Pam R. Sailors

Nature sports have been touted for their value “as ways of pursuing excellence and relating to the environment” (Krein 2014, 207). This value, however, is not widely available, in large part due to structural features that create barriers to access for all but able-bodied white men possessing substantial disposable income. In this paper, we will analyse four ‘isms’ that are prominent in nature sport: ableism, classism/elitism, racism, and sexism/heterosexism. Through an examination of nature sports like surfing, skiing, snowboarding, and climbing, we argue that the current culture of nature sports contains institutionalized isms. If we are to create spaces for inclusion and authentic participation and experiences in nature sports, then change needs to occur. To that end, we will address counterculture(s) and programs that challenge the ism-saturated established norms of nature sports, removing barriers to access and opening value-laden opportunities for all.

In contemporary society, humans interact with nonhuman animals in a number of ways, many of which involve the captivity of the nonhuman animals involved. Nonhuman animals trained for sport (sled dogs, horses trained for dressage, etc.), nonhuman animals confined for human entertainment (zoos, aquariums, circuses, etc.), and companion animals are all held captive by the human beings who interact with them. However, the moral acceptability of these forms of captivity seems to vary widely; this variance isn’t only a function of the conditions of the captivity itself, but the reasons, attitudes, and intentions of the captors. Martha Nussbaum’s conception of species-specific flourishing allows for what she calls ‘respectful paternalism’ in the case of nonhuman animals, and in this paper, we will explore (a) Nussbaum’s account of ‘respectful paternalism’ as an aspect of justice that governs our interactions with nonhuman animals, (b) what the ‘respectful’ aspect of that paternalism involves by examining what it means for a captor to limit the autonomy of a nonhuman animal respectfully and (c) implications for our interactions with nonhuman animals in sport and entertainment environments.

A brief review and classification of technology in general begins the paper, followed by an application of the classification to two specific marathon case studies: the 2018 Boston marathon and the 2017 Nike Breaking2 Project marathon. Then concepts from an array of sport philosophers are discussed to suggest an explanation for why each of the case studies strikes us as problematic. The conclusion provides a reasonable explanation for our misgivings, as well as an indication of how we might evaluate sporting endeavors in the face of increasing technological innovation.

The development of in vitro fertilization has ignited fresh controversy regarding the concept of autonomy. Some authors claim that the technique offers opportunity for initiative, action and autonomy traditionally denied women. Other authors condemn the technologies, claiming that support of them only perpetuates the essentialist definition of woman as reproducer, thus, in practice, reduces the autonomy of women. This dissertation is an attempt to make sense of the fact that two groups, who share the same basic political perspective, and examine the same practices, arrive at completely different conclusions about the effect of those practices on the level of autonomy possessed and exercised by women. ;I present an examination of the development and use of in vitro fertilization, discussing their historical development, the qualifications one currently must satisfy in order to avail oneself of them, and some potential technological developments in this area. Along the way, I explain the centrality of the concept of autonomy and reveal the presuppositions with which I work. ;In chapters II and III, I offer standardized versions of some of the existing arguments concerning in vitro fertilization. The arguments depend upon stipulative definitions of autonomy, one derived from the account of John Stuart Mill, the other from the work of Immanuel Kant. I show that both arguments rely upon problematic assumptions about the nature of autonomy and the relationship between individual desires and societal structures. ;I propose, in chapter IV, a view of autonomy that I derive from the work of Michel Foucault, Jana Sawicki, and Jean Grimshaw. I claim that this conceptualization is theoretically equal and, in this inquiry, practically superior to the previous accounts. ;In the final chapter, I employ the alternative account of autonomy to re-examine the standardized arguments. I show that the single superior concept of autonomy can be employed in order to reveal significant insights in both arguments. I also show that a distinction can be made between the estimation of actual present autonomy and potential future autonomy for women in relation to developments in the in vitro fertilization technique

The popularity and profitability of American gridiron football is beyond dispute. Recent polls put football as the overwhelming favorite of people who follow at least one sport and huge revenues are reported at both the professional and the university level. We know, however, that what is the case tells us little about what ought to be the case, and it is to the latter question that this paper is directed. I offer a three-pronged attack on the ethical acceptability of American football, both amateur and professional, based on harm to the players, objectification of the players, and harm to others done by the players, leading to the conclusion that the sport, as currently constituted, is morally unacceptable

A survey of the philosophy of sport literature reveals that arguments regarding the issue of sex segregation in athletics have been advanced from time to time, but there has been little sustained discussion, no consensus, and no change in existing practice. In this paper, an effort to advance the conversation, I begin with Jane English’s seminal 1978 article as a springboard and employ existing literature on the question of sex segregation in order to raise difficulties with English’s analysis and outline the basic alternative positions that have been taken on the issue. My own contribution to the conversation is in the introduction of four distinctions – between individual and team sports, direct and indirect competition, contact and non-contact sports, and amateur and professional sports – that have not been part of the discussion about the conditions under which men and women might compete against one another. These distinctions resolve several difficulties noted by others and suggest a more nuanced conclusion about desirable changes to the structure of sporting competition

Roller derby, once known for scripted theatricality that made it more like a stage play than a sport, has reinvented itself as a legitimate athletic endeavour. Since its rebirth as the Women's Flat Track Derby Association in the early 2000s, it has experienced exponential growth, from 30 flat track derby leagues in 2005 to more than 450 leagues in 2010. This translates to more than 15,000 skaters worldwide. Roller derby provides a unique case of a women's sport that is not derived from, or a diminutive version of, a men's sport, proudly stating as its philosophy a commitment to be?by the skaters, for the skaters?. This do-it-yourself aspect opens the way for examination of what a sport wholly created by women looks like and how that differs from sports created by men. The WFTDA claims that roller derby is empowering and revolutionary, yet some critics have claimed that the skaters reinforce rather than dismantle gender stereotypes. Using tools from previous gender critiques, I analyse several aspects of roller derby for their emancipatory potential and conclude that, while not completely unproblematic, the sport can function as a force for reshaping ideas about women, femininity, and sport

This paper examines footraces that are paced and unpaced, and runners who are pre-arranged, designated pacers and those who are not. Although pacesetting is commonplace in footraces today, the practice challenges our conception of sport competition, the nature of competitors and the meaning of records. For example, Bale calls paced races as ‘staged experiments’ to set world records and argues that pacers were crucial in the running career of Roger Bannister. In 2011, the International Association of Athletics Federation banned women’s world records in mixed gender running events, like major marathons, because women were paced by male runners. By examining these cases and others, the authors here will claim paced footraces are qualitatively different than unpaced competitions, pacers introduce peculiar motives and intentions as competitors, women should not be denied opportunities to excel and perform at their very best, and the 2011 IAAF policy is unjustified

Pacing, a phenomenon whereby seasoned runners assist other runners toward pre-determined goal times in races of various lengths, is a common practice, yet it has received very little sustained philosophical scrutiny. This paper aims to take steps in that direction with a particular focus on pacing in amateur distance running. We begin with Peter Arnold’s analysis of the three views of sportsmanship – as a form of social union, as a means in the promotion of pleasure, and as a form of altruism – to examine how well pacing fares in each. Additionally, we incorporate the concepts of the ‘dynamogenic agent’ from William James and the ‘intermediate man’ from John Lachs, which raise questions of autonomy, authenticity, and assistance. Furthermore, we provide descriptions of how the unique qualities of pace groups in running exemplify sportsmanship in ways that bolster Arnold’s analysis. While we write from an analytical position with regard to the topic, we also write from our own Emersonian ‘angle of vision’,..

“Look Great Naked!” “Sexy Legs Now!” “Score a Perfect 10 Body!” These invitations appear regularly on the covers of glossy fitness magazines, always beside a photograph of a too-perfect-not-to-be-airbrushed, generally scantily clad, young woman. Are they really invitations or are they imperatives? What should we make of the apparently presumed connection between fitness and sex? These are the questions that drive this article, in which we distinguish between fitness and sport and provide a feminist account of fitness to set the stage for analysis of the conflict between norms of femininity and heteronormativity in sport and in the fitness industry. We examine the medicalization of fitness to show that women’s...

The 2010 Quinnipiac cheerleading case raises interesting questions about the nature of both cheerleading and sport, as well as about the moral character of each. In this paper we explore some of those questions, and argue that no form of college cheerleading currently in existence deserves, from a moral point of view, to be recognized as a sport for Title IX purposes. To reach that conclusion, we evaluate cheerleading using a quasi-legal argument based on the NCAA’s definition of sport and conclude that cheerleading fails to qualify as a legitimate sport. A philosophical argument leads to the same conclusion, primarily because of the essential entertainment-aspect of cheerleading. We then examine a consequentialist moral case for making cheerleading an intercollegiate sport and argue that the balance of moral reasons is against doing so. Finally, we look at cheerleading’s newest offspring – Acrobatics and Tumbling, and STUNT – and express our moral reservations about their current claims to be worthy of Title IX recognition. While we would not claim that any single one of our arguments is decisive, we are convinced that the cumulative weight of the arguments against granting intercollegiate sport status to any of the forms of cheerleading or its derivatives is, at present, irresistible.