Olanrewaju Shitta-Bey

In this paper, we examine Maduabuchi Dukor’s article titled “Divination: A Science or An Art?”, where he endeavours to demonstrate the character and nature of African science as well as explores the issue whether some practices in Africa can be accorded a scientific status. These tasks to explore and demonstrate the scientific nature of African practices led Maduabuchi Dukor to focus on divination as his working example; and specifically identified Ifa divination. In sum, Maduabuchi Dukor argues that African (Ifa) divination is or can be made a science through formalization and quantification. The main thrust of his argument is that with the aid of formalization and quantification, divination as practiced in Africa can qualify as a science. Our contention as regards this exercise by Maduabuchi Dukor runs from the beginning of the article through to the end of it. That is, our critique of the article concerns some suppositions employed to build up the argument that supports the claim that (Ifa) divination is a scientific enterprise. In other words, the premises and the conclusion so provided, we argue, are full of contestations; and it is these contestations that we showcased in this paper. It is important to make it clear that our contention has nothing to do with the thinking of Maduabuchi Dukor that Ifa divination is a science or can be made to be so; rather, our contention is the suppositions that he deployed to articulate his thought

In Yoruba written literature in any field or on any subject, one cannot find the exact word for human will; at most, one can come across related or associated words that carries meanings derivable from the meaning of this important word that denote a significant mental element in human nature. Our position is that the word ‘Ife-Inu’ is the equivalence of the human will. In other words, what is called the human will in Western conception of a person is identified as Ife-Inu in Yoruba worldview on human nature. This claim is what we hope to demonstrate in subsequent pages of this paper

The sophistication and reoccurrence of violence has continued to gain increasing attention in contemporary discourse. Scholars that take interest in the study of violence have made efforts only in understanding and addressing the causes, forms, and the management mechanism. Such intellectual efforts have proved not to be sufficiently adequate as evident by the recurring decimal of violence in limitless proportion, even in places where it has been under-studied. This inadequacy has made the need for renewed interest in the study of the nature and dynamics of violence imperative. Concerned about the lack of consideration for ontological root of violence in previous studies, this paper seeks to critically explore the ontology of violence. It aims at examining classical philosophical texts on human nature with a view to expose the ontological origin of violence and shows how such consideration is apt in the understanding, addressing, and management of violence; that is, this paper makes a case for the study of the ontology of violence as a way of addressing the lacuna currently existing in the studies on violence. Thus, it argues that this ontological study entails as a matter of necessity an understanding of human nature in relation to the subject-matter of violence. The methodology used in achieving the aim of this paper is the analytic and phenomenological approaches, that is, analysis and phenomenological examination of textual materials are employed by the study.

Discourse on human will has a long history in the Western philosophical tradition; in fact, this history is as old as the history of Western philosophy itself. In this regard, the discourse on human will remains evergreen, with changing subject-matter from one period to another. With regard to subject-matter, the discourse on human will has significant implications for other intellectual disciplines that deal with the study of human species. As such, the paper centers on the most recurring debate in the history of the discourse on human will. The paper re-examines the various controversies that have been generated by the question whether the human will is free or not. To date, this question has had serious implications for the way we construe existence in all forms. The paper re-considers the debate within the bounds of two distinct thought-systems in the Western and Yoruba philosophical traditions. Within the context of Western thought, the paper focuses on doctrines that have evolved in the attempt to address or respond to the question whether the human will is free or not. The reason for dealing with doctrines rather than individual scholars is that it avoids the unnecessary repetition of arguments. The paper examines the works of some scholars in the Yoruba tradition who have contributed to the discourse on the fundamental question; however, these contributions misrepresent Yoruba thought. Thus, the paper argues that the question of whether human will is free or not does not arise in the Yoruba philosophical system. Analytical and phenomenological methods of research are adopted in the paper. The analytic approach is important to achieve the twin goal of explanation and clarity of concepts and issues; that is, the method will afford us the opportunity to engage with the literature and subject it to critical exposition. The phenomenological approach is significant as an interpretative tool for interrogating oral account that would properly account for the notion and conception of the human will in Yoruba thought.