Patti Tamara Lenard

Are democratic states permitted to denationalize citizens, in particular those whom they believe pose dangers to the physical safety of others? In this article, I argue that they are not. The power to denationalize citizens—that is, to revoke citizenship—is one that many states have historically claimed for themselves, but which has largely been in disuse in the last several decades. Recent terrorist events have, however, prompted scholars and political actors to reconsider the role that denationalization can and perhaps should play in democratic states, in particular with respect to its role in protecting national security and in supporting the global fight against terror more generally. In this article, my objective is to show that denationalization laws have no place in democratic states. To understand why, I propose examining the foundations of the right of citizenship, which lie, I shall argue, in the very strong interests that individuals have in security of residence. I use this formulation of the right to respond to two broad clusters of arguments: (1) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize citizens who threaten to undermine the safety of citizens in a democratic state or the ability of a democratic state to function as a democratic state, and (2) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize dual citizens because they possess citizenship status in a second country that is also able to protect their rights.

One of the most significant challenges facing global egalitarian theorists is the motivational gap: there is a noted gap between the duties imposed by a global commitment to the equal moral worth of all people and the willingness of the wealthy to carry out these duties. For Pablo Gilabert, the apparent absence of motivation to act justly on a global scale presses us to consider the importance of feasibility in developing a persuasive account of global justice, part of which requires being attentive to what motivates us to act in support of global egalitarianism. In this article, I am critical of Gilabert’s account of the role that relationships between individuals play in conceiving our global justice duties. I begin with an account of some confusion in Gilabert’s account of the actual costs likely to be imposed on citizens of wealthy states as a result of the duties he demands of us and why it is important to resolve that confusion. I will then consider, and critique, Gilabert’s account of special responsibilities. I shall argue that, fundamentally, there is an ineliminable tension between the special responsibilities individuals legitimately possess and the duties they have to eradicate global poverty.

We are not cosmopolitans, if by cosmopolitan we mean that we are willing to prioritize equally the needs of those near and far. Here, I argue that cosmopolitanism has yet to wrestle with the motivational challenges it faces: any good moral theory must be one that well-meaning people will be motivated to adopt. Some cosmopolitans suggest that the principles of cosmopolitanism are themselves sufficient to motivate compliance with them. This argument is flawed, for precisely the reasons that motivate this paper - we are cosmopolitan neither in our attitudes nor in our behaviors towards others. Other cosmopolitans suggest that 'global solidarity' is sufficient to generate a commitment to carrying out duties towards others. These latter efforts implicitly rely on insights best captured by the nationalist thesis, that is, that national communities are the best vehicles, morally speaking, through which individuals can carry out their obligations to others. I consider, and refute, two objections to my argument: first, that it is guilty of a 'time-lag fallacy' and, second, that it ignores an emergent cosmopolitan attitude among global citizens

Calls to expand temporary work programmes come from two directions. First, as global justice advocates observe, every year thousands of poor migrants cross borders in search of better opportunities, often in the form of improved employment opportunities. As a result, international organizations now lobby in favour of expanding ‘guest-work’ opportunities, that is, opportunities for citizens of poorer countries to migrate temporarily to wealthier countries to fill labour shortages. Second, temporary work programmes permit domestic governments to respond to two internal, contradictory political pressures: (1) to fill labour shortages and (2) to do so without increasing rates of permanent migration. Temporary work programmes permit governments to appear ‘tough’ on migration, while responding to employer pressure to locate workers willing to work in low-skilled, poorly remunerated positions. The coincidence of national self-interest and global justice generates a strong case in favour of expanding guest-work. We evaluate the moral benefits and burdens of expanding guest-work opportunities, and conclude that although there are benefits to be gleaned from the perspective of global wealth redistribution, at present, temporary work programmes are generally unjust. We will argue that just temporary work programmes, in time, permit temporary workers to attain citizenship. This spells the end of traditional temporary work programmes, which require that workers return to their home country in time; instead, what is temporary is the employment obligation that must be fulfilled as a requirement to access citizenship. As long as this requirement is met, we endorse guest-work programmes as a tool to respond to global inequality

Increasingly, western democratic countries are bearing witness to immigrant protest, that is, protest by immigrants who are dissatisfied with their status in the host community. In protesting, the immigrants object to the ways in which various laws and practices have proved to be obstacles to their full integration. Because immigrants, upon entering, have consented to abide by the rules and regulations of the host state, it might be thought that these forms of civil disobedience are, effectively, contract violations. Immigrants might therefore be thought to have a particularly stringent duty to abide by the laws of their host state. This paper evaluates whether immigrants are indeed under a special duty to abide by the laws of their host state. First, it suggests that it is useful — although incomplete — to apply the device of the ‘contract’ to understanding the relationship between new immigrants and the host community. Second, it argues that there are limits to what can be demanded of and by immigrants as well as of and by host communities. It then turns to offering principles that help to evaluate the motivations of immigrant protestors, as well as that help guide their actions, when they believe that the community they have joined is treating them unjustly. These principles suggest that immigrant protest actions are subject to the restriction that they do not undermine the possibility of an inclusive democratic community.

Abstract The apparent decline of trust in our political and social communities is widely lamented by both social scientists and political analysts. Our newspapers now regularly feature new evidence indicating the decline of trust, as well as regular commentary worrying about the possible effects on the political and social institutions that matter to us. Of late, political philosophers have taken up the task of assessing what, specifically, is on the decline and what, further, might be the consequences of this decline. The five books reviewed below all attempt to answer four central questions: What is trust? Is trust really on the decline? If it is, what are the possible effects on our communities? What possible solutions can halt the decline of trust? The competing answers offered by these philosophers are evaluated, revealing we are only part way to resolving these important issues

This article considers two questions: Do democratic states have the right to deport non-citizens present or residing on their territory? And, if so, what principles should guide deportation in democratic states? The overall objective is to offer an account of what deportation should look like in a liberal democratic state. I begin by situating the practice of deportation in larger discussions of the extent of state discretion in controlling both borders and membership; here, I will argue that potential deportees occupy an awkward middle space, i.e. it is not clear whether they should be treated according to the principles that regulate discretion at the border or discretion in admitting migrants to membership. I then consider more deeply whether deportation can be rendered non-arbitrary, or whether it is bound to remain unjustly applied; where it cannot be rendered non-arbitrary, it must be rejected, or so I shall argue. To be non-arbitrary, the practice of deportation must meet three criteria: a publicity criterion, a justification criterion, and a collective interest criterion. In the final section of the article, I disentangle deportation into its component parts – I distinguish just cause for deportation from just action in deportation – and consider how the criteria that stem from a commitment to non-arbitrariness constrain its application to non-citizen residents. The consequence of requiring deportation to be applied, if at all, in a non-arbitrary way is that there will certainly be cases where liberal democracies find themselves unable to deport those who might otherwise be thought eligible for deportation. Ultimately, I conclude that deportation from liberal democratic states can be fair only in a small number of cases

Trust is a central element of any well-functioning democracy, and the fact that it is widely reported to be on the wane is a worrisome phenomenon of contemporary politics. It is therefore critical that political and social philosophers focus on efforts by which to rebuild trust relations. I argue that a shared public culture is up to the task of trust-building, for three reasons. First, a shared public culture gives citizens an insight into the motivations that inspire fellow citizens to action. Second, a shared public culture serves to generate both positive and negative sanctions, an understanding of which helps citizens to predict how their fellow citizens will behave. Third, a shared public culture generates a sense that we belong together. There are, of course, many communities that can reasonably be interpreted as having a shared public culture, even though they are characterized by low levels of trust. This observation leads me to suggest two features that a shared public culture must have in order to facilitate the emergence of trust relations: citizens must be willing to cooperate and they must be willing to submit to common institutions that will be responsible for coordinating this large-scale cooperation. If these conditions are fulfilled, a shared public culture will serve as a reliable source of trust relations

Normative political theory over recent decades has focused mainly on what ought to be done as far as migration policies are concerned. It faces a basic challenge, which stems from two competing, yet equally fundamental, ideals underpinning liberal democratic societies: a commitment to moral universalism and the exclusionary requirement of democracy. The objective of this special issue, ‘New Challenges in Immigration Theory’, is to provide a conceptual overview of (some) immigration theories and to highlight the challenges new streams of immigration pose for normative (political) theory and liberal democratic practice. The issue will consider how to reconcile state-based exclusion with a commitment to equal moral concern for all persons, by focusing on the non-standard immigration questions that have so far been ‘neglected’ by normative political theory. In line with this objective, the issue will discuss some of the inadequacies of the dominant political theories of immigration and show how such theories can be expanded to take account of new migration challenges such as brain drain, climate migration, detention of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, rights of labour migrants, transnational networks of movement, and so on.

It is no longer controversial to observe the decline in trust in political institutions, political actors and in others more generally. Yet, trust still seems central to democratic political stability and efficiency. If distrust is on the rise ? and it certainly appears that it is ? we therefore have good reasons to worry about the quality of our democracies. This essay begins by evaluating the relationship between trust and distrust (since they are not, strictly speaking, opposites), as well as the causes and consequences of widespread distrust. Its main contribution is a critical evaluation of proposed methods to curb distrust and build trust. Research into developing these methods, and in articulating the principles that underpin them, is still in its infancy, and it is clear that there is no agreement with respect to the best approaches to trust?building in environments characterized by distrust. Yet, clear steps towards thinking through and developing effective methods and strategies are being taken, and deserve to be applauded

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are over 20 million refugees worldwide, less than 1% of whom are referred for resettlement to third countries permanently. One obstacle to resettlement stems from the alleged lack of resources in settlement countries. A possible way forward is a refugee selection and admission regime that shares costs between governments and private citizens, to permit states to admit greater numbers of refugees where their citizens are willing and able to contribute their own, private, resources to the resettlement project. Taking Canada’s private sponsorship scheme as a model, I argue that there are pros and cons to public–private cooperation in refugee resettlement. On the one hand, they permit the resettlement of greater numbers of refugees and they permit private citizens committed to aiding refugees to do so in concrete ways. On the other hand, they require oversight to protect refugees who are, otherwise, fully dependent on their sponsorship groups and there are cultural differences that make the offering of support challenging. In particular, while sponsorship groups ought to aim at securing the independence and autonomy of newcomers, they can sometimes behave in culturally inappropriate and paternalistic ways, which generate resentments between refugees and their sponsoring groups.

Cosmopolitan principles of justice tell us that it is the responsibility of the wealthy to ensure the immediate transfer of resources to the poor. Yet, it cannot be denied that most countries, and most individual citizens, seem unwilling to act as these principles demand. At issue is motivation: although many people would agree that cosmopolitan principles of justice are right, at least to some extent, few seem motivationally inspired to act upon them. This paper evaluates one set of proposals for securing the transfer of resources from the wealthy to the poor, namely, those that suggest that the right way to achieve cosmopolitan objectives is to generate institutions that will, over time, produce cosmopolitans. I argue that we should focus, doubly, on the generation of supra-national institutions as a way to create a?global demos? and on harnessing the motivational resources available at the nation-state level.

Temporary labour migration programs are often proposed as a way to provide the benefits of migration in general, while mitigating the allegedly problematic effects of permanent migration. Here I propose that the arguments deployed in favour of temporary labour migration over permanent migration are flawed, normatively, and that empirically temporary labour migration programs produce effects in receiving states that are even worse than those (allegedly) produced by permanent migration. As a result, I shall argue that, for reasons of consistency, advocates of restricting permanent migration should support restricting temporary labour migration programs as well. I conclude not by arguing that temporary labour migration programs should be abandoned, but rather that we must focus more seriously on re-constructing temporary labour migration programs that do not produce these dilemmas, as well as on generating policies that alleviate the challenges they often pose in receiving societies.

The global space is in need of creative solutions to the challenges posed by those seeking, and deserving of, asylum. In some democratic states, experiments in permitting citizens to have a greater role in selecting refugees for admission are underway; in this article, I consider the conditions that must apply to any citizen‐selection scheme, in order for such a scheme to be morally acceptable. I begin with an account of the way in which citizen‐selection schemes – usually called ‘sponsorship programs’ – operate presently. I then offer a justification for engaging citizens in refugee resettlement in general, as well as in selecting specific refugees for admission in particular, and then identify several conditions that must attend any permissible citizen‐selection scheme. I defend this account from two objections: (1) that states should be the primary, and indeed only, agent that selects refugees for admission and (2) that citizens will inevitably use problematic criteria in selecting refugees for admission, so they should be denied the right to do so. I conclude with some proposals for how a citizen‐selection scheme can be crafted to respond to this latter worry, including an outline of an exception clause that permits citizens to make the case that some refugees ought to be resettled, even if not specially selected by the UNHCR for resettlement priority, including especially family members and friends.