Panu Raatikainen

The new externalist picture of natural kind terms due to Kripke, Putnam, and others has become quite popular in philosophy. Many philosophers of science have remained sceptical. Häggqvist and Wikforss have recently criticised this view severely. They contend it depends essentially on a micro-essentialist view of natural kinds that is widely rejected among philosophers of science, and that a scientifically reasonable metaphysics entails the resurrection of some version of descriptivism. It is argued in this paper that the situation is not quite as dark for the new theory of reference as many critics suggest. There are several distinct questions here which should not be conflated and ought to be dealt with one by one. Descriptivism remains arguably problematic.

Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions of transparency and conveyability of meaning are distinguished and it is argued that, though the Dummettian argument for anti-realism presupposes only a weak connection between knowledge of meaning and understanding, even this much is not trivially true in light of semantic externalism, and that semantic externalism, if true, would thus represent a reason for rejecting the crucial assumption on which the Dummettian argument depends.

The essay exa­mines the views expressed in von Wright's Explanation and Understanding (1971) on human action and historical events from the perspective of the recent philosophy of science. Connecting causal explanation tightly to covering laws, as von Wright does, is found to be problematic, and his Logical connection argument invalid. On the other hand, von Wright's sketched theory of causation which is based on the concept of manipulation proves to be on the right track in light of current knowledge. From this perspective, however, there is no obstacle for explaining human action causally. This is illustrated with two examples from historical research. Finally, von Wright's idea that a complete account of the historical past is never achieved, because the past can always be re-evaluated, is briefly discussed.

It has sometimes been suggested that the so-called new theory of reference (NTR) would provide an alternative picture of meaning and reference which avoids the unwelcome consequences of the meaning-variance thesis and incommesurability. However, numerous philosophers of science have been quite critical towards the idea and NTR in general. It is argued that many of them have an over-simplified and, in part, mistaken understanding of what NTR amounts to. It is submitted that NTR, when correctly understood, can be an important ingredient in the realist toolkit for defending the rationality of science.

Storrs McCall continues the tradition of Lucas and Penrose in an attempt to refute mechanism by appealing to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. That is, McCall argues that Gödel’s theorem “reveals a sharp dividing line between human and machine thinking”. According to McCall, “[h]uman beings are familiar with the distinction between truth and theoremhood, but Turing machines cannot look beyond their own output”. However, although McCall’s argumentation is slightly more sophisticated than the earlier Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments, in the end it fails badly, as it is at odds with the logical facts

Viime vuosina ihmistieteiden kentässä on saanut osakseen paljon huomiota uusi lähestymistapa, jota kutsutaan ”evoluutiopsykologiaksi”. Sen piiristä on esimerkiksi väitetty, että evoluutio on muokannut meidän parinvalintamieltymyksiämme niin, että miehillä on taipumus tuntea vetoa lisääntymiskykyisiltä näyttäviin nuoriin naisiin, pyrkiä parittelemaan aina tilaisuuden tullen mahdollisimman monien naisten kanssa ja olla mustasukkaisia, kun taas naiset ovat taipuvaisia mieltymään iäkkäämpiin miehiin, joilla on valtaa ja resursseja. Luonnonvalinnalla on pyritty myös selittämään mm. raiskauksia.

Kiinnostukseni kohteena seuraavassa on tietty suosittu ”intellektualistinen” käsitys kielen ja käsitteiden oppimisesta ja ymmärtämisestä. Käsitys on sinällään hyvin periteinen, ja voidaan väittää, että se on ollut ainakin piilevästi sisäänrakennettuna useiden uuden ajan filosofien teorioissa. Jätän tämän väitteen tarkemman erittelyn kuitenkin filosofian historioitsijoiden selvitettäväksi, ja keskityn seuraavassa käsityksen enemmän tai vähemmän julkilausuttuihin ilmentymiin nykyajan filosofiassa. Se on vaikuttanut monissa vaikutusvaltaisissa lähestymistavoissa kieleen, merkitykseen ja mieleen.

In the early 20th century, scepticism was common among philosophers about the very meaningfulness of the notion of truth – and of the related notions of denotation, definition etc. (i.e., what Tarski called semantical concepts). Awareness was growing of the various logical paradoxes and anomalies arising from these concepts. In addition, more philosophical reasons were being given for this aversion.1 The atmosphere changed dramatically with Alfred Tarski’s path-breaking contribution. What Tarski did was to show that, assuming that the syntax of the object language is specified exactly enough, and that the metatheory has a certain amount of set theoretic power,2 one can explicitly define truth in the object language. And what can be explicitly defined can be eliminated. It follows that the defined concept cannot give rise to any inconsistencies (that is, paradoxes). This gave new respectability to the concept of truth and related notions. Nevertheless, philosophers’ judgements on the nature and philosophical relevance of Tarski’s work have varied. It is my aim here to review and evaluate some threads in this debate.

Nykyaikaisen logiikan keskeisenä tutkimuskohteena ovat erilaiset formalisoidut teoriat. Erityisesti vuosisadan vaihteen aikoihin matematiikan perusteiden tutkimuksessa ilmaantuneiden hämmentävien paradoksien (Russell 1902, 1903) jälkeen (ks. kuitenkin jo Frege 1879, Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889; vrt. Wang 1957) keskeiset matemaattiset teoriat on pyritty tällaisten vaikeuksien välttämiseksi uudelleen muotoilemaan täsmällisesti keinotekoisessa symbolikielessä, jonka lauseenmuodostussäännöt on täsmällisesti ja yksikäsitteisesti määrätty. Edelleen teoriat on pyritty aksiomatisoimaan, ts. on pyritty antamaan joukko peruslauseita, joista kaikki muut - tai ainakin mahdollisimman monet - teorian todet lauseet voidaan loogisesti johtaa tarkoin määrättyjen päättelysääntöjen mukaisesti (erityisesti Hilbert 1904, 1918, 1927; ks. myös Russell 1908, Zermelo 1908; vrt. Kleene 1952, §§ 14−15).

Ilkka Niiniluoto, a distinguished philosopher of science, has been a tirelesspokesman for scientific realism and reason more generally. Trained in the tradition of the Finnish school of inductive logic he has refined the notion of truthlikeness (verisimilitude) to make the realist idea scientific progress mathematically exact. Niiniluotos main technical works are included in his books Is Science Progressive? (1984) and Truthlikeness (1987), but his most recent general defense of scientific realism culminated in his Critical Scientific Realism (1999). Niiniluoto is, since 1981, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, and since 2003 the Rector of the University. He has for a long time been one of the most prominent public intellectuals in Finland. This Festschrift brings about a selection of philosophical essays on Niiniluotos philosophy by prominent member of the international community. The contributions are grouped around three themes. The first ones deal with philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mathematics, and the second group consists of papers on induction, truthlikeness, and scientific progress. The third part collects essays on the history of logical empiricism, the ontology of social groups, and the dispute between theism and atheism. This book is a tribute to Ilkka Niiniluoto on his 60th birthday, and it also contains Niiniluoto's replies to comments, queries and criticisms.

Kysymys siitä, onko tiede ja voiko se olla arvovapaata, on herättänyt vilkasta ja jopa kiivastakin keskustelua. Erityisen polttava tämä kysymys on ihmistieteissä. Yhdessä ääripäässä on kuva tieteellisestä tutkimuksesta kaikenlaisten eettisten ja yhteiskunnallisten kysymysten yläpuolella olevana intressittömänä toimintana. Toisessa päässä on väite, ettei tiede voi koskaan olla arvovapaata vaan että tieteellinen tutkimus ja sen tulokset ovat läpeensä arvojen värittämiä. Näiden välille mahtuu monenlaisia maltillisempia välittäviä kantoja.