•  22
    Epistemic Temperance
    American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2): 109-124. 2019.
    The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance i…Read more
  •  22
    The Character of the Hypocrite
    Journal of Philosophical Research 43 69-82. 2018.
    A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite. The former is understood as resulting from the employment of a double standard in order to obtain a wrongful advantage, while a particular problem with the latter is that hypocrites do not give trustworthy testimony.
  • Eudaimonia and Pratical Rationality
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 265-286. 2012.
  •  214
    Moral Reality
    Mind 112 (445): 94-99. 2003.
  •  76
    Justice as a Self‐Regarding Virtue
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 46-64. 2011.
  •  24
    Archimedeanism and Why Metaethics Matters
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4 283-302. 2009.
  •  266
    Tracking Eudaimonia
    Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (2). 2018.
    A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there would be no way to naturalistically represent or track them. Here, the basic structure for a tracking account of moral epistemology is given in empirically respectable terms, based on a eudaimonist conception of morality. The goal is to show how this form of moral realism can be seen as consistent with the details of evolutionary biology as well as being amenable to the most current understanding of …Read more
  •  108
    Is There Moral High Ground?
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4): 511-526. 2003.
  •  25
    Commonsense Darwinism (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 64 (4): 868-871. 2011.
  •  15
    Undeniably, life is unfair. So, why play fairly in an unfair world? The answer comes from combining the ancient Greek conception of happiness with a modern conception of self-respect. The book is about why it is bad to be bad and good to be good, and what happens in between.
  •  29
    Review: The Evolution of Morality (review)
    Mind 116 (461): 176-180. 2007.
  •  52
  •  68
    Dennett's misremenberings
    Philosophia 26 (1-2): 207-218. 1998.
  •  20
    Why it's bad to be bad
    In Morality and Self-Interest, Oxford University Press. 2007.
    The question “Why is it bad to be bad?” might seem either tautologous or poorly formed. It may seem like a tautology because it seems logical to think that badness is necessarily bad and so it must, of course, follow that it is bad to be bad. It might seem to be malformed because it may seem like anyone who asks the question, “Why is it bad to be bad?” must fail to understand the meaning of the words they are using: generally, if something is X, it cannot fail to be X. If so, then it may seem as…Read more
  •  33
    The Normative Web (review)
    Social Theory and Practice 36 (1): 157-164. 2010.
  •  28
    Prescriptions Are Assertions: An Essay on Moral Syntax
    American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1). 1998.
  •  32
    Comments: Partially Re-Humanized Ethics
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (Supplement): 184-189. 2003.
  •  173
    Virtue epistemology and the epistemology of virtue
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 23-43. 2000.
    The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an underlying intellectual structure , and having a particular skill entails understanding the relevant logos. possessing a general ability to diagnose and solve problems . as well as having appropriate experience. Two implications of accepting this thesis for moral epistemology and epistemology in general are considered. Thinking of virtues as skills yields a viable virtue epistemology in which moral …Read more
  •  203
    Two dogmas of metaethics
    Philosophical Studies 132 (3): 439-466. 2007.
    The two dogmas at issue are the Humean dogma that “‘is’ statements do not imply ‘ought’ statements” and the Kantian dogma that “‘ought’ statements imply ‘can’” statements. The extant literature concludes these logically contradict each other. On the contrary, it is argued here that while there is no derivable formal contradiction, the juxtaposition of the dogmas manifests a philosophical disagreement over how to understand the logic of prescriptions. This disagreement bears on how to understand …Read more
  •  64
    Moral Reality
    Oxford University Press. 2001.
    We typically assume that the standard for what is beautiful lies in the eye of the beholder. Yet this is not the case when we consider morality; what we deem morally good is not usually a matter of opinion. Such thoughts push us toward being realists about moral properties, but a cogent theory of moral realism has long been an elusive philosophical goal. Paul Bloomfield here offers a rigorous defense of moral realism, developing an ontology for morality that models the property of being morally …Read more
  •  128
    Error Theory and the Concept of Morality
    Metaphilosophy 44 (4): 451-469. 2013.
    Error theories about morality often take as their starting point the supposed queerness of morality, and those resisting these arguments often try to argue by analogy that morality is no more queer than other unproblematic subject matters. Here, error theory (as exemplified primarily by the work of Richard Joyce) is resisted first by arguing that it assumes a common, modern, and peculiarly social conception of morality. Then error theorists point out that the social nature of morality requires o…Read more
  •  20
    Moral Realism And Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 2: Reply To Miller
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 343-344. 2009.
    Miller's reply to Nelson misses the point because it does not attend to the difference between identifying the truth conditions for a proposition and explaining why those conditions are the ones in which the proposition is true
  •  4
    The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism (review)
    Social Theory and Practice 36 (1): 157-164. 2010.
  •  26
    Partially Re-Humanized Ethics: Comments on Butchvarov
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 184-189. 2003.
  •  76
    Morality and Self-Interest (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    The volume will act as a useful collection of scholarship by top figures, and as a resource and course book on an important topic.
  •  12
    Comments: Partially Re-Humanized Ethics: Comments on Butchvarov
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (Supplement): 184-189. 2003.
  •  12
    Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Virtue
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 23-43. 2000.
    The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an underlying intellectual structure, and having a particular skill entails understanding the relevant logos, possessing a general ability to diagnose and solve problems, as well as having appropriate experience. Two implications of accepting this thesis for moral epistemology and epistemology in general are considered. Thinking of virtues as skills yields a viable virtue epistemology in which moral kn…Read more