Paolo Gomarasca

The first aim of this paper is to examine if and why the European reaction to the migration crisis of 2015 can be considered anti-ethical. In order to argue this, the paper discusses the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which since 2005 has been the EU's overall framework for migration and asylum policies. The second aim of the paper is to justify that an ethics of migration is possible, arguing in favor of the thesis that caring for refugees is a fundamental value for citizenship and a contribution to social justice.

This paper is about the epistemology of practical reason and, in particular, the function of trust as an end to be pursued rationally in praxis. Our purpose is threefold: first, to present an outline of the structure of practical reason; secondly, to compare practical reason and scientific reason in order to determine the main differences between these two basic manifestations of human reason; finally, to argue in favour of a non-utilitarian model of practical reason in the light of some results of contemporary economic theory.

For Keynes, the history of money begins when the function of measure of value arises for the first time. By contrast, Menger believes that the origin of money is determined by the appearance of the function of medium of exchange. Despite this substantial difference in interpretation, Menger and Keynes agree in terms of criticizing the function of store of value, even though this third function is useful under certain conditions. This paper argues that this agreement, at the level of monetary theory, is linked to a common ethical evaluation: Both stigmatise the love of money exactly because this desire involves a false absolutisation of money as a store of wealth. The paper will be structured in two main parts: I. Monetary Theory. The first part briefly sketches the two competing models of the explanation of the origin of money and its value. II. Ethics. In the second part, the focus will be the common rejection of the love of money.

What is the usual way of interpreting the relationships and exchanges between cultures? Despite the widespread “backlash”, multiculturalism is the model that still prevails in one of its two main versions: (1) the “assimilationist” version, which tends to eliminate all cultural differences, reducing them to the colonial domain of the Occidental culture, and (2) the so called “differencialist” version, a current trend (taking into account the identity crises of the West), according to which cultures are like “museum pieces”, fixed and immutable “cognitive islands”, to be left on their own. What are the defects of this multicultural perspective, especially in the differencialist version? Exactly the ideological pretension of believing that cultures are like monads of Leibniz, without doors or windows. This is precisely the opposite of what Gandhi held, for example, when he said that a culture cannot survive if it believes it can eliminate the others.

The aim of this article is to analyze the recent debate on the end of multiculturalism. It has become a commonplace to say that multiculturalism has failed because of its presumed differentialism, i.e. its tendency to conceive different cultures as cognitive islands. The competing model is characterized by an intercultural approach. The article firstly intends to demonstrate that this is a false alternative within limits. Contrary to popular caricature, one version of multiculturalism is in fact attuned to the emphasis on cultural exchanges and connections. The problem is that the differentialist version has become the standard version of multiculturalism. That is why the article further argues for the importance of the concept of hybridization as a way of moving beyond the controversy over multiculturalism’s supposed failures. Hybridisation suggests one aspect which can be considered relevant: Cultures are originally and intrinsically intertwined. Finally, the article investigates the political implication of this concept of culture and tries to justify the request that cultural mixing processes should be channeled within the political framework of democracy, especially at the level of civil society.

Despite the substantial difference in their monetary theories, Menger and Keynes agree in terms of stigmatizing the love of money. This paper attempts to demonstrate that the shared ethical judgment is defensible for both on the grounds of the same metaethical assumptions—the value theory of Franz Brentano. The paper will be structured in two main parts: I. Ethics. The first part justifies the common rejection of the love of money, at the ethical level. This classical position, as a matter of fact, is considered controversial: in the case of Menger, his criticism towards egoism seems not coherent with his alleged utilitarianism; in the case of Keynes, his disparaging remarks on the love of money as a disgusting morbidity seem in direct contradiction with his endorsement of capitalism. II. Metaethics. In the second part, the focus will be the Fitting Attitude Theory of value, namely with reference to Brentano. The objective will be to identify and discuss the Brentanian arguments by which Menger and Keynes defend their ethical rejection of the love of money.

L'objectif du present travail est avant tout de retracer le celebre clivage cartesien entre pensee et corps, a partir d'une analyse epistemologique de la disqualification - operee par Descartes - du role cognitif de l'imagination. L'auteur approfondit, d'un point de vue phenomenologique, trois solutions symptomatiques de l'epoque moderne, pour repenser le statut anthropologique et politique du sujet de facon unitaire: la tentation de reduire le corps a une idee, comme on le voit dans l'interpretation hegelienne de Malebranche; la reaction anti-cartesienne du medecin-philosophe Cabanis, avec son ambition d'expliquer la pensee en termes d'emergence de la matiere corporelle; et enfin la tentative, que l'auteur met a l'epreuve a partir de Rosmini, de parler du corps sans renoncer a son alterite inquietante, mais en evitant aussi l'impasse dualiste."

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly to show the partial agreement between two ap-proaches to capitalism, considered as will of power and perverse metamorphosis of desire: Magatti’s conception of ‘techno-nihlist capitalism’ and the idea of ‘libidinal economy’, proposed by Deleuze&Guattari and Lyotard. Secondly, to evaluate the difference be-tween Magatti and Deleuze, in the light of the impact of financial crisis, understood as contraction of will of power and crisis of desire. From this clinical point of view, what is at stake is reconceptualizing the nature of desire as a generative power, against the deleuzian concept of desire as nomad and anonyme flux: the key question is the possibility to think the will of power as a desire to shape social bonds, beyond its perverse temptation to kill the Other