Nicholas Caste

In this article I attempt to examine the justification for the mandatory drug testing of employees. The justification commonly assumes the form of the productivity argument which states that an employer has a proprietary right to regulate the purchased time of the employee. Since the employer may be rightfully concerned with the employee''s productive output, so this argument goes, the employer retains the right to motivate production. By extension, the employee''s behavior outside of the workplace which affects his or her productive capacity may also be regulated, including drug use which may affect this capacity. Thus it is claimed that the employer has the right to test employees for drug use and to impose sanctions when it is discovered.I argue that the implications of the productivity argument lead to unacceptable consequences and thus must be rejected. The productivity argument can be examined in light of a thought-experiment in which the reader is asked to imagine the discovery of two drugs, both of which enhance employee productivity. Calling these drugs hedonine and pononine, I imagine the first to be pleasurable to the employee while the second is accompanied by a degree of pain and discomfort. Since the mandated use of both of these imagined drugs would be consistent with the productivity argument, I maintain that the productivity argument thereby fails and so must be rejected. As employee drug testing is justified by this argument, it must also be rejected.

Corporations despite their status as legally fictitious persons are not such, and to confound them with real persons in even the minimal legal sense is to negate much of the force of the concept of rights when applied to the society. When corporations have rights individual rights become meaningless. While corporations may need some form of protection to make them financially feasible investments, they need not be given the full protection of rights which are assigned to the individual. A much attenuated version of corporate rights is warranted. I would argue against Werhane's notion of a corporation possessing “secondary rights” which can be asserted only after the claims of individual rights have been met. Ibid., p. 62.One solution to the problems raised in this essay would be to ascribe rights to individuals only. This could occur without interfering with the financial independence of the corporation by a simple legal prescription that individuals within a corporation be held responsible for their activities and that the corporation p e r se not be blamed for individual actions. This is consistent with the judgments against the Nazi war criminals who were denied the defense of justifying their actions on the basis of following orders. Responsibility for those actions which are the result of the workings of the “invisible hand” cannot be ascribed to any individual or group of individuals. Donaldson is helpful on this point in recommending an “office of social responsibility” be created as part of the corporation to monitor those actions which otherwise escape scrutiny. Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, p. 207.A more radical solution is to restructure the corporation in such a way as to introduce the element of democracy in the workplace. Opponents would argue that such a practice would diminish the profit-making potential of the corporation by limiting the discretion of the corporate officers in making decisions. Similar arguments have been advanced against the democratic state. Yet democratic states have proven to be viable institutions capable of effective action and demonstrably more survivable than the authoritarian regimes which are the analogs of the corporation.Given the current hierarchical structure of the corporation and its ability to dissolve in the face of questions of responsibility, individual accountability is the only viable solution. This requires that members of the corporation not find cover behind the “invisible hand.” This in turn necessitates the granting of a greater degree of discretionary power to corporate functionaries at all levels. We cannot be responsible for a state of affairs over which we have no effective control. The courts would make the ultimate decision as to the assignation of responsibility in particular cases of corporate crime, with the stipulation that the ascription be to an individual and not “the corporation.” By making corporate officers individually responsible for their actions a much more effective deterrent to corporate crimes would be created. Corporations can easily afford most of the fines that are imposed on them, and corporations cannot be put in prison.The view of the corporation advanced here puts it in a legal and moral position greatly inferior to that of the individual as well as the state. Consequently, corporate needs and welfare must remain a tertiary concern. The rights of the individual must figure primarily, and the welfare of the state as preserver of those rights secondarily, in social policy decisions. The libertarian vision of the corporation is therefore a misguided result of the conflation of the corporation and the individual in the legal and moral realms. Corporations and individuals are ontologically distinct entities and must be recognized as such. The failure to do so has enabled corporations to abrogate individual rights with legal and moral impunity. Such a situation is inconsistent with the demands of a rights-based democracy

The final chapter of this dissertation attempts to discover James' philosophy of mind in general. It concludes that his three methods of psychology are in fact complementary and taken together provide an intelligible, non-dualistic framework which overcame many of the problems and paradoxes of traditional epistemology while clearing the field for modern psychology. ;A closer look at the Principles, however, reveals that this is not the case. There has been a general failure on the part of these commentators to recognize that James' method included three interrelated perspectives of mental phenomena. His "phenomenology of experience" attempted to analyze the experience of consciousness without the encumbrances of traditional suppositions. Chapter I of this dissertation discusses his arguments in the Principles which propose such an analysis. ;But mentality cannot be properly understood without reference to the physical system in which it operates. Both the neurological substrata of intelligence and the environment in which mentality operates must be examined. Chapters II and III of this dissertation consider his functional and physiological analyses of mentality. These analyses are then compared to various problematic discussions by James in his later works. ;For the most part commentators have been sympathetic to James' project, citing the difficulties faced by this pioneer in the field of psychology. The dualism is taken to be methodological. In order to overcome the difficulties of introspectionism, these writers maintain, he was forced to differentiate the mental from the physical in a radical manner. He supposedly accepted a mind-body dualism in the Principles uncritically in order to get on with his science. ;William James' philosophy of mind has posed a significant problem of interpretation for commentators since the publication of The Principles of Psychology. An ambiguity arises in this work when James simultaneously postulates a dualistic psychology while rejecting the theoretical hypothesis of the soul. Going to great lengths to supplant the soul hypothesis with the alternative conception of the non-substantial "passing thought," he nevertheless retains a strict subject-object dualism.