•  76
    Davidson’s Answer to Kripke’s Sceptic
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (2): 8-28. 2019.
    According to the sceptic Saul Kripke envisages in his celebrated book on Wittgenstein on rules and private language, there are no facts about an individual that determine what she means by any given expression. If there are no such facts, the question then is, what justifies the claim that she does use expressions meaningfully? Kripke’s answer, in a nutshell, is that she by and large uses her expressions in conformity with the linguistic standards of the community she belongs to. While Kripke’s …Read more
  •  38
    Bridging the Gap: A Reply to Hutto and Satne
    Philosophia 43 (3): 639-649. 2015.
    Daniel D. Hutto and Glenda Satne expose, and suggest a way to resolve, what they see as an “essential tension” which has plagued what they take to be, rightly I think, the most promising approach to the nature of contentful states, that is, the neo-pragmatist approach, according to which an adequate account of content essentially appeals to the notion of a social practice. This paper is a critical assessment of their proposal. On their view, the tension stems from the fact that participation in …Read more
  •  34
    Meaning Scepticism and Primitive Normativity
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2): 357-376. 2021.
    In this paper, I examine Hannah Ginsborg's attempt to address the challenge raised by Saul Kripke's meaning sceptic. I start by identifying the two constraints that the sceptic claims must be met by a satisfactory answer. Then I try to show that Ginsborg's proposal faces a dilemma. In the first instance, I argue that it is able to meet the second constraint, but not the first. I then amend the proposal in order to make room for the first constraint. I go on to argue that, under this new interpre…Read more
  •  18
    Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity
    In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. pp. 171-184. 2021.
    This chapter addresses the question of what, according to the conception of meaning offered by Donald Davidson, makes expressions meaningful. It addresses this question by reflecting on Kathrin Glüer’s recent response to it. It argues that Glüer misconstrues both the evidence for meaning that the radical interpreter must rely on and the way in which the principle of charity must be deployed. The articulation of the correct construal of the evidence and the principle reveals the thoroughly non-re…Read more
  •  13
    Dialogue 59 (2): 157-164. 2020.
    In Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry, Robert H. Myers and Claudine Verheggen spell out, and extensively build on, the triangulation argument advanced by Donald Davidson. This paper is an introduction to a symposium devoted to their development of that argument. The symposium began in 2018 as an authors-meet-critics session at the Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, and consists in the responses of three critics, Kirk Ludwig, Alexander Miller, and P…Read more
  •  2
    Dialogue 59 (2): 165-173. 2020.
    Dans Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry, Robert H. Myers et Claudine Verheggen offrent une élucidation ainsi qu'une édification de l'argument de la triangulation avancé par Donald Davidson. Cet article est une introduction à un symposium consacré à leur développement de cet argument. Le symposium a débuté en 2018 en tant que table ronde réunissant les auteurs et des critiques lors du congrès annuel de l'Association canadienne de philosophie, et comprend les réponse…Read more