Paul Hammond

This paper argues that the intentional actions of collective entities, such as corporations and agencies, are not necessarily joint intentional actions by several members of those collectives. I briefly summarize the social action theories of John Searle, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, and Seumas Miller, which I argue are all theories of joint action. I then describe a case based loosely on events from the 2008 financial crisis in which an intentional collective action is performed by a corporation due to the actions of two employees who have no knowledge of one another, and therefore cannot be engaged in a joint intentional action. I argue that this shows that, contrary to what joint action theorists are committed to, every intentional collective action does not entail the existence of a joint intentional action. Finally, I suggest that we should look for a weaker notion of coordination than that employed by joint action theories, and that this might be provided by examining the command structures of organizations

The contemporary social world is one in which, in addition to interacting regularly with a variety of different individual people, we find ourselves more and more often interacting with entities that we more naturally think of as groups. Thus, in addition to my friends, my co-workers, and members of my family, I also have regular meaningful interactions with my bank, my employer, and my government. It seems correct to call corporations and similar entities groups of people rather than individuals, but in our everyday practices we talk about them as having beliefs, motivations, and goals and as carrying out activities such as thinking, planning, and deciding. We frequently say things like “Airbus and Boeing are...

ABSTRACT This article applies Deleuze's metaphysics of multiplicities to groups of people, arguing that organized groups can be said to have mental states in the same sense as individuals. I begin by outlining the genealogy of Deleuze's use of the concept of multiplicity, beginning with Riemann and continuing through Bergson. Deleuze's transformation of these two thinkers' ideas results in a concept of any individual as a conjunction of two types of multiplicity, one relating to its material parts and one relating to its ideal or virtual parts. I then turn to Deleuze's theory of the mental faculties and argue that it describes a virtual multiplicity that, for Deleuze, is instantiated in human beings and other entities that can be said to think or have minds. I argue that many organized social groups have these mental faculties in the same way that individual people do and that therefore they can be said to have minds and mental states of their own, independent of the mental states of their members.

This chapter focuses on the elements of time, memory and mystery in Veronica Mars. Both the plot and the visual style of Veronica Mars assign a huge importance to the past, suggesting that past events have a major impact on the present. The most straightforward way in which the past is accessible to us and has an impact on the present is through everyday memories. Much of the time when we voluntarily remember things, it's because something happening now has prompted us to go looking for a memory designed to answer our question. The final episode of the first season ends with a touching sequence symbolizing the end of one particular detective story. Veronica dreams that she and Lilly are floating together in a pool, surrounded by flower petals, still in the soft focus of the past, but without the dark tints of foreboding and mystery.

This chapter analyzes why it may be okay for Veronica Mars to break the law. Breaking the law is something that we morally disapprove of. We have to follow the law because we said we would. It's easy, of course, to understand why we would make that promise: we get something valuable out of the deal too. Likewise, if the law is supposed to provide us with protection and justice in exchange for our obedience, but fails to hold up its end of the deal, then that might release us from the obligation to hold up ours. Now, the discussion shifts to Plato, who addressed a similar issue long ago and raised some points that might complicate the attempt to defend Veronica on these grounds. Veronica's law breaking can be seen as a protest or civil disobedience, a refusal to accept the rules imposed on her by an unjust society.