•  312
    Emotions and Process Rationality
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3): 531-546. 2021.
    ABSTRACT Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski’s argument from rational…Read more
  •  229
    The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion rema…Read more
  •  116
    What Makes Something Surprising?
    with Dan Baras
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive-neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this abstract and yet there is nothing surprising about …Read more
  •  97
    Can we intend the past?
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3): 304-311. 2017.
    First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one's present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace's notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offer reason to think that the rationality of retrospe…Read more
  •  79
    Reasons of Love: a Case against Universalism about Practical Reason
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3): 315-322. 2015.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 315-322, December 2015.
  •  65
    The Moral Significance of Shock
    In Ana Falcato & Sara Graça da Silva (eds.), The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 165-186. 2021.
    I propose that shock can be morally significant independently of its consequences but only as part of an ongoing commitment to certain norms, in particular norms that constitute recognizing another as a person. When we witness others in agony, or being severely wronged, or when we ourselves severely wrong or mistreat others, our shock can reflect our recognition of them as persons, a recognition constituted by our commitment to certain moral norms. However, if we do not in fact respond to the su…Read more
  •  61
    The fitting resolution of anger
    Philosophical Studies 177 (8): 2417-2430. 2020.
    How can we explain the rational diminution of backward-looking emotions without resorting to pragmatic or wrong kind of reason explanations? That is to say, how can the diminution of these emotions not only be rational but fitting? In this paper, I offer an answer to this question by considering the case of anger. In Sect. 1, I examine Pamela Hieronymi’s account of forgiveness as the rational resolution of resentment. I argue that Hieronymi’s account rests on an assumption about the rationality …Read more
  •  28
    The Birth of Ethics: Reconstructing the Role and Nature of Morality, by PettitPhilip, edited by HoekstraKinch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 400.
  • A meaningful life involves loving people and valuing things. We typically love our spouses, parents, children, siblings, and friends, and value our projects, activities, causes, and ideals. In virtue of such attachments, a meaningful life is also susceptible to regret of a distinctively personal kind. Our regrets about the misfortunes and harms that befall the people we love and the things we value reflect the extent to which we are implicated in the fate of those people and things, the extent, …Read more