•  110
    Introspection and perception
    Topoi 7 (March): 25-30. 1988.
      Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s…Read more
  •  81
    The papers in this volume of Consciousness & Emotion Book Series are organized around the theme of "enaction.
  •  63
    Emergence and the uniqueness of consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10): 47-59. 2001.
    This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness arises from the forced blending of components that are incompatible, or even logically contradictory, when combined by direct methods available to the subject; and that it is, as a result, analytically, ostensively and comparatively indefinable. First, I examine a variety of cases in which unpredictable novelties arise from the forced merging of contradictory elements, or at least elements that are unable in human experience to co-occur. The point …Read more
  •  59
    Three paradoxes of phenomenal consciousness: Bridging the explanatory gap
    with Ralph D. Ellis
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4): 419-42. 1998.
    Any physical explanation of consciousness seems to leave unresolved the ‘explanatory gap': Isn't it conceivable that all the elements in that explanation could occur, with the same information processing outcomes as in a conscious process, but in the absence of consciousness? E.g. any digital computational process could occur in the absence of consciousness. To resolve this dilemma, we propose a biological-process-oriented physiological- phenomenological characterization of consciousness that ad…Read more
  •  45
    The art of representation: Support for an enactive approach
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3): 411-411. 2004.
    Grush makes an important contribution to a promising way of viewing mental representation: as a component activity in sensorimotor processes. Grush shows that there need be no entities in our heads that would count as representations, but that, nevertheless, the process of representation can be defined so as to include both natural and artificial (e.g., linguistic or pictorial) representing.
  •  45
    The interdependence of consciousness and emotion
    with Ralph D. Ellis
    Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1): 1-10. 2000.
  •  40
    The role of action representations in the dynamics of embodied cognition
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1): 58-59. 2001.
    Thelen et al. present a convincing explanation of the A-not-B error, but contrary to their own claims, their explanation essentially involves mental representations. As is too common among cognitive scientists, they equate mental representations with representations of external physical objects. They clearly show, however, that representations of bodily actions on physical objects are central to the dynamical system producing the error.
  •  32
    Machine understanding and the chinese room
    Philosophical Psychology 2 (2): 207-15. 1989.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the inten…Read more
  •  32
    Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining, both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach is timely. But a large vision requires …Read more
  •  32
    Error in action and belief
    Philosophia 19 (4): 363-401. 1989.
  •  32
    Foundations of Understanding
    John Benjamins. 1996.
  •  30
    Problem reprezentacji w teoriach poznania ucieleśnionego
    Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T). 2012.
    This paper looks at a central issue with embodiment theories in cognition: the role, if any, they provide for mental representation. Thelen and Smith hold that the concept of representations is either vacuous or misapplied in such systems. Others maintain a place for representations, but are imprecise about their nature and role. It is difficult to understand what those could be if representations are understood in the same sense as that used by computationalists: fixed or long-lasting neural st…Read more
  •  30
    Introspection and the secret agent
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4): 629-629. 1999.
    The notion of introspection is unparsimonious and unnecessary to explain the experiential grounding of our mentalistic concepts. Instead, we can look at subtle proprioceptive experiences, such as the experience of agency in planning motor acts, which may be explained in part by the phenomenon of collateral discharge or efference copy. Proprioceptive sensations experienced during perceptual and motor activity may account for everything that has traditionally been attributed to a special mental ac…Read more
  •  25
    Machine understanding and the chinese room
    Philosophical Psychology 1 (2). 1988.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the inten…Read more
  •  24
    Experience and imagery
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (4): 475-87. 1983.
  •  22
    Consciousness, qualia, and re-entrant signaling
    Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1): 21-41. 1991.
    There is a distinction between phenomenal properties and the "phenomenality" of those properties: e.g. between what red is like and what it is like to experience red. To date, reductive accounts explain the former, but not the latter: Nagel is right that they leave something out. This paper attempts a reductive account of what it is like to have a perceptual experience. Four features of such experience are distinguished: the externality, unity, and self-awareness belonging to the content of cons…Read more
  •  18
    The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization--An Anthology (edited book)
    with Ralph D. Ellis
    John Benjamins. 2000.
    CHAPTER 1 Integrating the Physiological and Phenomenological Dimensions of Affect and Motivation Ralph D. Ellis Clark Atlanta University A neglected but ...
  •  17
    Humphreys solution
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4): 62-66. 2000.
    [opening paragraph]: It is easy to conceptualize a problem in a way that prevents a solution. If the conceptualization is entrenched in one's culture or profession, it may appear unalterable. But there is so much precedent for the discovery of fruitful reconceptualizations that in the case of most philosophical and scientific puzzles it is probably irrational ever to give up trying. The notion of qualia, understood as phenomenal properties of sensations that can exist as objects of experience fo…Read more
  •  16
    The sensorimotor theory of cognition
    Pragmatics and Cognition 1 (2): 267-305. 1993.
    The sensorimotor theory of cognition holds that human cognition, along with that of other animals, is determined by sensorimotor structures rather than by uniquely human linguistic structures. The theory has been offered to explain the use of bodily terminology in nonphysical contexts, and to recognize the role of experienced embodiment in cognition. This paper defends a version of the theory which specifies that reasoning makes use of mental models constructed by means of action-planning mechan…Read more
  •  15
    Acting and perceiving in body and mind
    Philosophy Research Archives 11 407-429. 1985.
    In this paper I sketch an account of (a) the origin of the terms and concepts of folk psychology, and (b) the true nature of mental states. I argue that folk psychology is built on metaphors for the functioning physical body, and that mental states are neurological traces which serve as schematic ‘mental images’ of those same functions. Special attention is paid to the folk psychology of self-consciousness. In particular, I argue that the notion of introspection is mistaken, and I criticize rece…Read more
  •  14
    Arguing about consciousness: A blind Alley and a red Herring
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 162-163. 1999.
    O'Brien & Opie hold that phenomenal experience should be identified with “stable patterns of activation” across the brain's neural networks, and that this proposal has the potential for closing the ‘explanatory gap' between mental states and brain processes. I argue that they have too much respect for the conceivability argument and that their proposal already does much to close the explanatory gap, but that a “perspicuous nexus” can in principle never be achieved.
  •  11
    Experience and Imagery
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (4): 475-487. 1982.
  •  10
  •  7
    Acting and Perceiving in Body and Mind
    Philosophy Research Archives 11 407-429. 1985.
    In this paper I sketch an account of the origin of the terms and concepts of folk psychology, and the true nature of mental states. I argue that folk psychology is built on metaphors for the functioning physical body, and that mental states are neurological traces which serve as schematic ‘mental images’ of those same functions. Special attention is paid to the folk psychology of self-consciousness. In particular, I argue that the notion of introspection is mistaken, and I criticize recent claim…Read more