•  78
    The multiverse hypothesis is one of the leading proposed explanations of cosmic fine-tuning for life. One common objection to the multiverse hypothesis is that, even if it were true, it would not explain why this universe, our universe, is fine-tuned for life. To think it would so explain is allegedly to commit “the inverse gambler's fallacy.” This paper presents what the inverse gambler's fallacy is supposed to be, then surveys the discussion of it in the philosophical literature of the last 35…Read more
  •  5
    This book was written with my University of Mississippi "Philosophy of Religion" students in mind. Many of them have no prior experience with philosophy. That is why Chapter One begins with a crash course in philosophy, with an emphasis on the basic concepts in logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. While not all students may need to cover that material, quite a few will. And for the rest, a refresher never hurts. I am sure this applies to many "Philosophy of Religion" courses taught elsewhere. W…Read more
  •  137
    A future for presentism - by Craig Bourne
    Philosophical Books 49 (1): 65-67. 2008.
  •  31
    Fine-Tuning
    The Philosophers' Magazine 86 99-105. 2019.
  •  3
    Guest Editors’ Introduction
    with Jay W. Richards
    Philosophia Christi 7 (2): 247-250. 2005.
  •  227
    Fine-tuning, multiple universes, and the "this universe" objection
    with Michael J. Thrush
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1). 2003.
    When it is suggested that the fine‐tuning of the universe for life provides evidence for a cosmic designer, the multiple‐universe hypothesis is often presented as an alternative. Some philosophers object that the multiple‐universe hypothesis fails to explain why this universe is fine‐tuned for life. We suggest the “This Universe” objection is no better than the “This Planet” objection. We also fault proponents of the “This Universe” objection for presupposing that we could not have existed in an…Read more
  •  34
    God and time
    Philosophical Books 46 (1): 66-70. 2005.
  •  369
    There is no adequate definition of ?Fine-tuned for life?
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (3). 2000.
    The discovery that the universe is fine-tuned for life ? a discovery to which the phrase ?the anthropic principle? is often applied ? has prompted much extra-cosmic speculation by philosophers, theologians, and theoretical physicists. Such speculation is referred to as extra-cosmic because an inference is made to the existence either of one unobservable entity that is distinct from the cosmos and any of its parts (God) or of many such entities (multiple universes). In this article a case is moun…Read more
  •  43
    The 'why design?' Question
    In Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New waves in philosophy of religion, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 68. 2008.
  •  106
    Review of Niall Shanks, God, the Devil, and Darwin: A Critique of Intelligent Design Theory (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (5). 2004.
    In this book Niall Shanks aims to debunk thoroughly “intelligent design theory” (henceforth IDT). The aim of proponents of IDT, Shanks warns us (p. xi), “is to insinuate into public consciousness a new version of science – supernatural science – in which the God of Christianity (carefully not directly mentioned for legal and political reasons) is portrayed as the intelligent designer of the universe and its contents.” He thinks the answer to the two basic questions about IDT – “Is intelligent de…Read more
  •  51
    Why Shouldn’t Insurance Companies Know Your Genetic Information?
    Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (9999): 345-356. 2007.
    In this paper I state and reject two of the most commonly given arguments for regulating access by insurance companies to the results of genetic tests. I then argue that since we cannot assume a priori that those genetically predisposed to disease will have worse health outcomes than those not so disposed, we cannot know a priori that genetic discrimination will emerge as a major problem in a free market health insurance system. Finally, I explore the possibility of a free-market solution to the…Read more
  •  963
    The fine-tuning argument
    Philosophy Compass 4 (1): 271-286. 2009.
    The Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) is a variant of the Design Argument for the existence of God. In this paper the evidence of fine-tuning is explained and the Fine-Tuning Design Argument for God is presented. Then two objections are covered. The first objection is that fine-tuning can be explained in terms of the existence of multiple universes (the 'multiverse') plus the operation of the anthropic principle. The second objection is the 'normalizability problem'– the objection that the Fine-Tuning …Read more
  •  8
    Response to “Animal Interrupted”
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1): 134-139. 2014.
    Strong conventionalism goes wrong well before cases of transfiguration even arise. Assuming it is a “rock-bottom” form of conventionalism, it cannot deliver on its promise to resolve the classic transporter case. In the classic transporter case, the transported individual is not specified as being a member of any person-determining community, and so there is no fact of the matter whether the transported individual survives
  •  36
    This introduction has two functions. First, it apprises readers of some of the basic data, terminology, and formalisms used in contemporary discussions of the design argument while also giving a sense of the argument's history. Other pieces in this anthology – particularly those of Elliott Sober, John Leslie, Paul Davies, and Michael Ruse – cover some of the same ground. Second, it gives readers some idea of what the various contributors will say and why their contributions are important for und…Read more
  •  32
    If you have taken a college biology class, or just watched Animal Planet, you may have been struck by the startling complexity of living organisms. From the grandest mammal to the lowliest cell, life displays intricacy and structure that would put a high-paid team of engineers to shame. How could such fantastically organized, complex structures arise blindly out of unintelligent matter? Speaking of matter, why is it the way it is? Though unimaginably vast, our universe has precise features, as d…Read more
  •  25
    The design argument and natural theology
    In J. H. Brooke, F. Watts & R. R. Manning (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Natural Theology, Oxford Up. pp. 295. 2013.
    In the broadest sense, natural theology is the effort to gain knowledge of God from non-revealed sources – that is, from sources other than scripture and religious experience – but there is also a much narrower sense of natural theology: the construction of arguments for the existence of God from empirical evidence. This narrower sense is most strongly associated with the argument for God's existence from the appearance that the natural world has been constructed for a purpose. This argument is …Read more
  •  4
    Infinite Minds (review)
    Religious Studies 40 (4): 499-502. 2004.
  •  466
    Fine-Tuning, Multiple Universes, and the 'This Universe' Objection
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1). 2003.
    When it is suggested that the fine‐tuning of the universe for life provides evidence for a cosmic designer, the multiple‐universe hypothesis is often presented as an alternative. Some philosophers object that the multiple‐universe hypothesis fails to explain why this universe is fine‐tuned for life. We suggest the “This Universe” objection is no better than the “This Planet” objection. We also fault proponents of the “This Universe” objection for presupposing that we could not have existed in an…Read more
  • God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 57 (2): 139-142. 2005.
  •  196
    Recent discoveries in physics, cosmology and biochemistry have captured the public imagination and made the Design Argument - the theory that God created the world according to a specific plan - the object of renewed scientific and philosophical interest. This accessible but serious introduction to the design problem brings together new perspectives from prominent scientists and philosophers including Paul Davies, Richard Swinburne, Sir Martin Rees, Michael Behe, Elliot Sober and Peter van Inwag…Read more
  •  144
    Formulating the Precautionary Principle
    Environmental Ethics 24 (3): 263-274. 2002.
    In part one, I identify the core logical structure of the precautionary principle and distinguish it from the various key concepts that appear in the many different formulations of the principle. I survey these concepts and suggest a program of further conceptual analysis. In part two, I examine a particular version of the precautionary principle dubbed “the catastrophe principle” and criticize it in light of its similarities to the principle at work in Pascal’s Wager. I conclude with some sugge…Read more
  •  51
    Anthropocentrism, Exoplanets, and the Cosmic Perspective
    Environmental Ethics 34 (3): 275-290. 2012.
    Nonanthropocentric environmental philosophy is a response to two kinds of anthropocentrism: personal anthropocentrism, according to which being human involves the possession of some or all of a set of properties typical of persons, and biological anthropocentrism, according to which being a human involves being a member of the species Homo sapiens. Nonanthropocentric environmental philosophy itself becomes problematic when it is viewed in terms of two arguments that it often seems to imply: the …Read more
  •  77
    This volume addresses the role value judgments play in science. It is my contention that a particular research programme in modern physical cosmology rests crucially on a value judgment. Before making my case, let me introduce the following abbreviations for the following propositions.
  •  55
    A philosophical question divides the field of addiction research. Can a psychological disorder count as an addiction absent a common underlying physical basis (neurological or genetic) for every case of the disorder in the category? Or is it appropriate to categorize a disorder as an addiction if the symptoms of and diagnostic criteria for it are sufficiently similar to those of other disorders also classified as addictions—regardless of whether there is some underlying physical basis common to eac…Read more