My research interests lie primarily within epistemology and ethics, but extend to issues in the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and the theory of rationality. Most of my work to date has focused on the nature and limits of normative guidance, ‘ought-implies-can’ principles, questions about what normative and metaphysical roles knowledge plays, and the relationship between knowledge and rationality. Recently I’ve published a number of papers about the possibility, nature, and scope of epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting, and so jointly unsatisfiable, epistemic requirements. I'm curr…
My research interests lie primarily within epistemology and ethics, but extend to issues in the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and the theory of rationality. Most of my work to date has focused on the nature and limits of normative guidance, ‘ought-implies-can’ principles, questions about what normative and metaphysical roles knowledge plays, and the relationship between knowledge and rationality. Recently I’ve published a number of papers about the possibility, nature, and scope of epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting, and so jointly unsatisfiable, epistemic requirements. I'm currently working on a new project on non-ideal epistemic rationality.