Nicholas Whittaker

In this essay, I sketch a preliminary, phenomenological definition of black horror cinema. I argue that black horror films are films in which blackness and antiblackness are depicted as unintelligible. I build this definition first by arguing that horror films generally evoke a mood of Heideggerian uncanniness, by which I mean that they create a global affective state in which the world is experienced as unintelligible. I then turn to the Afropessimist theorizing of Frank B. Wilderson, who proposes both that blackness and antiblackness are phenomenologically graspable as unintelligible, and that cinema resists this unintelligibility by warping blackness and antiblackness. However, I thus contend that black horror is an exception to this rule. Black horror films take advantage of horror’s uncanny mood to craft a filmic world in which blackness and anti blackness are unintelligible.

Much theorizing on the aesthetics of nature focuses on its uniqueness qua nature. An overly-inflated sense of the ethical and aesthetic normative force of this focus has resulted in a general paucity of philosophical investigation into artified nature. The investigations that do exist typically refuse to or are unable to marshall the theoretical resources of nature aesthetics, which are taken to only apply to live nature. Here, I resist such wing-clipping by taking artified nature–specifically, filmed nature–to deserve its own discrete theorizing while nonetheless insisting upon, and taking full advantage of, a robust connection between filmed and live nature. I do so by arguing that cinema can successfully remediate an important, and unique, element of the aesthetic experience of live nature: namely, its engaged environmental character.

Contemporary philosophy of art generally assumes that aesthetic experience is constituted by a certain ontological-phenomenological structure: the apprehension by a subject of an object. This article explores an underexamined critique of this philosophical model found within the black intellectual and artistic tradition. I will specifically focus on the version of this critique proposed by the similarly underexamined black philosophers Adrian Piper and Fred Moten. This critique, which I dub the subjectivizing concern, takes issue with the notion of ontological distance that I argue defines the subject-object model. I define ontological distance as the removal and alienation of the subject’s fundamental sense of self from that of so-called objects. The subjectivizing concern holds that this distance is not value neutral. Rather, the subject-object model is considered to be directly entwined with projects and practices of aesthetic and extraesthetic racism and antiblackness. After offering Piper’s own model of aesthetic experience—which she dubs catalysis—as an alternative, I propose three possible ways in which the subject-object model can be conceived as tied to antiblack racism.

In this chapter, the author argues that Avatar: the Last Airbender ( ATLA ) actually provides us with what the he will call an abolitionist philosophical account. Abolitionism is a theory of justice – derived primarily from the work of Black radicals – built on claims that global and local injustices can be explained by evil institutions or ways of life that cannot be reformed or changed, but that must be abolished. The world of ATLA is built on a very specific metaphysical picture, the idea that the world is made up of the four elements. The natural causes the social, and so the latter ends up taking the shape of the former. The connection between the nations and the elements is deeper than production design. The swamp is not just an entire ecosystem, consisting of varied and distinct elements, but is in fact “one big, living organism”, a unity.