•  9
    The innocent eye: Seeing-as without concepts
    American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1): 17. 2011.
    Can one see one thing as another without possessing a concept of it? The answer to this question is intuitively negative. This is because seeing x as F is usually taken to consist in the application of the concept F to x . Seeing the duck-rabbit figure as a duck figure, for instance, involves applying the concept DUCK to the figure; thus, one cannot see the figure as the figure of a duck unless one has the concept of a duck and is able to deploy it when looking at the figure. Nearly by definitio…Read more
  •  671
    Visual Switching: The Illusion of Instantaneity and Visual Search
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4): 469-480. 2012.
    This paper questions two prima facie plausible claims concerning switching in the presence of ambiguous figures. The first is the claim that reversing is an instantaneous process. The second is the claim that the ability to reverse demonstrates the interpretive, inferential and constructive nature of visual processing. Empirical studies show that optical and cerebral events related to switching protract in time in a way that clashes with its perceived instantaneity. The studies further suggest a…Read more
  •  460
    Embedded seeing-as: Multi-stable visual perception without interpretation
    Philosophical Psychology 25 (4): 1-19. 2012.
    Standard models of visual perception hold that vision is an inferential or interpretative process. Such models are said to be superior to competing, non-inferential views in explanatory power. In particular, they are said to be capable of explaining a number of otherwise mysterious, visual phenomena such as multi-stable perception. Multi-stable perception paradigmatically occurs in the presence of ambiguous figures, single images that can give rise to two or more distinct percepts. Different int…Read more
  •  419
    Holistic realism: A response to Katz on holism and intuition
    with Michael D. Resnik
    Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4): 301-315. 2003.
  •  786
    Ambiguous figures and representationalism
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3): 307-323. 2011.
    Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect s…Read more
  •  422
    Are sensory properties represented in perceptual experience?
    Philosophical Psychology 23 (6): 721-740. 2010.
    Philosophers of perception widely agree that sensory properties, like color, are represented in perceptual experience. Arguments are usually needed to establish that something other than sensory properties, for example three-dimensional objects or kind properties, are part of perceptual content. Call the idea that sensory properties are represented in perceptual experience the Sensation View (SV). Given its widespread acceptance, we may expect to find strong reasons for holding SV. In this paper…Read more
  •  21
    Reversing as a dynamic process variability of Ocular and brain events in perceptual switching
    with Hironori Nakatani and Cees van Leeuwen
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6): 5-6. 2012.
    We investigated the possible causes of perceptual switching in ambiguous figures. Ambiguous figures are a special class of visual stimuli that can give rise to at least two alternative interpretations. Because the figures themselves stay the same, these stimuli are particularly suitable to study the dynamic changes in our visual apparatus that enable us to see the world in different ways. Recent studies stress the importance of both low-level and high-level processes in switching. We show that t…Read more
  •  61
    Bayesian Perception Is Ecological Perception
    Philosophical Topics 44 (2): 327-351. 2016.
    There is a certain excitement in vision science concerning the idea of applying the tools of bayesian decision theory to explain our perceptual capacities. Bayesian models are thought to be needed to explain how the inverse problem of perception is solved, and to rescue a certain constructivist and Kantian way of understanding the perceptual process. Anticlimactically, I argue both that bayesian outlooks do not constitute good solutions to the inverse problem, and that they are not constructivis…Read more
  •  88
    Predictive perceptual systems
    Synthese 195 (6): 2367-2386. 2018.
    This article attempts to clarify the commitments of a predictive coding approach to perception. After summarizing predictive coding theory, the article addresses two questions. Is a predictive coding perceptual system also a Bayesian system? Is it a Kantian system? The article shows that the answer to these questions is negative.
  •  39
    Why does the world look to us as it does? As Nico Orlandi argues, it is simply because of how the world is. This answer emerges from understanding vision as situated in a structured environment, and it contrasts with the view that visual perception involves an inference.