•  38
    Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities (edited book)
    with Antonio Piccolomini D’Aragona, Martin Carrier, Roger Deulofeu, Axel Gelfert, Jens Harbecke, Lara Huber, Peter Hucklenbroich, Ludger Jansen, Elizaveta Kostrova, Keizo Matsubara, Anne Sophie Meincke, Andrea Reichenberger, Kian Salimkhani, and Javier Suárez
    Springer Verlag. 2018.
    This broad and insightful book presents current scholarship in important subfields of philosophy of science and addresses an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary readership. It groups carefully selected contributions into the four fields of I) philosophy of physics, II) philosophy of life sciences, III) philosophy of social sciences and values in science, and IV) philosophy of mathematics and formal modeling. Readers will discover research papers by Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Keizo Matsubara, Kian…Read more
  •  4
    Die Frage nach den grundsätzlichen Erkenntnisgrenzen der Physik wird hier verstanden als die Frage danach, welchen Status die Aussagen der Physik über unbeobachtbare Gegenstände haben, z.B. über den Urknall, über Quarks oder über dunkle Materie. Sind die diesbezüglichen Aussagen der besten physikalischen Theorien einfach wahr oder wenigstens annähernd wahr (realistische Interpretation)? Oder wenigstens wahrscheinlich? Oder handelt es sich um bloße Modellvorstellungen, die für Vorhersagen und ggf…Read more
  •  4
    Fragt man heute Vertreter verschiedener Disziplinen nach der Bedeutung des Hannoveraner Universalgelehrten Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, so hort man jeweils immer wieder: Leibniz hat Bedeutendes fur unser Fach geleistet. Leibniz beeindruckt nicht nur durch die Exzellenz seiner Leistung, sondern auch durch die Breite seiner Betatigungsfelder. Der aus einer Ringvorlesung an der Leibniz Universitat Hannover hervorgegangene Band fuhrt nun an die Vielfalt der von Leibniz ausgehenden der Leistungen und A…Read more
  •  21
    Incommensurability, Realism, and Meta-Incommensurability
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 12 (3): 447-465. 1997.
    The essay begins with a detailed consideration of the introduction of incommensurability by Feyerabend in 1962 which exposes several historically inaccurate claims about incommensurability. Section 2 is a coneise argument against causal theories of reference as used as arguments against incommensurability. We object to this strategy because it begs the question by presupposing realism. Section 3 introduces and discusses a hypothesis that w'e call meta-incommensurability which provides the reason…Read more
  •  3
    European and American Philosophers
    with John Marenbon, Douglas Kellner, Richard D. Parry, Gregory Schufreider, Ralph McInerny, Andrea Nye, R. M. Dancy, Vernon J. Bourke, A. A. Long, James F. Harris, Thomas Oberdan, Paul S. MacDonald, Véronique M. Fóti, F. Rosen, James Dye, Pete A. Y. Gunter, Lisa J. Downing, W. J. Mander, Peter Simons, Maurice Friedman, Robert C. Solomon, Nigel Love, Mary Pickering, Andrew Reck, Simon J. Evnine, Iakovos Vasiliou, John C. Coker, Georges Dicker, James Gouinlock, Paul J. Welty, Gianluigi Oliveri, Jack Zupko, Tom Rockmore, Wayne M. Martin, Ladelle McWhorter, Hans-Johann Glock, Georgia Warnke, John Haldane, Joseph S. Ullian, Steven Rieber, David Ingram, Nick Fotion, George Rainbolt, Thomas Sheehan, Gerald J. Massey, Barbara D. Massey, David E. Cooper, David Gauthier, James M. Humber, J. N. Mohanty, Michael H. Dearmey, Oswald O. Schrag, Ralf Meerbote, George J. Stack, John P. Burgess, Nicholas Jolley, Adriaan T. Peperzak, E. J. Lowe, William D. Richardson, Stephen Mulhall, and C.
    In Robert L. Arrington (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophers, Blackwell. 2017.
    Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categ…Read more
  • Einleitung
    with Gertrude Hirsch
    In Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Gertrude Hirsch (eds.), Wozu Wissenschaftsphilosophie?: Positionen und Fragen zur gegenwärtigen Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 1-16. 1988.
  •  64
    Feyerabend's Early Philosophy
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2): 363-375. 2000.
  •  59
    Reference, ontological replacement and Neo-Kantianism: a reply to Sankey
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2): 203-209. 2009.
    Contrary to Sankey’s central assumption, incommensurability does not imply incomparability of content, nor threaten scientific realism by challenging the rationality of theory comparison. Moreover, Sankey equivocates between reference to specific entities by statements used to test theories and reference to kinds by theories themselves. This distinction helps identify and characterize the genuine threat that incommensurability poses to realism, which is ontological discontinuity as evidenced in …Read more
  •  100
    On incommensurability
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (1): 131-141. 1996.
  •  48
    On naturalizing Kuhn’s essential tension
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1): 215-218. 2011.
  •  157
    What makes economics special: orientational paradigms
    with Harold Kincaid
    Journal of Economic Methodology (2): 1-15. 2023.
    From the mid-1960s until the late 1980s, the well-known general philosophies of science of the time were applied to economics. The result was disappointing: none seemed to fit. This paper argues that this is due to a special feature of economics: it possesses ‘orientational paradigms’ in high number. Orientational paradigms are similar to Kuhn’s paradigms in that they are shared across scientific communities, but dissimilar to Kuhn’s paradigms in that they are not generally accepted as valid gui…Read more
  •  10
    The Plausibility of Thomas Kuhn’s Metaphysics
    In Pablo Melogno, Hernán Miguel & Leandro Giri (eds.), Perspectives on Kuhn: Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn, Springer. pp. 139-154. 2023.
    One of the elements of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions not only confused his readers but even Kuhn himself, namely, his talk about world change. In my earlier work, I have tackled the question of Kuhn’s metaphysics from a viewpoint that was informed by Kant’s critical theoretical philosophy. Useful as this may be, in this chapter I will try a different approach. I will focus on the fact that Kuhn acted mainly as a reflective historian when he wrote Structure. Thus, he reflected on what s…Read more
  •  133
    In this paper, I shall defend two main claims. First, Friedman’s famous paper “On the methodology of positive economics” (“F53”) cannot be properly understood without taking into account the influence of three authors who are neither cited nor mentioned in the paper: Max Weber, Frank Knight, and Karl Popper. I shall trace both their substantive influence on F53 and the historical route by which this influence took place. Once one has understood these ingredients, especially Weber’s ideal types, …Read more
  •  78
    Why Is Modern Science Technologically Exploitable?
    Journal of Ethics and Legal Technologies 1 (1): 2-23. 2019.
    This paper deals with the following question: What features of modern natural science are responsible for the fact that, of all forms of science, this form is technologically exploitable? The three notions: concept of nature, epistemic ideal, and experiment, suggest the most important components of my answer. I will argue, first, that only the peculiar interplay of the modern concept of nature with an epistemic ideal attuned to it can cast experiment in the specific, highly central role it plays…Read more
  •  214
    Objectivity, value-free science, and inductive risk
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (1): 1-26. 2023.
    In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or conceptions of objectivity are in fact criteria of, or means to achieve, objectivity. I shall then discuss the ideal of value-free science and its relation to the objectivity of science; its status can be at best a criterion of, or means for, objectivity. Given this analysis, we can then turn to the problem of inductive risk. Do the value judgement…Read more
  •  15
    Is Kuhn’s “World Change through Revolutions” Comprehensible?
    Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 59 (4): 55-72. 2022.
    Kuhn’s talk of “world change through revolutions” has mostly been met with perplexity. What is it really that Kuhn wants to express in this strange way? I will first review what Kuhn exactly says on this topic. Next, I show that the world change talk is at least not inconsistent and has some initial plausibility. Then I will discuss whether “world change through revolutions” should be replaced by “change of world view”. This will show that “world change through revolutions” is motivated by a str…Read more
  •  8
    Systematicity: The Nature of Science
    Oxford University Press. 2013.
    In Systematicity, Paul Hoyningen-Huene answers the question "What is science?" by proposing that scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, by being more systematic. "Science" is here understood in the broadest possible sense, encompassing not only the natural sciences but also mathematics, the social sciences, and the humanities. The author develops his thesis in nine dimensions in which it is claimed that science is more system…Read more
  •  132
    Recently, Barbara Renzi argued that Kuhn's account of scientific change is undermined by mismatches in the analogy that Kuhn supposedly draws between scientific change and biological evolution. We argue that Renzi's criticism is inadequate to Kuhn's account of scientific change, as Kuhn does not draw any precise analogy between the mechanisms of scientific change and biological evolution nor aims to argue that the mechanisms of scientific change and biological evolution are similar in any import…Read more
  •  31
    Incommensurability and Related Matters (edited book)
    Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2001.
    Incommensurability and Related Matters draws together some of the most distinguished contributors to the critical literature on the problem of the incommensurability of scientific theories. It addresses all the various problems raised by the problem of incommensurability, such as meaning change, reference of theoretical terms, scientific realism and anti-realism, rationality of theory choice, cognitive aspects of conceptual change, as well as exploring the broader implications of incommensurabil…Read more
  •  149
    The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. Moreover, it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues, and revisits some familiar issues, with…Read more
  •  6
    Emergenz versus Reduktion
    In Georg Meggle & Ulla Wessels (eds.), Analyōmen 1 =, De Gruyter. pp. 324-332. 1994.
  •  180
    Are There Good Arguments Against Scientific Realism?
    In Antonio Piccolomini D’Aragona, Martin Carrier, Roger Deulofeu, Axel Gelfert, Jens Harbecke, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Lara Huber, Peter Hucklenbroich, Ludger Jansen, Elizaveta Kostrova, Keizo Matsubara, Anne Sophie Meincke, Andrea Reichenberger, Kian Salimkhani & Javier Suárez (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities, Springer Verlag. pp. 3-22. 2018.
    I will first discuss a peculiarity of the realism-antirealism debate. Some authors defending antirealist positions in a philosophical discussion seem to be inconsistent with what they do when treating scientific subjects. In the latter situation, they behave as realists. This tension can be dissolved by distinguishing different discourses belonging to different levels of philosophical radicality. Depending on the respective level, certain presuppositions are either granted or questioned. I will …Read more