• Restricted composition
    In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics, Blackwell. 2008.
  •  410
    This piece is a contribution to a book symposium on Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz's _Nothing to Come: A Defense of the Growing Block Theory of Time_. I start by considering one of the main objections that has been raised against the Growing Block Theory, namely, the Epistemic Objection, together with Correia and Rosenkranz's response to that objection. This leads to a question about whether Correia and Rosenkranz’s view is a Four-Dimensionalist version of the Growing Block Theory or a Thre…Read more
  •  1690
    Five New Arguments for The Dynamic Theory of Time
    Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1): 158-181. 2022.
    According to The Static Theory of Time, time is like space in various ways, and there is no such thing as the passage of time. According to The Dynamic Theory of Time, on the other hand, time is very different from space, and the passage of time is an all-too-real phenomenon. This paper first offers some suggestions about how we should understand these two theories, and then introduces five new arguments for The Dynamic Theory of Time.
  •  328
    Many of the leading accounts of what makes a life meaningful are goal-based theories, according to which it is the pursuit of some specific goal (such as love for things that are worthy of love) that gives meaning to our lives. In this chapter I consider how these goal-based theories of meaning in life interact with the two main theories of the nature of time that have been defended in the recent metaphysics literature, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time and The Static Theory of Time. I argue th…Read more
  •  64
    The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past
    Disputatio 12 (57): 137-165. 2020.
    I argue that time travel to the past is impossible, given a certain metaphysical theory, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time. I first spell out my particular way of capturing the difference between The Dynamic Theory of Time and its rival, The Static Theory of Time. Next I offer four different arguments for the conclusion that The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. Then I argue that, even if I am wrong about this, it will still be true that The Dynamic…Read more
  •  1621
    Sideways music
    Analysis (1). 2019.
    There is a popular theory in the metaphysics of time according to which time is one of four similar dimensions that make up a single manifold that is appropriately called spacetime. One consequence of this thesis is that changing an object’s orientation in the manifold does not change its intrinsic features. In this paper I offer a new argument against this popular theory. I claim that an especially good performance of a particularly beautiful piece of music, when oriented within the manifold in…Read more
  •  1
    A Defense of Presentism
    In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 1, Oxford University Press Uk. 2004.
  • Time
    In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, . 2014.
  •  15
    Two Arguments from Sider's Four‐Dimensionalism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3): 665-673. 2004.
    Theodore Sider’s Four-Dimensionalism is a well-organized and clearly written book that is chock-full of important arguments. Both friends and foes of the views defended by Sider will benefit enormously from careful study of the book. I am going to focus on just two of Sider’s many arguments for Four-Dimensionalism: his argument from vagueness, which I take to be the most important and powerful argument in the book, and his argument from time travel, which I find to be the funnest to think about.
  •  128
    Do You Know That You Are Not a Brain in a Vat?
    Logos and Episteme 5 (2): 161-181. 2014.
    The topic of this paper is the familiar problem of skepticism about the external world. How can you know that you are not a brain in a vat being fooled byalien scientists? And if you can't know that, how can you know anything about the external world? The paper assumes Evidentialism as a theory about justification, and then argues that you are justified in believing that you are not a brain in a vat, in virtue of the fact that your evidence supports that belief. The paper also considers a number…Read more
  •  2852
    A compatibilist version of the theory of agent causation
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3): 257-277. 1999.
    The problem of freedom and determinism has vexed philosophers for several millennia, and continues to be a topic of lively debate today. One of the proposed solutions to the problem that has received a great deal of attention is the Theory of Agent Causation. While the theory has enjoyed its share of advocates, and perhaps more than its share of critics, the theory’s advocates and critics have always agreed on one thing: the Theory of Agent Causation is an incompatibilist theory. That is, …Read more
  •  506
    Soc it to me? Reply to McDaniel on maxcon simples
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2). 2004.
    I raised the following question in a recent paper: What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object's being a simple? And I proposed and defended this answer (which I called 'MaxCon'): Necessarily, x is a simple iff x is a maximally continuous object. In a more recent paper, Kris McDaniel raises several objections to MaxCon, including, in particular, two objections based on a principle about the supervenience of constitution that he calls 'SoC'. The purpose of the present p…Read more
  •  10
    Semantics, Tense, and Time (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 98 (6): 325-329. 2001.
  •  2111
    Identifying the problem of personal identity
    In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity, Mit Press. pp. 129. 2010.
    This paper has two main aims. The first is to propose a new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity. The second is to show that the metaphysical picture that underlies my proposal has important implications for the 3D/4D debate. I start by spelling out several of the old ways of characterizing the problem of personal identity and saying what I think is wrong with each of them. Next I present and motivate some metaphysical principles concerning property instantiations that underlie…Read more
  •  35
    A Simple Solution to the Two Envelope Problem
    Logos and Episteme 2 (3): 347-357. 2011.
    Various proposals have been made for solving The Two Envelope Problem. But even though the problem itself is easily stated and quite simple, the proposedsolutions have not been. Some involve calculus, some involve considerations about infinite values, and some are complicated in other ways. Moreover, there is not yet any one solution that is widely accepted as correct. In addition to being notable for its simplicity and its lack of a generally agreed-upon solution, The Two Envelope Problem is al…Read more
  •  1656
    What are physical objects?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2): 375-395. 2000.
    The concept of a physical object has figured prominently in the history of philosophy, and is probably more important now than it has ever been before. Yet the question What are physical objects?, i.e., What is the correct analysis of the concept of a physical object?, has received surprisingly little attention. The purpose of this paper is to address this question. I consider several attempts at answering the question, and give my reasons for preferring one of them over its rivals. The account …Read more
  •  317
    An Introduction to Metaphysics
    Cambridge University Press. 2010.
    This book is an accessible introduction to the central themes of contemporary metaphysics. It carefully considers accounts of causation, freedom and determinism, laws of nature, personal identity, mental states, time, material objects, and properties, while inviting students to reflect on metaphysical problems. The philosophical questions discussed include: What makes it the case that one event causes another event? What are material objects? Given that material objects exist, do such things as …Read more
  •  944
    Two Arguments from Sider’s Four-Dimensionalism (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3). 2004.
    In this essay for a PPR book symposium on Theodore Sider's _Four-Dimensionalism<D>, I focus on two of Sider's arguments for four-dimensionalism: (i) his argument from vagueness, and (ii) his argument from time travel. Concerning (i), I first show that Sider's argument commits him to certain strange consequences that many four-dimensionalists may not endorse, and then I discuss an objection that involves appealing to 'brutal composition', the view that there is no informative answer to Peter van …Read more
  •  40
    Rossian Minimalism
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1): 1-17. 2009.
    The main question addressed in this paper is: What is the most promising ethical theory that can be formulated in terms of the notion of a prima facie duty? I try to show that the answer to this question involves an ethical theory that, despite never having been discussed, is nevertheless worthy of serious consideration. The theory, Rossian Minimalism, says, roughly, that an act, A, is morally right iff no alternative to A would constitute less of a violation of prima facie duties than A
  •  26
    O Paradoxo da Pergunta
    Disputatio (1): 22-25. 1996.
    001-2
  •  1437
    How fast does time pass?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 829-844. 1993.
    I believe that time passes. In the last one hundred years or so, many philosophers have rejected this view. Those who have done so have generally been motivated by at least one of three different arguments: (i) McTaggart's argument, (ii) an argument from the theory of relativity, and (iii) an argument concerning the alleged incoherence of talk about the rate of the passage of time. There has been a great deal of literature on McTaggart's argument (although no concensus has been reached).1 There …Read more
  •  42
    A Compatibilist Version Of The Theory Of Agent Causation
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3): 257-277. 2002.
    The Theory of Agent Causation has always been formulated as an incompatibilist view, but I think that this has been a mistake. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what agent causation theorists and their opponents have always believed, the most plausible version of the Theory of Agent Causation is actually a compatibilist version of that theory. I formulate the traditional version of the Theory of Agent Causation, and consider a series of objections to it and related views. With …Read more
  •  35
    The Paradox of the Question
    Analysis 57 (2): 95-97. 1997.
  •  1285
    A Spatial Approach to Mereology
    In Shieva Keinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    When do several objects compose a further object? The last twenty years have seen a great deal of discussion of this question. According to the most popular view on the market, there is a physical object composed of your brain and Jeremy Bentham’s body. According to the second-most popular view on the market, there are no such objects as human brains or human bodies, and there are also no atoms, rocks, tables, or stars. And according to the third-ranked view, there are human bodies, but still no…Read more
  •  1209
    Simples, Stuff, and Simple People
    The Monist 87 (3): 405-428. 2004.
    Here is a question about mereological simples that I raised in a recent paper.
  •  1441
    Physical objects are the most familiar of all objects, and yet the concept of a physical object remains elusive. Any six-year-old can give you a dozen examples of physical objects, and most people with at least one undergraduate course in philosophy can also give examples of non-physical objects. But if asked to produce a definition of ‘physical object’ that adequately captures the distinction between the physical and the nonphysical, the average person can offer little more than hand-waving.
  •  425
    On language and the passage of time
    Philosophical Studies 66 (1). 1992.
    Since the early part of this century there has been a considerable amount of discussion of the question 'Does time pass?'. A useful way of approaching the debate over the passage of time is to consider the following thesis: The space-time thesis (SPT): Time is similar to the dimensions of space in at least this one respect: there is no set of properties such that (i) these properties are possessed by time, (ii) these properties are not possessed by any dimension of space, and (iii) in virtue of …Read more
  •  14
    Current periodical articles 673
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 672-673. 1993.