•  28
    An Argument for Intrinsic Value Monism
    Philosophia 44 (4): 1375-1385. 2016.
    In this paper I argue that there is only one intrinsic value. I start by examining three aspects of values that are often taken to count against this suggestion: that values seem heterogeneous, that values are sometimes incommensurable, and that we sometimes experience so-called “rational regret” after having forsaken a smaller value for a greater one. These aspects, I argue, are in fact compatible with both monism and pluralism about intrinsic value. I then examine a fourth aspect: That a very …Read more
  •  18
    The Unabomber’s ethics
    Bioethics 33 (2): 223-229. 2019.
  •  16
    Smarter Babies
    Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25 (3): 515-517. 2016.
  •  14
    Bright New World
    Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25 (2): 282-287. 2016.
  •  54
    Prostitution and sexual ethics: a reply to Westin
    Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (2): 88-88. 2014.
    In ‘Is prostitution harmful?’ I argue that if casual sex is acceptable, then so is prostitution.1 Anna Westin, in ‘The harms of prostitution: critiquing Moen's argument of no-harm’, raises four objections to my view.2 Let me reply to these in turn.Westin's first objection is that it is ‘fundamentally problematic [to] categorise sexual ethics into merely two types’, the type that accepts casual sex and the type that does not. The reason why, she explains, is that this ‘incompletely frames the con…Read more
  •  25
  •  36
    Jan Narveson, This is Ethical Theory
    Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (3): 337-341. 2011.
  •  47
    The case for cryonics
    Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (8): 677-681. 2015.
  •  56
    Cosmetic surgery
    Think 11 (31): 73-79. 2012.
  •  36
    Prostitution and harm: a reply to Anderson and McDougall
    Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (2): 84-85. 2014.
    I agree with Scott A Anderson1 and Rosalind J McDougall2 that many prostitutes suffer significant harms, and that these harms must be taken seriously. Having a background in public outreach for sex workers, I share this concern wholeheartedly.In the article to which Anderson and McDougall respond,3 I ask why prostitutes are harmed: are prostitutes harmed because prostitution itself is harmful or because of contingent ways in which prostitutes are socially and legally treated? This is an importan…Read more
  •  56
    The Unity and Commensurability of Pleasures and Pains
    Philosophia 41 (2): 527-543. 2013.
    In this paper I seek to answer two interrelated questions about pleasures and pains: (i) The question of unity: Do all pleasures share a single quality that accounts for why these, and only these, are pleasures, and do all pains share a single quality that accounts for why these, and only these, are pains? (ii) The question of commensurability: Are all pleasures and pains rankable on a single, quantitative hedonic scale? I argue that our intuitions draw us in opposing directions: On the one hand…Read more
  •  182
    Is prostitution harmful?
    Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (2): 73-81. 2014.
    A common argument against prostitution states that selling sex is harmful because it involves selling something deeply personal and emotional. More and more of us, however, believe that sexual encounters need not be deeply personal and emotional in order to be acceptable—we believe in the acceptability of casual sex. In this paper I argue that if casual sex is acceptable, then we have few or no reasons to reject prostitution. I do so by first examining nine influential arguments to the contrary.…Read more