My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: no
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: objective If a realist account may be as loose as some social agreement of some reductive physical account, then yes, objective.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism Externalism in the causal sense, but very weakly. Internal mental states and other stuff can be causes, I think. And in that sense they are external.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: idealism In the sense that there can be few justified, positive skeptical claims, non-skeptical. In the sense that traditional 'realism' implies a correspondence over a coherence, probably idealism, in the phenomenalist sense.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Other Depends on definition of free will. My answer is 'compatibilism' if the definition of 'free will' is the loose 'you may do want you want' formulation. But if your definition need be more robust (as mine is), then no free will.
God: theism and atheism Accept another alternative
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: non-classical Enjoy reading Priest's and McGee's arguments for a revision of classical logic and rejection of inferential rules such as modus ponens and disjunction and the problem of contradictions, but probably not worth the time.
Mental content: internalism and externalism Agnostic/undecided
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism Physicalism but only in the weak functionalist way. Or possibly a revised version of anomolous monism, rejecting even a token-identity but maintaining the supervening of mental concepts.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Agnostic/undecided
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: one box If the predictor truly CANNOT be wrong then it will have factored its own prediction, your own greed, and your own reasoning. Therefore, there are not 4 possible outcomes, only two (which are both conjunctions). Supposing you are a logical entity, these outcomes are: you choosing one box and the predictor having been correct (yielding the bigger amount), or you choosing both and the predictor being correct (and yielding the smaller amount). So always take one box.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept another alternative Social-evolutionary theory. Teleological social-relativism.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: biological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism There is no fact of the matter
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Fregean
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific anti-realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory The question is too unclear to answer If the question is regarding McTaggart's A-SERIES and B-SERIES then probably neither. Relativity and space-time/string theory are too strong to deny (contingently - not a necessary truth).
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Agnostic/undecided
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence Yes there are 'truth-makers'. But only a weak correspondence theory should be trusted - Tarski may have leant away, but a non-realist correspondence (denying 'absolute' truth due to the metaphysical implications of 'true' correspondence) is intuitively attractive.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible Sympathy for the functionalist case. Conceivable in a strange cartoon-like way. But for the zombies to do what they do is to be conscious (strong functionalism).