Pascual Martinez-Freire

¿Llegarán los ordenadores a sustituir a los seres humanos? Lo que hasta hace unas décadas parecía una pregunta de ciencia-ficción, es ahora defendido con seriedad por algunos especialistas en inteligencia artificial. El presente articulo dibuja las más importantes líneas de investigación en este campo y las posiciones más relevantes respecto de la relación hombre-maquina pensante. La conclusión que propone el autor supone una decidida apuesta por un humanismo en el que quepa integrar el desarrollo tecnológico sin perder de vista sus innegables implicaciones éticas

The mind is a collection of various classes of processes that can be studied empirically. To limit the field of mental processes we must follow the criteria of folk psychology. There are three kinds of mind: human, animal and mechanical. But the human mind is the paradigm or model of mind. The existence of mechanical minds is a serious challenge to the materialism or the mind-brain identity theory. Based on this existence we can put forward the antimaterialist argument of machines. Intelligence is a class of mental processes such that the mind is the genus and the intelligence is a species of this genus. The capacity to solve problems is a clear and definite criterion of intelligence. Again, like in the mind, the human intelligence is the paradigm of the intelligence. There are also three kinds of intelligence: human, animal and mechanical. Searle’s Chinese room argument is misleading because Searle believes that it is possible to maintain a sharp distinction between syntax and semantics. The reasonable dualism in the brain-mind problem defends the existence of brain-mental processes, physical-mental processes, and nonphysical-mental processes. Constitution of the personal project of life, self-consciousness and free volitions are examples of spiritual processes. Usually the intelligence has been considered the most important quality of human beings, but freedom, or the world of free volitions, is a more specific quality of human beings.

RESUMENEn primer lugar, se analiza la teoría clásica, tal como la formuló Aristóteles, de los seres humanos como animales racionales. En segundo lugar, se presenta la caracterización del hombre como no animal e irracional que ofrece Martinho da Vila. En tercer lugar, se consideran las tesis freudianas sobre la mezcla de racionalidad e irracionalidad en los humanos. En cuarto lugar, se señalan algunos puntos de vista recientes, debidos a Simon así como a la psicología y neurociencia actuales, sobre la limitación de la razón humana y su relación con las emociones. Finalmente se argumenta que ni Aristóteles ni Martinho da Vila describen bien la condición humana.PALABRAS CLAVERACIONALIDAD-CONDICIÓN HUMANA-ARISTÓTELES-FREUDABSTRACTFistly the classical theory, as put forward by Aristotle, about the human beings as rational animals is analysed. Secondly the description of man as no animal and irrational offered by Martnho da Vila is presented. Thirly the Freudian thseses on the mixture os rational and irrational aspects in humans are considered. Forurthly some recent points of view, by Simon and the current psychology and neurosciencie, about the limitation of human reason and irs relation with emotions are pointed out. Lastly it is argued that neithert Aristotle nor Martinho da Vila decribe well the human nature.KEYWORDSRATIONALITY-HUMAN NATURE-ARISTOTLE-FREUD