Ömer Aygün

This paper proposes a solution to the apparent contradiction between Aristotle’s positions concerning the bees’ ability to hear in the Metaphysics and in the History of Animals. It does so not by appealing to external (chronological or philological) emendations, but by disambiguating the Ancient Greek verb akouein into three meanings: hearing of sound (psophos), of voice (phônê) and of speech (logos). Such a differentiation shows that, according to Aristotle, bees do hear other bees’ intermittent buzzes as meaningful and interested calls for cooperation. This differentiation also hints toward the specificity of human communication and community.

This paper proposes a solution to the apparent contradiction between Aristotle’s positions concerning the bees’ ability to hear in the Metaphysics and in the History of Animals. It does so not by appealing to external (chronological or philological) emendations, but by disambiguating the Ancient Greek verb akouein into three meanings: hearing of sound (psophos), of voice (phônê) and of speech (logos). Such a differentiation shows that, according to Aristotle, bees do hear other bees’ intermittent buzzes as meaningful and interested calls for cooperation. This differentiation also hints toward the specificity of human communication and community.

In this paper, we offer an overview of Aristotle’s account for his belief that honeybees reproduce without copulation. Following this, we draw the three following implications: First, that Aristotle’s position on this question is quite unconventional, and undercuts many traditional and “Aristotelian” hierarchies; secondly, that the method that requires him to hold this unconventional position is largely dialectical; and finally, that the lineage behind this method is Socratic. In this sense, Aristotle’s biological work may be seen as taking up where young Socrates left off according to his autobiographical remark in Plato’s Phaedo 95E-99E.

This article applies Russon's principles of reading Plato's dialogues to solve a problem arising from both the dramatic and philosophical aspects of Plato's Republic: persuasive speech seems effective only when its audience is already willing to listen and be convinced. Yet if so, then either persuasive speech is powerless to persuade anybody truly, or it is unclear how it differs from simple manipulation or brainwashing. This article resolves this dilemma by using Russon’s insights about the kind of rationality Plato invites us to assume, namely a “concrete rationality,” and by analyzing the ????irst three interlocutors of Socrates in the Republic: Polemarchus, Cephalus, and, of course, Thrasymachus. This approach enables us to differentiate these three interlocutors, explain Thrasymachus’s persistence in listening to the conversation until the end despite his unwillingness to listen, as well as the therapeutic function of theōria for providing him some momentary relief from his “hatred of speech” (misologia).