University of Virginia
Corcoran Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2005
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Interest

My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept an intermediate view Aristotelianism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: objective I'm taking "aesthetic value" to mean "beauty," which is a mistake in at least two ways. But I can't really answer the question otherwise.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Reject one, undecided between others Reject 'no free will.' Usually inclined to think that compatibilism is a wretched subterfuge, but occasionally waffle on that.
God: theism and atheism Accept: theism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept an intermediate view I guess it's an intermediate view. Aristotelianism again. Surprise!
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Insufficiently familiar with the issue Reject relativism, of course.
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept: biological view Sort of. Close enough.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: communitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Agnostic/undecided
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism Pretty happy with scientific realism in some domains, not so much in others.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory Accept: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: metaphysically possible