•  110
    Persons, Stages, and Tensed Belief
    Erkenntnis 83 (3): 577-593. 2018.
    Perdurantists hold that we persons—just like other ordinary objects—persist by perduring, by having temporal parts, or stages, located over time. Perdurantists also standardly endorse the B-theory of time. And, in light of this endorsement, they typically characterize our tensed beliefs as self-ascriptions of properties, made not by us but by our stages. For instance, for me to believe that Angela Merkel is currently the chancellor of Germany is for my now-located stage to self-ascribe the prope…Read more
  •  57
    Why Contingentist Actualists Should Endorse the Barcan Formula
    Acta Analytica 38 (1): 133-159. 2023.
    On its usual interpretation, the Barcan Formula—◊∃_xB_ → ∃_x_◊_B_—says that, if there could have been something that is such and such a way, then there is something that could have been that way. It is traditionally held that contingentist actualists should—indeed, must—reject the Barcan Formula. I argue that contingentist actualists should—indeed, must—endorse the Barcan Formula, at least assuming a standard, Tarskian conception of truth and truth preservation. I end by proposing a logic for co…Read more
  •  57
    Can the Future-Like-Ours Argument Survive Ontological Scrutiny?
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (5): 667-680. 2022.
    We argue that the future-like-ours argument against abortion rests on an important assumption. Namely, in the first trimester of an aborted pregnancy, there exists something that would have gone on to enjoy conscious mental states, had the abortion not occurred. To accommodate this assumption, we argue, a proponent of the future-like-ours argument must presuppose that there is ontic vagueness. We anticipate the objection that our argument achieves “too much” because it also applies mutatis mutan…Read more
  •  36
    Vagueness: A Global Approach (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4). 2021.
    Vagueness: A Global Approach. By Fine Kit.
  •  14
    Identity Matters: Foetuses, Gametes, and Futures like Ours
    Philosophy 98 (3): 345-369. 2023.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that, despite appearances, the success of Don Marquis's well-known future-like-ours argument against abortion does not turn, in an important way, on the metaphysics of identity. I argue that this is false. The success of Marquis's argument turns on precisely two issues: first, whether it is prima facie seriously wrong to deprive something of a future like ours; second, whether, in a counterfactual circumstance in which an abortion does not occur, th…Read more
  •  6
    This book defends a novel view of mental representation—of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs—beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves—given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspect…Read more