Patricia M. Locke

Style is a complex and problematic term in the critical vocabulary of several disciplines. The eleven authors represented in this volume draw on art history, philosophy, literary theory, and musicology to take on the task of defining "style" precisely, not only within their fields but with cross-disciplinary emphasis. First published in 1979, these essays resulted from lectures given at the Summer Institute in Aesthetics held in Boulder, Colorado, in 1977. Despite the intervening effect of deconstruction, which is barely mentioned, they continue to open significant avenues of discussion. This is primarily due to the diversity of views, which is enhanced by the arrangement of the book into three sections.

In this slim volume of three lectures, Judith Butler reads Sophocles’ Antigone with a care often reserved for Oedipus himself. She takes on Hegel’s interpretation of the play, found primarily in the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right. While Butler intends to challenge Hegel’s reading, she begins the book with an epigraph from the Aesthetics: “They are gripped and shattered by something intrinsic to their own being.” It is this engagement with the texts, the sense that Antigone’s fate is our fate, which gives Antigone’s Claim its vitality.

The key word in the title is 'otherness', since this book aims to show how even Hegel, the master of dialectic, fails to adequately explain the phenomenon of otherness. Desmond claims that the common experience of difference can be thought of from four basic perspectives of which dialectic is one. Dialectic has advantages over two of them, yet the last category, the metaxological, is best able to account for the intentional infinity that human beings have paradoxically within the finite boundaries of the self. The problem is to maintain the self while allowing its driving force, infinite desire, to be open to the world. At the same time, this desire for wholeness must not negate or consume the other.

This collection of essays has the advantages and disadvantages of having been given, for the most part, as lectures. At their best, the voices are lively and fresh. Ted Cohen's essay on the artistic merit of television, in particular, the effect of watching baseball on television, is quite good. He sets philosophers the task of describing television's transformation of character and of time and space. He cautions against looking at television shows as if we were seeing movies, for that looking ignores the special requirements of the tube. Cohen claims that philosophers cannot make final judgments about aesthetic quality because television is still working itself out. Witness the advent of continuing and controversial shows such as "Twin Peaks," which bring into question some of the assumed limits of the form.

There is a striking resemblance between the metaphors Galileo and Cézanne use to describe nature. Galileo claims "this grand book, the universe" is written in a mathematical language that alone can lead us out of the "dark labyrinth" of human ignorance. Cézanne suggests that "to read nature is to see it, as if through a veil" in terms of a harmonious arrangement of colors. The identification of reading with light and clarity about the world, seen against a dark ground that their creativity explores, ties the scientist and painter together. Edwin Jones compares their achievements with the interpretative methods of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.

The question must be asked: are we, the readers, included in the "we" of the Phenomenology of Spirit? Are we omnipresent, at times distantly observing the emerging shapes of consciousness, at times plunging in to assist the delivery of those shapes? We are dying to know, and David Parry's book satisfies that desire. If readers are to comprehend the unfolding of the Hegelian science, Parry claims, they must imitate the "we's" activity. As participants in the task, readers can answer the initial question.

Recent biological studies have wrought a sea-change in our understanding of our intimate relations with the microbiota dwelling within or upon the human body. Since these microorganisms are imperceptible, we have access to them only indirectly, through data analysis, rather than through experiments or tools that enhance human observation. Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the human subject and our relations with animals depends upon perception in a dynamic of reversibility. Thus both the scientific method of approach and the extension of subjectivity to microbiota challenge his views. Yet, with Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of intertwining and the anonymous visibility that subtends it, we can redefine the human being as a community in kinship with multiple microbial species, sharing space, metabolic functions, and future.Des études biologiques récentes ont provoqué un bouleversement dans notre compréhension de nos relations intimes avec les microbiotes habitant dans ou à la surface du corps humain. Puisque ces micro-organismes sont imperceptibles, nous n’accédons à eux qu’indirectement, par l’analyses des données, plutôt que par l’expérience ou les outils qui renforcent l’observation humaine. La compréhension merleau-pontienne du sujet humain et de nos relations avec les animaux dépend de la dynamique de la réversibilité. Par conséquent, la méthode de saisie scientifique et l’extension de la subjectivité aux microbiotes interrogent et défient sa conception. Cependant, à partir des concepts d’entrelacement et de visibilité anonyme qui le sous-tend, nous pouvons redéfinir l’être humain comme une communauté d’affinités avec de multiples espèces microbiennes, qui partage un espace, des fonctions métaboliques et même un futur.Studi biologici recenti hanno introdotto una profonda trasformazione nella nostra comprensione dell’intima relazione che intratteniamo con i microbiota che dimorano all’interno o sulla superficie del corpo umano. Poiché questi micro-organismi sono impercettibili, abbiamo accesso ad essi solo indirettamente, attraverso l’analisi di dati, oppure attraverso esperimenti o strumenti che accrescano l’osservazione umana. La comprensione di Merleau-Ponty del soggetto umano e della nostra relazione con gli animali si basa sulla percezione in una dinamica di reversibilità. Una simile prospettiva è messa alla prova se confrontata sia con il metodo dell’approccio scientifico, che con una possibile estensione della soggettività ai microbiota. Allo stesso tempo, attraverso il concetto merleau-pontiano di intreccio, e a partire dall’idea di una visibilità anonima che lo sottende, diviene possibile ridefinire la natura umana come una comunità condivisa dalle diverse specie microbiche, in quanto compartecipano degli stessi spazi, funzioni metaboliche e avvenire.

Architecture provides a model of Hegel's aesthetic theory. Since architecture displays the characteristics of art works and of the system, this essay maintains that the strengths and weaknesses of architecture parallel those of Hegel's theoretical construct. ;As the threshold to the realm of Absolute Spirit, architecture is considered in terms of general aesthetic criteria, particular art styles , and individual constructions . It is shown that poetic metaphors enhance architectural forms and, in a reciprocal movement, architecture serves as a metaphor in poetry and thought. Basing his argument on the metaphor of being at home, Hegel explains developments in art history, the creative process, and human self-consciousness in spatial terms. Thus architectural history is a search for , discovery and loss of a home. Physical and metaphorical structures come into self-contradiction in the conflicting demands of interiority and the sensuous form of aesthetic appearance. ;The dematerialization associated with the shift from substance to subject proves to be the death of architecture, with implications for the other arts. Within the system, art shares pride of place with religion and philosophy as manifestations of Absolute Spirit, differing only in form. But within their internal relations, art is a precursor to the more explicitly self-conscious forms. Hegel is finally forced by his logical system to reduce contemporary art and architecture to ornamental status, adorning an Idea that has been clearly articulated by philosophy. He allows the hierarchical aspect of the metaphor to overrule the dimension of spatial simultaneity also latent in an architectural model. This essay concludes that Hegel made the unfortunate choice in this regard, rendering his aesthetics unsatisfying; yet a reassessment of his thinking about architecture might restore his aesthetic theory to an openness on the threshold of new ideas