Ole Martin Sandberg

A frequent misunderstanding about Peter Kropotkin, and anarchism more generally, is that by emphasising mutual aid as a factor of evolution and history, he advocates a view of human nature as essentially benign. This essay aims to disprove that claim by showing that Kropotkin explicitly rejects any notion of a fixed human essence and insists that we are composed of a multitude of autonomous but interacting faculties with no authentic or essential centre. This view of the human psyche reflects his view of the world in general: for Kropotkin, philosophy and science were not about finding universal mechanisms and eternal substances. Instead, he advances a view of the world that can only be described as process-thinking: a philosophical tendency that prioritises difference over identity and change over stability. Kropotkin’s process ontology also informs his view of politics, which rejects the idea of a harmonious social end state free of conflict and embraces diversity as a factor that promotes progress and movement. Kropotkin’s process philosophy has relevance to debates in such diverse fields as philosophy and metaphysics, political and social theory, and biology and ecology.

In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins’ argues that evolution, being a process of ruthless competition, results in selfish behavior. Human nature is short-sighted and amoral due to our genes. But he also insists humans have a unique capacity for moral behavior: Using reason we can suppress the natural instincts and act against our nature. In this chapter I show that Dawkins view is as old as the theory of evolution itself. It was first advocated by T.H. Huxley and criticized by Peter Kropotkin. Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid builds upon Darwin and seeks to establish a naturalistic grounding of human morality in the social instincts necessary for all social animals. This avoids the dualism implied in Dawkins’ and Huxley’s theories. It also raises questions of biological essentialism and determinism which the chapter discusses. Finally, the chapter compares the thoughts of Dawkins and Kropotkin with those of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche would have rejected Dawkins’ version of atheism that retains Christian views of the wickedness of bodily instincts. He was also critical of egalitarian movements which he thought were based in ressentiment. I show that Kropotkin’s views were in some ways quite close to Nietzsche’s as both advocate an affirmation of life.

This chapter tries to make sense of a particular aspect of our contemporary experience: the so-called “post-truth era.” This era is characterized by strong polarization where it seems like the arguments and opinions of the opposing sides are informed by different realities. When beliefs are still held despite being debunked by contradicting evidence, it is easy to dismiss the opponent as “irrational,” resulting in breakdown of communication. This chapter argues that such beliefs may still feel right because they connect to something deeper in the bodily awareness and lived experience, which Eugene Gendlin calls the “felt sense” or “felt meaning.” When we are disconnected from this bodily sense, it can result in various articulations which do not make sense at a surface level but critiquing the surface level articulations while ignoring their source often results in frustration and anger. Rather than dismissing people’s rationality, we should assume they have reasons for holding their beliefs, although they may not be able to articulate those reasons. Drawing on the works of Gendlin I argue for a sympathetic yet critical listening to the bodily sense which requires attention to the whole situation of our social environment.

Many fear that climate change will lead to the collapse of civilization. I argue both that this is unlikely and that the fear is potentially harmful. Using examples from recent disasters I argue that climate change is more likely to intensify the existing social order—a truly terrifying prospect. The fear of civilizational collapse is part of the climate crisis; it makes us fear change and prevents us from imagining different social relations which is necessary if we are to survive the coming disasters and prevent further escalation. Using affect theory, I claim that our visions of the future affect our ability to act in the present. Rather than imagining a terrifying societal breakdown, we can look at how communities have survived recent disasters to get an image of what we need to expand upon to prepare for the future.

Many fear that climate change will lead to the collapse of civilization. I argue both that this is unlikely and that the fear is potentially harmful. Using examples from recent disasters I argue that climate change is more likely to intensify the existing social order—a truly terrifying prospect. The fear of civilizational collapse is part of the climate crisis; it makes us fear change and prevents us from imagining different social relations which is necessary if we are to survive the coming disasters and prevent further escalation. Using affect theory, I claim that our visions of the future affect our ability to act in the present. Rather than imagining a terrifying societal breakdown, we can look at how communities have survived recent disasters to get an image of what we need to expand upon to prepare for the future.