
    Moral Luck Defended
    Noûs 48 (4): 683-698. 2014.
    I argue that there is moral luck, i.e., that factors beyond our control can affect how laudable or culpable we are.
  •  847
    Liberalism and the general justifiability of punishment
    Philosophical Studies 145 (3): 325-349. 2009.
    I argue that contemporary liberal theory cannot give a general justification for the institution or practice of punishment, i.e., a justification that would hold across a broad range of reasonably realistic conditions. I examine the general justifications offered by three prominent contemporary liberal theorists and show how their justifications fail in light of the possibility of an alternative to punishment. I argue that, because of their common commitments regarding the nature of justificatio…Read more
  •  772
    Against Phenomenal Conservatism
    Acta Analytica 26 (3): 213-221. 2011.
    Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases where…Read more
  •  706
    Retributivism revisited
    Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 473-484. 2014.
    I’ll raise a problem for Retributivism, the view that legal punishment is justified on the basis of desert. I’ll focus primarily on Mitchell Berman’s recent defense of the view. He gives one of the most sophisticated and careful statements of it. And his argument is representative, so the problem I’ll raise for it will apply to other versions of Retributivism. His insights about justification also help to make the problem particularly obvious. I’ll also show how the problem extends to non-retrib…Read more
  •  664
    Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2): 251-73. 2016.
    The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm says that an event is overall harmful for someone if and only if it makes her worse off than she otherwise would have been. I defend this account from two common objections.
  •  575
    Why punitive intent matters
    Analysis 81 (3): 426-435. 2021.
    Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.
  •  572
    Say what? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism
    Law and Philosophy 27 (2): 123-150. 2008.
    Some philosophers think that the challenge of justifying punishment can be met by a theory that emphasizes the expressive character of punishment. A particular type of theories of this sort - call it Expressive Retributivism [ER] - combines retributivist and expressivist considerations. These theories are retributivist since they justify punishment as an intrinsically appropriate response to wrongdoing, as something wrongdoers deserve, but the expressivist element in these theories seeks to corr…Read more
  •  511
    An argument for voting abstention
    Public Affairs Quarterly 23 (4): 279-286. 2009.
    I argue that voting abstention may be obligatory under certain non-trivial conditions. Following recent work on voting ethics, I argue that the obligation to abstain under certain conditions follows from a duty not to vote badly. Whether one votes badly, however, turns on more than one's reasons for wanting a particular candidate elected or policy implemented. On my account, one's reasons for voting at all also matter, and one can be in a position where there is no way to exercise one's right to…Read more
  •  493
    Against Legal Punishment
    In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 559-78. 2022.
    I argue that legal punishment is morally wrong because it’s too morally risky. I first briefly explain how my argument differs from similar ones in the philosophical literature on legal punishment. Then I explain why legal punishment is morally risky, argue that it’s too morally risky, and discuss objections. In a nutshell, my argument goes as follows. Legal punishment is wrong because we can never sufficiently reduce the risk of doing wrong when we legally punish people. We can never sufficient…Read more
  •  472
    Philosophical success
    Philosophical Studies 172 (8): 2109-2121. 2015.
    Peter van Inwagen proposes a criterion of philosophical success. He takes it to support an extremely pessimistic view about philosophy. He thinks that all philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions fail, including the argument from evil. I’m more optimistic on both counts. I’ll identify problems with van Inwagen’s criterion and propose an alternative. I’ll then explore the differing implications of our criteria. On my view, philosophical arguments can succeed and the argument from evil …Read more
  •  416
    Hitting Retributivism Where It Hurts
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1): 109-127. 2019.
    Many philosophers think that, when someone deserves something, it’s intrinsically good that she get it or there’s a non-instrumental reason to give it to her. Retributivists who try to justify punishment by appealing to claims about what people deserve typically assume this view or views that entail it. In this paper, I present evidence that many people have intuitions that are inconsistent with this view. And I argue that this poses a serious challenge to retributivist arguments that appeal to …Read more
  •  394
    Two Claims About Desert
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1): 41-56. 2013.
    Many philosophers claim that it is always intrinsically good when people get what they deserve and that there is always at least some reason to give people what they deserve. I highlight problems with this view and defend an alternative. I have two aims. First, I want to expose a gap in certain desert-based justifications of punishment. Second, I want to show that those of us who have intuitions at odds with these justifications have an alternative account of desert at our disposal – one that ma…Read more
  •  359
    The Nature of Punishment: Reply to Wringe
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5): 969-976. 2017.
    Many philosophers think that an agent punishes a subject only if the agent aims to harm the subject. Bill Wringe has recently argued against this claim. I show that his arguments fail.
  •  351
    The passions of punishment
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2): 232-250. 2009.
    I criticize an increasingly popular set of arguments for the justifiability of punishment. Some philosophers try to justify punishment by appealing to what Peter Strawson calls the reactive attitudes – emotions like resentment, indignation, remorse and guilt. These arguments fail. The view that these emotions commit us to punishment rests on unsophisticated views of punishment and of these emotions and their associated behaviors. I offer more sophisticated accounts of punishment, of these emotio…Read more
  •  306
    Facing the Consequences
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (3): 589-604. 2014.
    According to deterrence justifications of legal punishment, legal punishment is justified at least in part because it deters offenses. These justifications rely on important empirical assumptions, e.g., that non-punitive enforcement can't deter or that it can't deter enough. I’ll challenge these assumptions and argue that extant deterrence justifications of legal punishment fail. In the process, I examine contemporary deterrence research and argue that it provides no support for these justificat…Read more
  •  302
    It’s Only Natural: Legal Punishment and the Natural Right to Punish
    Social Theory and Practice 38 (4): 598-616. 2012.
    Some philosophers defend legal punishment by appealing to a natural right to punish wrongdoers, a right people would have in a state of nature. Many of these philosophers argue that legal punishment can be justified by transferring this right to the state. I’ll argue that such a right may not be transferrable to the state because such a right may not survive the transition out of anarchy. A compelling reason for the natural right claim – that in a state of nature there are few if any viable non-…Read more
  •  293
    The Nature of Punishment Revisited: Reply to Wringe
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1): 89-100. 2020.
    This paper continues a debate about the following claim: an agent punishes someone only if she aims to harm him. In a series of papers, Bill Wringe argues that this claim is false, I criticize his arguments, and he replies. Here, I argue that his reply fails.
  •  148
    Cosmic Coincidence and Intuitive Non-Naturalism
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (2): 1-5. 2010.
    I defend Intuitive Non-Naturalism in ethics from an objection by Matt Bedke.
  •  73
    Punitive intent
    Philosophical Studies 179 (2). 2022.
    Most punishment theorists seem to accept the following claim: punishment is intended to harm the punishee. A significant minority of punishment theorists reject the claim, though. I defend the claim from objections, focusing mostly on recent objections that haven’t gotten much attention. My objective is to reinforce the already strong case for the intentions claim. I first clarify what advocates of the intentions claim mean by it and state the standard argument for it. Then I critically discuss …Read more