•  17
    Complicity and hypocrisy
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (2): 154-181. 2020.
    This article offers a justification for accommodating claims of conscience. The standard justification points to the pain that acting against one’s conscience entails. But that defense cannot make sense of the state’s refusal to accommodate individuals where the law interferes with their deeply meaningful but nonmoral projects. An alternative justification, we argue, arises once one recognizes the connection between conscience and moral address: One’s lived moral convictions determine when and w…Read more
  •  29
    How do rights relate to moral complaints? What is the relationship between our moral entitlements---the obligations that are owed to us---and the moral complaints that we can make---our claims to have been wronged?
  •  157
    The Puzzle of the Beneficiary's Bargain
    Tulane Law Review 90 75-128. 2015.
    This Article describes a jurisprudential puzzle—what I call the puzzle of the beneficiary’s bargain—and contends that adequately resolving this puzzle will require significant revisions to basic premises of contract law. The puzzle arises when one party enters into two contracts requiring the same performance, and the promisee of the second contract is the third-party beneficiary of the first. For example, a taxi driver contracts with a woman to transport her parents from the airport next week,…Read more
  •  158
    A Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law
    University of Pennsylvania Law Review 164 1131-1175. 2016.
    This Article draws attention to a conceptual point that has been overlooked in recent discussions about the theoretical foundations of contract law. I argue that, rather than enforcing the obligations of promises, contract law concerns complaints against promissory wrongs. This conceptual distinction is easy to miss. If one assumes that complaints arise whenever an obligation has been violated, then the distinction does not seem meaningful. I show, however, that an obligation can be breached wit…Read more
  •  81
    The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving
    Philosophical Review 126 (2): 241-272. 2017.
    This essay defends the possibility of preemptive forgiving, that is, forgiving before the offending action has taken place. This essay argues that our moral practices and emotions admit such a possibility, and it attempts to offer examples to illustrate this phenomenon. There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emo…Read more
  •  90
    Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (2): 109-143. 2015.