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One of the innovative approaches in contemporary philosophical ontology consists in the assumption of a plurality of ontologies based on different metaphysical presuppositions. Such presuppositions involve, among others, the identification of relevant properties for the objects of our domain as a guiding principle in uncovering what it is to be considered intrinsic and what could be the mere effect of selection preferences based on objective or subjective criteria. A remarkable example of the application of a background metaphysical theory in astrophysics is the problem of selection biases in detecting cosmological objects, such as supernovae, galaxies and gamma-ray bursts. We will show that it is valuable to be aware of the importance of uncovering this type of background theory to better understand selection effects and to promote a novel approach in scientific research.

According to the quantificational Quinean model in meta-ontology, the question of ontology boils down to the question of whether a sortal property is exemplified. I address some complications that arise when we try to build a philosophical reconstruction of the link between individuals and kinds displayed in the exemplification relation from the point of view of conceptualism about kinds and having in mind this stand in ontology. I distinguish two notions of resemblance, object-to- object and object-to- kind, and show the problems with both of them. Finally, I argue for a better awareness of the implicit "bias" involved in the very notion of "resemblance," without indulging in Quine's veto toward this notion.

Ponto de partida do presente artigo é uma interrogação acerca do significado existencial das proposições. Em primeiro lugar, é considerada a ideia de existência simbólica na lógica de MacColl, ao mesmo tempo que se assinalam os problemas que, na perspectiva de Bertrand Russell, estão associados com a auta-referência e o significado da classe-nula. Por outro lado, o artigo demonstra também até que ponto a própria perspectiva de Russell não está livre de problemas, de ambiguidades e de mudanças de opinião. O autor do artigo partilha a crítica de Russell sobre o significado do quantificador, acabando por usar Russell contra Russell, ou seja, a réplica russelliana de 1957 a G. J. Warnock contra a réplica russelliana de 1905 a MacColl. Assim, a partir de uma análise lógica do debate entre Russell e MacColl, o artigo procede a uma investigação da relação entre Lógica e Ontologia, considerando de um modo especial o caso dos objectos não-existentes. /// Moving from a technical, logical point of view in the RusselUMacColl debate about the existential import of propositions and the significance of the null-class, the paper tries to inquiry the relationship between logic and ontology, considering in special the case ofnon existing objects, Russell's philosophical treatment of the existential quantification gains his full meaning in his realistic perspective. But it is possible to use this treatment versus Russell intentions, to deny that there is a supplementary (in space-time) existence, that "lies wholly outside Symbolic Logic".