My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes This is a weak acceptance that is characterized by the possibility of some non-linguistic conceptual a priori which might be necessary for us to have any concepts at all. I have trouble with the idea of linguistic a priori. none of these ideas are well defined as of yet.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: no free will I am inclined to think that this is more of a definitional problem revolving around what we mean by free will than a metaphysical problem of choice.
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept more than one it seems that each theory has its difficulties in dealing with specific problems. Taking one position would limit ones ability to address certian moral problems.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: qualia theory
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism I have questions as to whether or not this is actually possible to implement, but Egalitarianism should be the goal.
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Fregean
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: death Whether this is an important distinction is unclear.
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch This is not a consequentialist response. The experiment assumes a negative outcome; the respondent simply determines the extent of that outcome.The trolley does not do the intended job.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: epistemic
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible note that this a limited view of the zombie. The zombie in question cannot have the same mental states as its feeling antecedent.