Paul Gregory

Recent Carnap scholarship suggests that the received view of the Carnap-Quine analyticity debate is importantly mistaken. It has been suggested that Carnap’s analyticity distinction is immune from Quine’s criticisms. This is either because Quine did not understand Carnap’s use of analytic-ity, or because Quine did not appreciate that, rather than dispelling dog-mas, he was merely offering an alternate framework for philosophy. It has also been suggested that ultimately nothing of substance turns on this dis-pute. I am sympathetic to these reassessments and their rejection of the re-ceived view, but argue that they fail to pay proper attention to Carnap’s metaphysical deflationism. For it is there that Quine’s arguments ultimately make contact with Carnap, undermining his metaphysical deflationism. Moreover, the viability of deflationism is directly related to the viability of Carnap’s view of philosophy as methodologically distinct from science. Hence, Quine’s criticisms make contact with the deepest aspects of Carnap’s views

Recently O'Grady argued that Quine's "Two Dogmas" misses its mark when Carnap's use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap's deflationism, I argue that O'Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to insist on a nonarbitrary analyticity distinction, we see that "Two Dogmas" makes direct contact with Carnap's deflationism. We must look beyond "Two Dogmas" to Quine's other critiques of analyticity to understand why the arbitrariness of the distinction threatens to undermine or overextend Carnap's deflationism. (edited)

Recently O’Grady argued that Quine’s “Two Dogmas” misses its mark when Carnap’s use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap’s deflationism, I argue that O’Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to insist on a non-arbitrary analyticity distinction, we see that “Two Dogmas” makes direct contact with Carnap’s deflationism. We must look beyond “Two Dogmas” to Quine’s other critiques of analyticity to understand why the arbitrariness of the distinction threatens to undermine or overextend Carnap’s deflationism, collapsing it into a view much like Quine’s. Quine is then seen to achieve many of Carnap’s ends, with the important exception of deflationism.

W. V. Quine was the most important naturalistic philosopher of the twentieth century and a major impetus for the recent resurgence of the view that empirical science is our best avenue to knowledge. His views, however, have not been well understood. Critics charge that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is circular and that it cannot be normative. Yet, such criticisms stem from a cluster of fundamental traditional assumptions regarding language, theory, and the knowing subject – the very presuppositions that Quine is at pains to reject. Through investigation of Quine’s views regarding language, knowledge, and reality, the author offers a new interpretation of Quine’s naturalism. The naturalism/antinaturalism debate can be advanced only by acknowledging and critiquing the substantial theoretical commitments implicit in the traditional view. Gregory argues that the responses to the circularity and non-normativity objections do just that. His analysis further reveals that Quine’s departure from the tradition penetrates the conception of the knowing subject, and he thus offers a new and engaging defence of Quine’s naturalism.

_Formal Logic_ is an undergraduate text suitable for introductory, intermediate, and advanced courses in symbolic logic. The book’s nine chapters offer thorough coverage of truth-functional and quantificational logic, as well as the basics of more advanced topics such as set theory and modal logic. Complex ideas are explained in plain language that doesn’t presuppose any background in logic or mathematics, and derivation strategies are illustrated with numerous examples. Translations, tables, trees, natural deduction, and simple meta-proofs are taught through over 400 exercises. A companion website offers supplemental practice software and tutorial videos.

PHIL 102 - Problems of Philosophy (Fall) This course has two main goals: first, to cultivate students’ critical attitude towards reading, writing, and daily life; second, to engage students with primary philosophical texts. Plato, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Peirce, Russell, Paley, Perry, Sagan, Ayer, Chisholm, and Dennett are among the authors I have used. Each week students are responsible for readings and reading questions to be answered out of class or in small in-class groups. These assignments are designed to develop critical writing and thinking skills, focus students’ reading, and prompt students to actively engage the text prior to lecture and open discussion. Essay exams or short papers are used for assessment. Sample syllabus.

In the fourth Immanuel Kant Lecture, Quine summons the specter of Kant’s Ding an sich, the thing in itself. Clearly antithetical to his naturalism, Quine quickly dismisses it as having feet of clay. Despite this short shrift, it is worth examining what he did say about the Ding an sich—in the Kant Lectures, in “Things and Their Place in Theories”, and in “Structure and Nature”. I offer a critical reading of these passages in the context of Quine’s proxy functions, ontological relativity, and structure. I argue that Quine uses the Ding an sich as a foil for his anti-metaphysical, deflationary structuralism—a view that grounds objectivity in true statements, without any transcendental notion of objects, without the Ding an sich.

The natural epistemology of W. V. Quine has not been well understood. Critics argue that Quine's scientific approach to epistemology is circular and fails to be normative, yet these criticisms tend to be based on the very presuppositions concerning language, theory, and epistemology that Quine is at pains to reject or alter. ;Quine's views on the meaningfulness of language use imply a breakdown in the dichotomy between language as a theoretically neutral instrument and theory as the commitment to some subset of the sentences allowed by a language. This breakdown, and the view of language which drives it, result in Quine's doctrine that speaking a language involves substantial theoretical commitments, and that inquiry must begin from within some ongoing theory of the world. That is, our epistemic practices, including epistemology itself, must be globally circular. The traditionally fundamental norm of linear propositional support, which drives the circularity objection, is thus seen as based in a misconception of language and theory. This not only explains Quine's lack of concern with the circularity of his view, but also illuminates the fundamental motivation for his general naturalism. ;Natural epistemology cannot be normative in the traditional sense of providing an independent ground for science. However, having accepted the "terminal parameter" of prediction as the test of theory, normativity becomes a matter of describing which procedures best promote predictively successful theory. Thus, epistemic norms emerge from science as hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of various methods in promoting predictively successful theory. Not only can natural epistemology prescribe and proscribe various epistemic practices, it offers the promise of an explanatory understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of those practices. Based on this understanding, natural epistemology further involves the improvement of current practices and the development of new ones. Crucial to this reconception of epistemology is the reconception of the knower as an adaptive organism employing the language/theory complex as an adaptive tool for interacting with the environment. ;The naturalism/anti-naturalism debate is advanced by acknowledging the substantial theoretical commitments implicit in the traditional view, and by examining Quine's reconception of language, theory, and the human knowing subject