•  1
    COHEN, G. A. "Karl Marx's Theory of History" (review)
    Mind 89 (n/a): 628. 1980.
  • The Price of Doubt
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3): 735-739. 2005.
  • Evidence and Assurance
    Philosophy 56 (215): 129-131. 1981.
  • Knowledge and Its Limits (review)
    Philosophy 76 (3): 460-475. 2001.
  •  22
    Exclusion and Sufficient Reason: N. M. L. Nathan
    Philosophy 85 (3): 391-397. 2010.
    I argue for two principles by combining which we can construct a sound cosmological argument. The first is that for any true proposition p's if ‘there is an explanation for p's truth’ is consistent then there is an explanation for p's truth. The second is a modified version of the principle that for any class, if there is an explanation for the non-emptiness of that class, then there is at least one non-member of that class which causes it not to be empty.
  •  54
    Substance Dualism Fortified: N. M. L. Nathan
    Philosophy 86 (2): 201-211. 2011.
    You have a body, but you are a soul or self. Without your body, you could still exist. Your body could be and perhaps is outlasted by the immaterial substance which is your soul or self. Thus the substance dualist. Most substance dualists are Cartesians. The self, they suppose, is essentially conscious: it cannot exist unless it thinks or wills or has experiences. In this paper I sketch out a different form of substance dualism. I suggest that it is not consciousness but another immaterial featu…Read more
  •  1
    Will and World: A Study in Metaphysics
    Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174): 122-124. 1994.
  • Necessity, Inconceivability and the "A Priori"
    with J. J. Valberg
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 56 117-155. 1982.
  • Evidence and Assurance
    Mind 90 (360): 612-614. 1981.
  •  25
    Evidence and Assurance
    Cambridge University Press. 1980.
    A systematic study of rational or justified belief, which throws fresh light on current debates about foundations and coherence theories of knowledge, the validation of induction and moral scepticism. Dr Nathan focuses attention on the largely unsatisfiable desires for active and self-conscious assurance of truth liable to be engendered by philosophical reflection about total belief-systems and the sources of knowledge. He extracts a kernel of truth from the doctrine that a regress of justificat…Read more
  •  12
  •  5
    VI—Scepticism and the Regress of Justification
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1): 77-88. 1974.
  •  57
    Murder and the death of Christ
    Think 9 (26): 103-107. 2010.
    Some people believe that God made it a condition for His forgiveness even of repentant sinners that Jesus died a sacrificial death at human hands. Often, in the New Testament, this doctrine of Objective Atonement seems to be implied, as when Jesus spoke of his blood as ‘shed for many for the remission of sins’ , or when St Paul said that ‘Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures’ . And for many centuries the doctrine was indeed accepted by most if not all Christian theologians. It se…Read more
  • Freedom and Belief
    Philosophical Books 29 (1): 48-50. 1988.
  •  10
    The Good and the True
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 494-496. 1995.
  •  32
    Necessity, Inconceivability and the "A Priori"
    with J. J. Valberg
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 56 (1). 1982.
  •  11
  •  22
  •  60
    Admiration: A New Obstacle
    Philosophy 72 (281). 1997.
  •  62
    Exclusion and sufficient reason
    Philosophy 85 (3): 391-397. 2010.
    I argue for two principles by combining which we can construct a sound cosmological argument. The first is that for any true proposition p's if 'there is an explanation for p's truth' is consistent then there is an explanation for p's truth. The second is a modified version of the principle that for any class, if there is an explanation for the non-emptiness ofthat class, then there is at least one non-member ofthat class which causes it not to be empty
  •  33
    Self and will
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1). 1997.
    When do two mental items belong to the same life? We could be content with the answer -just when they have certain volitional qualities in common. An affinity is noted between that theory and Berkeley's early doctrine of the self. Some rivals of the volitional theory invoke a spiritual or physical owner of mental items. They run a risk either of empty formality or of causal superstition. Other rivals postulate a non-transitive and symmetrical relation in the set of mental items. They must allow …Read more
  •  67
    Naturalism and self-defeat: Plantinga's version
    Religious Studies 33 (2): 135-142. 1997.
    In "Warrant and Proper Function" Plantinga argues that atheistic Naturalism is self-defeating. What is the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given this Naturalism and an evolutionary explanation of their origins? Plantinga argues that if the Naturalist is modest enough to believe that it is irrational to have any belief as to the value of this probability, then he is irrational even to believe his own Naturalism. I suggest that Plantinga's argument has a false premise, and t…Read more
  •  69
    Book review. The nature of perception John Foster (review)
    Mind 110 (438): 455-460. 2001.