Patrizia Pedrini

Achille Varzi è uno dei maggiori metafisici viventi. Nel corso degli anni ha scritto testi fondamentali di logica, metafisica, mereologia, filosofia del linguaggio. Ha sconfinato nella topologia, nella geografia, nella matematica, ha ragionato di mostri e confini, percezione e buchi, viaggi nel tempo, nicchie, eventi e ciambelle; e non ha disdegnato di dialogare con gli abitanti di Flatlandia, con Neo e con Terminator. Tra le sue opere principali: Holes and Other Superficialities e Parts and Places. The Structures of Spatial Representation, entrambi scritti insieme a R. Casati per MIT Press; Il mondo messo a fuoco, Laterza; e il suo libro più recente: Le tribolazioni del filosofare, con C. Calosi, per Laterza. Da una giornata all’Università di Urbino nasce questa conversazione a molte voci sulla e con la filosofia di Achille C. Varzi. In un dialogo critico al quale l’Autore si presta con generosità e onestà intellettuale, Andrea Borghini, Francesco Calemi, Claudio Calosi, Elena Casetta, Valeria Giardino, Pierluigi Graziani, Patrizia Pedrini, Daniele Santoro e Giuliano Torrengo lo interrogano e mettono alla prova sui temi affrontati, nel corso degli anni, in campi diversi. Il risultato è un percorso che si snoda attraverso molti mondi, dalla logica alla metafisica, dalla filosofia del linguaggio alla filosofia della matematica, dalla mereologia alla filosofia del tempo, spingendosi in qualche caso oltre i confini del saggio filosofico.

According to the principle known as “the principle of present-tense ascription immunity”, “It is impossible for anyone to have or entertain thoughts without being aware—immediately and self-evidently—that he is thinking that thought”. In other words, my thoughts are fundamentally experienced as mine, and I typically have this experience of mineness immediately, that is, without any inference based on evidence about who is the thinker of the thought. Thought insertion reveals instead that, under particular pathological conditions, people can be startlingly in error about who is thinking a thought. How can this happen? In the attempt to specify how the capacity for self-ascription of a thought can..

John McDowell and Christine Korsgaard have defended the claim that when human beings judge or believe that p, they are exercising a fundamental kind of freedom, the “freedom of judging.” David Owens has challenged the view: he argues that they offer us at best no more than a modest notion of freedom, which does not vindicate the claim that we are free in many relevant instances of judgment, in particular in perceptual judgment. I argue that Owens is right if we view the freedom of judgment along the lines of McDowell’s and Korsgaard’s proposals – as being a form of freedom which is describable as “freedom of choosing between alternatives,” but that that is not the only option available. In order to secure the nexus between reason and freedom, we can exploit a quite distinct model of freedom, which is the “freedom of autonomy.”

I thank Dr. Matthew Parrott and Dr. V.Y. Allison-Bolger very much for their valuable comments on my paper. They have given me the chance to reflect further on the account of thought insertion I propose, and I respond to them with enthusiasm. I also thank the Editor of this journal for arranging this discussion and for giving me the opportunity to reply. Both Dr. Parrott and Dr. Allison-Bolger are concerned about whether my account is fundamentally tenable. They suggest that I make two incompatible claims in the paper: I deny that a schizophrenic thinker suffering from thought insertion has the appropriate dispositions to enter the cause/reason-giving practice for the thought that she...

Patrizia Pedrini | : In this paper, I argue that paradigmatic-state accounts of self-deception suffer from a problem of restrictedness that does not do justice to the complexities of the phenomenon. In particular, I argue that the very search for a paradigmatic state of self-deception greatly overlooks the dynamic dimension of the self-deceptive process, which allows the inclusion of more mental states than paradigmatic-state accounts consider. I will discuss the inadequacy of any such accounts, and I will argue that we should replace them with a dynamic view of self-deception that is more liberal regarding the mental states in which self-deceivers may find themselves. | : Dans cet article, je soutiens que les explications de l’auto-illusion en termes d’un état « paradigmatique » souffrent d’un problème de limitation qui ne rend pas justice à la complexité du phénomène. Plus précisément, j’avance que la recherche même d’un état paradigmatique néglige tout à fait la dimension dynamique du processus d’auto-illusion, de sorte à inclure davantage d’états mentaux que ne le font les explications en termes d’un état paradigmatique. Après avoir démontré l’insuffisance de ces dernières, je proposerai que nous devrions les remplacer par une conception dynamique de l’auto-illusion qui serait plus flexible quant aux états mentaux potentiellement vécus par des personnes sous l’emprise de l’auto-illusion.

According to a recent theory of the motivational content of self-deception, the self-deceiver wants to be in a state of mind of belief that p, upon which her want that p be true would be merely contingent. While I agree with Funkhouser that the self-deceiver is considerably moved by an interest in believing that p, which makes it possible for her to relate to reality in a highly prejudiced way, I will argue that it is unlikely that the self-deceiver’s primary want to believe, or interest in believing that p occurs as the result of a merely contingent interest in p being true. I will finally assess various consequences of the view I favor, regarding the self-deceiver’s avoidance behaviour, “twisted” self-deception, and whether we should provide a unifying account of “straight” and “twisted” self-deception.

According to a recent theory of the motivational content of self-deception, the self-deceiver wants to be in a state of mind of belief that p, upon which her want that p be true would be merely contingent. While I agree with Funkhouser that the self-deceiver is considerably moved by an interest in believing that p, which makes it possible for her to relate to reality in a highly prejudiced way, I will argue that it is unlikely that the self-deceiver’s primary want to believe, or interest in believing that p occurs as the result of a merely contingent interest in p being true. I will finally assess various consequences of the view I favor, regarding the self-deceiver’s avoidance behaviour, “twisted” self-deception, and whether we should provide a unifying account of “straight” and “twisted” self-deception.

In this contribution I offer an analysis of some specific theses defended by Ceva and Ferretti (2021). First, I raise a question related to the theoretical work done by the sabotage of an institution’s raison d’être when both describing and morally evaluating political corruption. In particular, I will ask whether the ultimate moral reason why corruption is a moral wrong rests on the sabotage of the raison d’être that it entails and to which it could be con-substantially tied. Relatedly, I will explore whether the sabotage of an institution’s raison d’être can be described without that particular cause-effect relationship which is the relationship between action and its consequences, and if the relation holds, whether we can still guarantee the constitutivist account of the moral agent that the authors favor. The second question I pose concerns the deficit of “office accountability” which according to the authors would be at the heart of the moral wrong of which political corruption consists. I will wonder whether this deficit is sufficient to capture political corruption, although it is certainly a necessary manifestation of it. Finally, I will argue that in order to grasp the phenomenon of political corruption not only should we look at intra-institutional relations, but also at the inter-institutional ones. A succinct appendix on the common sense semantics of the adjective “corrupt” completes my commentary.