Georgetown University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1990
Seattle, Washington, United States of America
  •  208
  •  169
    A lexicon of attention: From cognitive science to phenomenology (review)
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2): 99-132. 2003.
    This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part struc…Read more
  •  132
    Attentional capture and attentional character
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4): 539-562. 2008.
    Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environ…Read more
  •  106
    Toward a phenomenology of attention
    Human Studies 19 (1): 71-84. 1996.
    There is a considerable amount of research being done on attention by cognitive psychologists. I claim that in the process of measuring and mapping consciousness, these researchers have missed important phenomenological findings. After a synopsis and illustration of the nature of attention as described by Aron Gurwitsch, I critique the assumptions of current psychological research on this topic. Included is discussion of the metaphor of attention as a beam or spotlight, the concept of selective …Read more
  •  83
    For the first time, this book classifies how attention shifts, and argues that self-awareness, reflection, and even morality, are best thought of as dynamic...
  •  62
    Transformations in consciousness: Continuity, the self and marginal consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3): 3-26. 2000.
    The term ‘consciousness’ is usually reserved only for the focus of attention. This restriction empties the phenomenology of consciousness of some of its richness. Rather than conceiving of consciousness as one-dimensional, researchers should consider that consciousness has a three-dimensional organization. Conscious presentations are structured in a focus, context and margin pattern. Inclusion of these other dimensions of consciousness as consciousness is important for an adequate relation betwe…Read more
  •  56
    Restructuring Attentionality and Intentionality
    Human Studies 36 (2): 199-216. 2013.
    Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-…Read more
  •  46
    The field of consciousness: James and Gurwitsch
    Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society 28 (4): 833-856. 1992.
  •  35
    In the experimental psychology of attention, the phenomenon of attentional context has been underappreciated, while focal attention has taken center stage. Similar problems of context are found in certain realist arguments in.the philosophy of science. Through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch's phenomenology of attention, this paper discusses and evaluates the ways in which context is or is not brought into focus in experimental psychology and the philosophy of science. It concludes that recent develo…Read more
  •  21
    Intuition: The Inside Story (edited book)
    with R. Davis-Floyd
    Routledge. 1997.
    NATURALLY. DEVELOPED. THOUGHT. Figure i these two construcrs to define a sprctrum of modes of thought, ranging ftom analytical (inrensive checking and nattow focus) to intuitive (minimal checking and btoad focus). He develops the ...
  •  18
    The Field of Consciousness and Extended Cognition
    Human Studies 41 (1): 21-40. 2018.
    Extended cognition theorists claim that the definition of cognition can be extended to include not only the brain, but also the body and environment. In a series of works, Mark Rowlands has envisioned a new science of mind that explores the externalism of consciousness and cognition. This paper connects Rowlands’ work with the phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch. It shows how Gurwitsch’s field of consciousness, in particular his conception of the marginal halo, can provide a distinct, organized way …Read more
  •  18
    Between Phenomenology and Psychology
    Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 45 (2): 146-167. 2014.
    This essay reflects on what it means to bring together the disciplines of Husserlian philosophy and psychology in light of current thinking about interdisciplinarity. Drawing from Allen Repko’s work on the interdisciplinary research process, aspects highlighted include justifying using an interdisciplinary approach, identifying conflicts between disciplinary insights, creating common ground between concepts, and constructing a more comprehensive understanding. To focus the discussion and provide…Read more
  •  13
    Acknowledgement of external reviewers for 2002
    with John Barresi, Tim Bayne, Pierre Bovet, Andrew Brook, Andy Clark, Lester Embree, William Friedman, Peter Goldie, and David Hunter
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (95): 151-152. 2003.
  •  1
    Irvin Rock, Indirect Perception (review)
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1): 114-114. 1999.
  • The Field of Consciousness: James and Gurwitsch
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 28 (4): 833. 1992.
  • Limits in the Field of Consciousness
    Dissertation, Georgetown University. 1990.
    Aron Gurwitsch claims that the field of consciousness is invariantly organized in a theme, thematic field, margin pattern. However, at least two perceptual presentations, chaos and boundlessness, are not ordered in accordance with this pattern. The question this study poses then is the following: given Gurwitsch's field-theory of experiential organization, what is the structure, status, and function of chaos and boundlessness in the field of consciousness? ;Using Gurwitsch's field-theory organiz…Read more
  • On the Origin of Organization in Consciousness
    Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 23 (1): 53-65. 1992.
  • On the origin of organization in consciousness
    Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology 23 (1): 53-65. 1992.