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202On Self-Knowledge of MotivesThe Monist. forthcoming.Many philosophers claim that we have duty to know our motives. However, prominent theories of the mind suggest that we can’t. Such scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives is based on psychological evidence. I show that this evidence only mandates scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives if we rely on a mistaken assumption which I call ‘the myth of the one true motive’. If we reject this myth, we see that there is space to plausibly interpret the empirical data such that knowledge of one’s…Read more
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192The Rational and the SanePhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 30 (2): 155-158. 2023.“But surely if it's not irrational, it can’t be OCD!” my friend exclaimed, when I told them about the paper Carolina Flores and Brent Kious provided their excellent comments for. In all fairness, my friend is not working in philosophy, or psychiatry, or in psychology. Still, I take their sentiment to be expressive of a widely held view: if you have a certain mental illness, then you must be irrational. Conversely, rationality guarantees mental health; the sane life is the rational life. In my pa…Read more
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240What’s the Linguistic Meaning of Delusional Utterances? Speech Act Theory as a Tool for Understanding DelusionsPhilosophical Psychology 36 (7). 2023.Delusions have traditionally been considered the hallmark of mental illness, and their conception, diagnosis and treatment raise many of the fundamental conceptual and practical questions of psychopathology. One of these fundamental questions is whether delusions are understandable. In this paper, we propose to consider the question of understandability of delusions from a philosophy of language perspective. For this purpose, we frame the question of how delusions can be understood as a question…Read more
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459Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 30 (2): 133-146. 2023.It’s a common assumption in psychiatry and psychotherapy that mental health conditions are marked out by some form of epistemic irrationality. With respect to obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), the mainstream view is that OCD causes irrational beliefs. Recently, however, this ‘doxastic view’ has been criticized from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Instead a more promising ‘zetetic view’ has been proposed which locates the epistemic irrationality of OCD not in irrational beliefs, but i…Read more
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330Das Paradox der ToleranzZeitschrift Für Politische Theorie 10 (2): 169-192. 2019.How should civil society deal with radical actors such as populists? Should democrats engage in an open dialogue or avoid confrontation? Should they listen to them, let them speak and try to expose them argumentatively, or should they deny them any kind of public platform? Rather than providing a normative answer to these questions, this article analyzes and systematizes responses that are already circulating in public discourse. In particular, we focus on reactions to the invitations of the AfD…Read more
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445Can Wittgenstein’s Philosophy account for Uncertainty in Introspection?Wittgenstein-Studien 12 (1): 145-163. 2021.What happens when we are uncertain about what we want, feel or whish for? How should we understand uncertainty in introspection? This paper reconstructs and critically assess two answers to this question frequently found in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein: indecision and self-deception (Hacker 1990, 2012; Glock 1995, 1996). Such approaches seek to explain uncertainty in introspection in a way which is completely distinct from uncertainty about the ‘outer world’. I argue that in doing so…Read more
Cambridge, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Self-Knowledge |
Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Political Theory |
Moral Psychology |
Modal Epistemology |
20th Century Philosophy |