•  371
  •  199
    What is Wrong with the Brains of Addicts?"
    Neuroethics 10 (1): 1-8. 2016.
    In his target article and recent interesting book about addiction and the brain, Marc Lewis claims that the prevalent medical view of addiction as a brain disease or a disorder, is mistaken. In this commentary we critically examine his arguments for this claim. We find these arguments to rest on some problematical and largely undefended assumptions about notions of disease, disorder and the demarcation between them and good health. Even if addiction does seem to differ from some typical brain di…Read more
  •  116
    Dretske on knowledge and content
    Synthese 86 (March): 425-41. 1991.
    In this paper I discuss Fred Dretske's account of knowledge critically, and try to bring out how his account of informational content leads to cases of extreme epistemic good luck in his treatment of knowledge. My main interest, however, is to establish that the cases of epistemic luck arise because Dretske's account of knowledge in a fundamental way fails to take into account the role our actual recognitional capacities and powers of discrimination play in perceptually based knowledge. This res…Read more
  •  81
    Indexicals: what they are essential for
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3): 295-314. 2017.
    Cappelen and Dever have recently defended the view that indexicals are not essential: They do not signify anything philosophically deep and we do not need indexicals for any important philosophical work. This paper contests their view from the point of view of an account of intentional agency. It argues that we need indexicals essentially when accounting for what it is do something intentionally and, as a consequence, intentional action, and defends a view of intentional action as a possible con…Read more
  •  79
    A Kripkean objection to Kripke's argument against identity-theories
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (4). 1987.
    This paper analyses and criticizes S. Kripke's celebrated argument against materialist identity?theories. While criticisms of Kripke in the literature attack one or more of his premisses, an attempt is made here to show that Kripke's conclusion is unjustified even if his premisses are accepted. Kripke's premisses have sufficient independent plausibility to make this strategy interesting. Having stated Kripke's argument, it is pointed out that Kripke must assume that the contents of the Cartesian…Read more
  •  66
    Intention and alternatives
    Philosophical Studies 82 (2). 1996.
  •  55
    Experience
    Theoria 70 (2-3): 167-191. 2004.
  •  47
    Philosophy as Interdisciplinary Research
    In Hanne Andersen, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao González, Thomas Uebel & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Theoria, Springer Verlag. pp. 447--455. 2013.
  •  46
    Addiction and Responsibility: A Survey of Opinions
    with Hans Olav Melberg and Edmund Henden
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (5). 2013.
    ABSTRACT This article reports the result of a survey about causal beliefs, normative conceptions and moral evaluations of addicts and addiction in the general population. Specifically, we focused on four issues: To what extent are the normative conceptions of addiction current in the philosophical and scientific literature reflected in laypersons' conception of addiction? How do laypersons rate addicts on perceived responsibility? Which factors influence laypersons' responsibility attributions i…Read more
  •  37
    Causal explanation provides knowledge why
    In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation, Springer. pp. 69--92. 2007.
  •  37
    Tracking truth and solving puzzles
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (2). 1997.
    No abstract
  •  35
    Paradox Lost, but in which Envelope?
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3): 353-362. 2002.
    The aim of this paper is to diagnose the so-called two envelopes paradox. Many writers have claimed that there is something genuinely paradoxical in the situation with the two envelopes, and some writers are now developing non-standards theories of expected utility. I claim that there is no paradox for expected utility theory as I understand that theory, and that contrary claims are confused. Expected utility theory is completely unaffected by the two-envelope paradox.
  •  34
    A Note on Objects and Events
    Analysis 48 (1). 1988.
  •  33
    Anscombe and Davidson on Practical Knowledge. A Reply to Hunter
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (6). 2017.
    David Hunter has recently argued that Donald Davidson and Elizabeth Anscombe were in basic agreement about practical knowledge. In this reply, it is my contention that Hunter’s fascinating claim may not be satisfactorily warranted. To throw light on why, a more careful consideration of the role of the notion of practical knowledge in Anscombe’s approach to intentional action is undertaken. The result indicates a possible need to distinguish between what is called ‘practical knowledge’ and ‘ know…Read more
  •  32
    Representational content and the explanation of behaviour
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (3). 1990.
    No abstract
  •  30
    Preface
    with Herman Ruge Jervell
    Synthese 98 (1): 1-2. 1994.
  •  26
    Philosophy, Addiction and Inquiry
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (5). 2013.
    ABSTRACT This introductory paper raises, partly as a preparation for the other papers in this issue, questions about how philosophy ought to proceed in the light of knowledge we have in surrounding disciplines, with a focus on the case of addiction. It also raises issues about how addiction research might be enlightened by philosophical work. In the background for the paper are two competing approaches to the evidential grounding of philosophical insight. According to a widespread view, philosop…Read more
  •  13
    Facing Facts and Motivations
    ProtoSociology 23 159-170. 2006.
  •  10
    Om Næss, Skjervheim og den store striden i norsk filosofi
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 51 (2): 55-66. 2016.
  •  10
    Epistemiske grunner og epistemiske plikter
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 48 (2): 133-143. 2013.
    This paper inquires into some problems for a thesis about the aim of belief, expressed in normative terms along the lines that we ought to have correct or true beliefs. In particular, the paper aims to disarm the important blind-spot objections to such a view. What these objections seek to establish is that there are pretty simple truths we cannot have beliefs about, and since ought implies can, we ought not to have beliefs about these truths. It follows that there cannot be a correct normative …Read more
  •  9
    On enthusiasm in history and elsewhere
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (3): 350-364. 2021.
    ABSTRACT This paper engages in a discussion about a select few of the crucial questions raised by Jon Elster's paper on Enthusiasm and Anger in History. It focusses on enthusiasm and engages in particular with Elster's questions and arguments about whether enthusiasm is an emotion or not. In doing so, I am led to ask some general questions about current theories of emotions in the discipline of psychology and their relationship to common sense psychological notions of emotional types. I argue th…Read more
  •  9
    The Epistemology of Decision-Making “Naturalised”
    In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, Kluwer Academic Print On Demand. pp. 109--129. 2000.
  •  8
    Dagfinn Føllesdal: Et personlig og faglig portrett
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (1): 6-19. 2020.
  •  8
    Integrering, en skotsk idealist og CSMN- Svar til Alastair Hannay
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 44 (2): 158-161. 2009.
  •  5
    Freedom to Act
    In Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, Wiley. 2013.
    This chapter presents and discusses Donald Davidson's contribution to the debate about what freedom to act is, and the relationship between this contribution and Davidson's causal theory of action. It presents and evaluates issues in accounting for the content of “can x” (where “can” seems to stand for a capacity or an ability) by conditionals with “would do x” in the consequent. The discussion also throws light on the relationship between Davidson's work on the freedom issues and that of predec…Read more
  •  3
    On “Meaning and Experience”
    In Michael Frauchiger (ed.), Reference, Rationality, and Phenomenology: Themes from Føllesdal, De Gruyter. pp. 221-234. 2013.