Nathan Placencia

Los Angeles Valley College
  •  227
    Race in the Afterlife: An Eastern Christian Approach
    In James Siemens & Joshua Matthan Brown (eds.), Eastern Christian Approaches to Philosophy, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 281-301. 2022.
    In a previous paper, I addressed the question: Will there be races in heaven? (Placencia, 2021 ). There I argued that the answer to that question depends on one’s view of heaven and one’s account of race. After sorting out these concepts, I defended the conclusion that racial identity, but not race, is compatible with the mainstream Christian account of the afterlife. However, I left open the question of whether deflationary realist races (what I will refer to as minimalist races in this chapter…Read more
  • A Role Identification Account of Social Identity
    Dissertation, University of California, Riverside. 2009.
    This dissertation articulates a new model for understanding the moral psychology of social identity. It argues that it is best to think of social identities as social roles that are defined by socio-normative rules. When agents identify with social roles the result is a social identity. Social identities give an agent a unique source of reasons to act.
  •  1384
    Will there be races in heaven?
    In T. Ryan Byerly (ed.), Death, Immortality, and Eternal Life, Routledge. pp. 192-206. 2021.
    Drawing on work in the Philosophy of Race, this chapter argues that the existence of races in heaven is either incompatible or only questionably compatible with the mainstream Christian view of the afterlife. However, it also argues that there is a phenomenon adjacent and related to race that can exist in the afterlife, namely racial identity. If one thinks of racial identity as a kind of practical identity, it turns out that racial identity is primarily psychological. Thus, its existence in hea…Read more
  •  407
    Am I Who I Say I Am? Social Identities and Identification
    Social Theory and Practice 36 (4): 643-660. 2010.
    This paper further elucidates our understanding of social identities. Some theorists have argued that we identify with our social statuses when we self-consciously adopt them as our own. This paper argues against this view and instead suggests that we identify with our social statuses when we care about them. Moreover, it theorizes care as a kind of emotional attunement to our social statuses that sometimes operates below the surface of self-reflective awareness