•  12
    Morality and Action
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3): 729-732. 1997.
  •  14
    Value... And What Follows
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2): 492-495. 2001.
    Joel Kupperman’s Value…And What Follows ranges widely over topics in value theory, moral epistemology, normative ethics and political philosophy. Given its breadth, and the generally high quality of the discussion, Kupperman’s work should interest philosophers working in one or more of these areas. The book is divided into three parts, entitled “Axiology”, “Axiology and Conduct”, and “Axiology and Social Choice”. The first part on axiology receives the most attention and consists of five chapter…Read more
  • Organic Unities, Summation, and the Problem of Evil
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9 165-182. 2019.
  •  5
    The Nature of Intrinsic Value
    Mind 112 (447): 587-590. 2003.
  •  5
    Promising, Intending, and Moral Autonomy
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4): 685-688. 1987.
  •  4
    Editorial
    with Wim Dubbink
    Journal of Ethics 1-1. forthcoming.
  •  4
    Editorial
    with Wim Dubbink
    Journal of Ethics 23 (1): 1-2. 2019.
  •  14
    Love, Beneficence, and the Hedonic Constraint
    American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3): 259-268. 2016.
    In this paper, I present briefly a view about intrinsic value, one connected to the concepts of ethically required attitudes of favor, disfavor, and preference. If lives can have both welfare value and intrinsic value, how are these values related? I defend the view that the welfare value of a life does not track the intrinsic value of that life. Some philosophers, however, deny that anything can have intrinsic value or absolute value. Some argue that to hold that something is both bad for a per…Read more
  •  11
    Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 829-832. 1994.
  •  56
    Higher Goods and the Myth of Tithonus
    Journal of Philosophy 90 (9): 482-496. 1993.
  •  57
    Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant
    Cambridge University Press. 1994.
    This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including cohe…Read more
  • Egoism and the Concept of One's Own Good
    Dissertation, Brown University. 1983.
    There are two main tasks which I undertake in this thesis. First, I consider critically certain concepts of one's own good and the relation of these concepts to egoism. I distinguish between subjective and objective views of one's own good and argue that no subjective account, such as that offered by R. B. Brandt, is satisfactory. I attempt to provide an objective account of one's own good which is compatible with Moore's criticisms of the concept of "good for me". Unfortunately, the objective a…Read more
  •  27
    The Bearers of Intrinsic Value
    In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer. pp. 181--190. 2005.
  •  9
    The Concept of Intrinsic Value
    In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer. pp. 17--31. 2005.
  •  16
    Chisholm's Definition of Organic Unity
    In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer. pp. 319--323. 2005.
  •  126
    Review: Michael Huemer: Ethical Intuitionism (review)
    Mind 117 (466): 483-486. 2008.
  •  53
    Common Sense and A Priori Epistemology
    The Monist 81 (3): 473-487. 1998.
    Some philosophers have adopted both a commonsense approach to the theory of knowledge and held that some epistemic principles are knowable a priori. Roderick Chisholm is a prominent example of a philosopher who does both. In The Problem of the Criterion, Chisholm holds that in attempting to discover criteria of evidence we should begin with particular commonsense examples of knowledge, such as I know that I have two hands and I know that there are other people. According to Chisholm, our knowled…Read more
  •  40
    Moral goodness, esteem, and acting from duty
    Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (2): 103-117. 1991.
    There is a long tradition in moral philosophy which maintains that a necessary condition for moral goodness is that one act from a sense of duty. Kant is perhaps the best known and most discussed representative of this view, but one finds others prior to Kant, such as Butler and Price, and Kant's contemporaries, such as Reid, expressing similar ideas. Price, for example writes, ". . . what I have chiefly insisted on, is, that we characterize as virtuous no actions flowing merely from instinctive…Read more
  •  10
    Two types of epistemic evaluative cognitivism
    Philosophical Studies 49 (3). 1986.
  •  46
  •  15
    Brandt on rationality, value, and morality
    Philosophical Studies 45 (1). 1984.
  • Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense
    Philosophy 81 (315): 165-170. 2006.
  •  2
    Self- Evidence and Principia Ethica
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 451-464. 1985.
  •  27
    Self- Evidence and Principia Ethica
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 451-464. 1985.