•  30
    Problem reprezentacji w teoriach poznania ucieleśnionego
    Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T). 2012.
    This paper looks at a central issue with embodiment theories in cognition: the role, if any, they provide for mental representation. Thelen and Smith hold that the concept of representations is either vacuous or misapplied in such systems. Others maintain a place for representations, but are imprecise about their nature and role. It is difficult to understand what those could be if representations are understood in the same sense as that used by computationalists: fixed or long-lasting neural st…Read more
  • Imagination and Logical Possibility
    Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook. 1980.
    Understanding Quine's analysis puts us in a position to connect imagination and logical possibility. The description of what is to be imagined may induce an imaginative experience which can be related to the description in various ways. The description may be 'observational,' meaning that everything that it describes can be observed; in this case imagining under a description is decisive evidence for the possibility of what is described. If the description is non-observational, or contains more …Read more
  •  59
    Three paradoxes of phenomenal consciousness: Bridging the explanatory gap
    with Ralph D. Ellis
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4): 419-42. 1998.
    Any physical explanation of consciousness seems to leave unresolved the ‘explanatory gap': Isn't it conceivable that all the elements in that explanation could occur, with the same information processing outcomes as in a conscious process, but in the absence of consciousness? E.g. any digital computational process could occur in the absence of consciousness. To resolve this dilemma, we propose a biological-process-oriented physiological- phenomenological characterization of consciousness that ad…Read more
  •  7
    Acting and Perceiving in Body and Mind
    Philosophy Research Archives 11 407-429. 1985.
    In this paper I sketch an account of the origin of the terms and concepts of folk psychology, and the true nature of mental states. I argue that folk psychology is built on metaphors for the functioning physical body, and that mental states are neurological traces which serve as schematic ‘mental images’ of those same functions. Special attention is paid to the folk psychology of self-consciousness. In particular, I argue that the notion of introspection is mistaken, and I criticize recent claim…Read more
  •  45
    The art of representation: Support for an enactive approach
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3): 411-411. 2004.
    Grush makes an important contribution to a promising way of viewing mental representation: as a component activity in sensorimotor processes. Grush shows that there need be no entities in our heads that would count as representations, but that, nevertheless, the process of representation can be defined so as to include both natural and artificial (e.g., linguistic or pictorial) representing.
  •  81
    The papers in this volume of Consciousness & Emotion Book Series are organized around the theme of "enaction.
  •  32
    Machine understanding and the chinese room
    Philosophical Psychology 2 (2): 207-15. 1989.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the inten…Read more
  •  63
    Emergence and the uniqueness of consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10): 47-59. 2001.
    This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness arises from the forced blending of components that are incompatible, or even logically contradictory, when combined by direct methods available to the subject; and that it is, as a result, analytically, ostensively and comparatively indefinable. First, I examine a variety of cases in which unpredictable novelties arise from the forced merging of contradictory elements, or at least elements that are unable in human experience to co-occur. The point …Read more
  • The unity of consciousness: An enactivist approach
    with Ralph D. Ellis
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4): 225-280. 2005.
    The enactivist account of consciousness posits that motivated activation of sensorimotor action imagery anticipates possible action affordances of environmental situations, resulting in representation of the environment with a conscious “feel” associated with the valences motivating the anticipations. This approach makes the mind–body problem and the problem of mental causation easier to resolve, and offers promise for understanding how consciousness results from natural processes. Given a proce…Read more
  • Representation in Theories of Embodied Cognition
    Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T): 66-82. 2012.
    This paper looks at a central issue with embodiment theories in cognition: the role, if any, they provide for mental representation. Thelen and Smith hold that the concept of representations is either vacuous or misapplied in such systems. Others maintain a place for representations , but are imprecise about their nature and role. It is difficult to understand what those could be if representations are understood in the same sense as that used by computationalists: fixed or long-lasting neural s…Read more
  •  110
    Introspection and perception
    Topoi 7 (March): 25-30. 1988.
      Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s…Read more
  •  32
    Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining, both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach is timely. But a large vision requires …Read more
  •  18
    The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization--An Anthology (edited book)
    with Ralph D. Ellis
    John Benjamins. 2000.
    CHAPTER 1 Integrating the Physiological and Phenomenological Dimensions of Affect and Motivation Ralph D. Ellis Clark Atlanta University A neglected but ...
  •  25
    Machine understanding and the chinese room
    Philosophical Psychology 1 (2). 1988.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the inten…Read more
  •  32
    Error in action and belief
    Philosophia 19 (4): 363-401. 1989.
  •  14
    Arguing about consciousness: A blind Alley and a red Herring
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 162-163. 1999.
    O'Brien & Opie hold that phenomenal experience should be identified with “stable patterns of activation” across the brain's neural networks, and that this proposal has the potential for closing the ‘explanatory gap' between mental states and brain processes. I argue that they have too much respect for the conceivability argument and that their proposal already does much to close the explanatory gap, but that a “perspicuous nexus” can in principle never be achieved.
  •  30
    Introspection and the secret agent
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4): 629-629. 1999.
    The notion of introspection is unparsimonious and unnecessary to explain the experiential grounding of our mentalistic concepts. Instead, we can look at subtle proprioceptive experiences, such as the experience of agency in planning motor acts, which may be explained in part by the phenomenon of collateral discharge or efference copy. Proprioceptive sensations experienced during perceptual and motor activity may account for everything that has traditionally been attributed to a special mental ac…Read more
  •  24
    Experience and imagery
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (4): 475-87. 1983.
  • Alfred R. Mele: Self-deception unmasked
    Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1): 173-179. 2001.
  •  40
    The role of action representations in the dynamics of embodied cognition
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1): 58-59. 2001.
    Thelen et al. present a convincing explanation of the A-not-B error, but contrary to their own claims, their explanation essentially involves mental representations. As is too common among cognitive scientists, they equate mental representations with representations of external physical objects. They clearly show, however, that representations of bodily actions on physical objects are central to the dynamical system producing the error.
  •  32
    Foundations of Understanding
    John Benjamins. 1996.
  •  6