Paul Lopez

The article reviews research between 1999 and 2013 with the aim of knowing the epistemological foundations of research on distributed leadership, with special interest in education studies. We conclude it is an area in developing, with potential, but its empirical foundations are weak and methodological strategies are not always explicit, making it difficult to evaluate their findings somewhat. With respect to the theoretical basis, much of the research finds their sustenance in Engeström’s activity theory and Hutchins’s distributed cognition. The importance of distributed leadership studies is its growing influence in the administration of colleges and universities, making these studies, a major political issue. El artículo revisa investigaciones entre los años 1999 y 2013 con el objetivo de conocer las bases epistemológicas de la investigación en liderazgo distribuido, con especial interés en estudios de educación. Se concluye que es un campo en formación, con potencial, pero que sus bases empíricas son débiles y sus estrategias metodológicas no siempre están explícitas, lo que dificulta un poco evaluar sus descubrimientos. Con respecto a las bases teóricas, gran parte de las investigaciones encuentran su sustento en la teoría de la actividad de Engeström y la teoría de la cognición distribuida de Hutchins. La importancia de los estudios de liderazgo distribuido es su creciente influencia en la administración de colegios y universidades, lo que hace de estos estudios un tema de gran relevancia política

There is a gap between the most abstract approach of Philosophy of language and the empirical information of language sciences. An intermediate level of abstraction and a bridge between Philosophy of language and language sciences is precisely Philosophy of languages. How can we come forward in philosophizing on language, if we are not able to philosophize on particular languages?. Language is nothing but the interrelated sum of languages. Philosophy of languages set out from the fact that every language has a philosophical identity. Therefore, we should be much more conscious of the great relevance of every particular language for philosophical speech. A language is not a neutral tool for deep thinking. The core of a language is its Philosophy, a philosophicalperspective. Thus, a language has to give an implicit general orientation to whatever speech that is performed or written with its syntactic rules and concepts. A language is the framework, the atmosphere, the environment of every deep thinking (Philosophy or Theology). It is the deepest root of every deep thought. All of that can be analyzed in basic concepts like “to be” or “essence”.

Despite the diagnostic relevance of thought insertion for disorders such as schizophrenia, the debates about its aetiology are far from resolved. This paper claims that in paying exclusive attention to the perceptual and cognitive impairments leading to delusional experiences in general, current deficit approaches overlook the role that affective disturbances might play in giving rise to cases of thought insertion. In the context of psychosis, affective impairments are often characterized as a consequence of the stress and anxiety caused by delusional episodes. However, here I explore some of the conceptual and empirical reasons to think that affective problems might in fact play a crucial doxastic role in the aetiology of thought insertion. Finally, I conclude by proposing a way of integrating the main insights of my analysis with the current ‘two-factor’ deficit approach to thought insertion and I explore the potential adaptive role that some delusions might have within this framework.

The aim of this paper is to review some implications of the work of the Frankfurt School theorist Franz Neumann, the author of Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (1942). Against the conception of National Socialism as a form of «state capitalism» (F. Pollock, M. Horkheimer), Neumann argues that German fascism should be read as a form of «totalitarian monopoly capitalism», that preserves the primacy of economic relations and threatens essential components of the modern idea of State. Neumann’s study provides important insights into the current relationship between power, law and sovereignty

The concept of mental privacy can be defined as the principle that subjects should have control over the access to their own neural data and to the information about the mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. Our aim is to contribute to the current debate on mental privacy by identifying the main positions, articulating key assumptions and addressing central arguments. First, we map the different positions found in current literature. We distinguish between those who dismiss concerns about mental privacy and those who endorse them. In this latter group, we establish a further disagreement between conservative and liberal strategies to protect mental privacy. Then, we address the first discussion by articulating and criticizing different skeptical views on mental privacy. Finally, we try to identify what are the unique features of neural data and examine how they may be connected to the ways in which neurotechnological mindreading could put mental privacy at risk. We suggest that even if neural data is unique, it may not require new strategies to protect people from its misuse. However, identifying the special features and risks of neurotechnological mind-reading is necessary for the second discussion on mental privacy to properly take off.

Patients suffering from delusions of thought insertion (TI) report that external agents of different nature have placed thoughts into their minds. The symptom involves distressing feelings of intromission and exposition, loss of mental privacy, diminished ego boundaries, and a – often neglected – peculiar “physicality”. A dominant approach within cognitive sciences characterizes TI as involving alterations in the experience of being the author of certain thoughts. For the advocates of this so-called Standard Approach to TI, the absence of a sense of agency for certain thoughts would lead to their externalization, this explaining the general structure of the clinical reports. In this paper, I problematize the phenomenological picture of everyday thoughts that the standard approach adopts when trying to make sense of TI. I claim that the standard approach neglects two more fundamental aspects of TI, namely the multimodal nature of thinking in psychosis and the deeply social dimension of the phenomenology of delusions in schizophrenia. After this, a broader descriptive phenomenological characterization of TI is provided. Finally, I establish some connections between the characterization of TI developed here and current research in social perception and clinical practice.

An attribution of mental agency is defined as the act of assigning the initiation or authorship of a first personal phenomenal thought to a specific agent. This type of attribution is fundamental for the production of the belief that human beings are rational agents not only in behavioral terms, but also, in a cognitive manner. The top-down approach –one of the dominant theories in current literature– suggests that attributions of mental agency arise as retrospective rational explanations for the occurrence of phenomenal thoughts. Thus, the agency of a thought would not be contained in its most fundamental phenomenal structure, rather, it would be an imposed category. After introducing the most fundamental elements of the debate, this paper evaluates the top-down model in order to identify its argumentative strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, although this model possesses a number of merits, it cannot deal in a plausible way with some fundamental conceptual challenges.

En filosofía de la mente se ha sugerido que, a diferencia de los estados puramente materiales, los estados conscientes serían aquellos de los cuales podemos decir que existe ‘un algo que es como estar en ellos’ para un sujeto, esto es, estados que poseen una fenomenología. Asumiendo una demarcación intuitiva entre estados sensoriales y estados cognitivos, durante los últimos años se ha establecido un debate en torno a la pregunta acerca del carácter fenoménico de nuestros estados cognitivos, especialmente, el de nuestros pensamientos. A este asunto se le ha denominado el debate acerca de la fenomenología cognitiva. El análisis del debate parece depender del examen crítico de las formas en las que establecemos conclusiones acerca de los componentes fenoménicos de nuestra propia vida mental. El presente artículo elabora diversos problemas que se derivan del uso de dos estrategias en este contexto: reportes introspectivos y los contrastes fenoménicos. Luego de analizar la forma en que tales estrategias podrían favorecer a cierta posición dentro del debate, el artículo concluye comentando cómo algunos asuntos asociados a la fenomenología de la actividad matemática podrían iluminar el debate.

The Next Release Problem (NRP) is a combinatorial optimization problem that aims to find a subset of software requirements to be delivered in the next software release, which maximize the satisfaction of a list of clients and minimize the effort required by developers to implement them. Previous studies have applied various metaheuristics, mostly genetic algorithms. Estimation of Distribution Algorithms (EDA), based on probabilistic modelling, have been proved to obtain good results in problems where genetic algorithms struggle. In this paper we propose to adapt three EDAs to tackle the multi-objective NRP in a fast and effective way. Results show that EDAs can be applicable to solve the NRP with rather good quality of solutions. Furthermore, we prove that their execution time can be significantly reduced using a per-iteration solution subset selection method while maintaining the overall quality of the solutions obtained, and they perform the best when limiting the search time as in an interactive tool that requires fast responsiveness. The experimental framework, code and datasets have been made public in a code repository.

With a higher prevalence in schizophrenia, delusions of thought insertion (TI) are regarded as one of the most severe symptoms of psychosis. Patients suffering from TI report that external agents are able to place thoughts into their minds or skulls. A version of the doxastic approach characterizes delusions as abnormal beliefs rooted in anomalous experiences. Nonetheless, the exact role of these experiences in determining the content and the way in which delusional beliefs are fixated is still under debate. While _endorsement_ models claim that the abnormal experience comprises the very content of the delusional beliefs, _explanationist_ approaches claim that delusional beliefs emerge as explanations for abnormal experiences with less specific content. This paper combines conceptual analysis with phenomenological data to examine the merits of both endorsement and explanationist approaches to TI. I propose that potential solutions to the dispute could lay in finding a middle ground between the two approaches, and non-exhaustive ways in which hybrid doxastic approaches to TI could be formulated.

Términos como «espiritualidad», «naturaleza», «naturalismo» y «religión» se han venido usando con frecuencia de modo engañoso desde el siglo decimoctavo, a partir del sector antirreligioso del Iluminismo británico y francés. De hecho, esos términos a veces significan lo contrario de lo que aparentemente expresan. Así pues, necesitamos explorar el significado real de dichos términos, en especial el de «naturalismo». También tenemos que analizar una serie de contradicciones acerca de la comprensión de nociones como «persona» y «religión». Nos proponemos argumentar una nueva fraternidad universal y personal basada en la real naturaleza humana, la real espiritualidad y la real religiosidad.

Over the last several years, predictive processing approaches to computational neuropsychiatry have been gaining explanatory traction. According to these accounts, some of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia arise from aberrant precision-weighting during hierarchical Bayesian inference. In contrast to computational approaches, the phenomenological tradition in psychiatry holds that disruptions or alterations of the self (Ichstörungen) lie at the core of schizophrenia. In this article, we aim to integrate these approaches. We align ourselves with the phenomenological insight that self-disturbances lie at the core of schizophrenia and with the hierarchical conception of the self-model that emerges from the predictive processing architecture. We suggest that disruptions of the “hard core” of the narrative self-model might be partially involved in the generation of aberrant experiences and hyperreflexivity, and in some aspects of the sense of self-alienation and ambiguity that is characteristic of the phenomenology of schizophrenia.

Este artículo examina el debate acerca de si el delirio de inserción de pensamiento constituye un contraejemplo para el denominado principio de inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación. Luego de distinguir diferentes formulaciones del principio en la literatura, concluimos que el fenómeno delirante en cuestión no constituye un contraejemplo para el principio examinado. En la parte final se clarifica el concepto de autoadscripción psicológica y su uso relativo a los pronombres de primera persona en el contexto del debate acerca de la relación entre inserción de pensamiento e inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación.

En un artículo de 1927, el novelista cubano Alejo Carpentier, entonces todavía poco conocido, planteaba con una metáfora afectiva el mayor peligro, a su juicio, de las relaciones culturales entre España y Latinoamérica. Carpentier trataba de separar claramente las dos orillas del Atlántico en el terreno cultural y evitar cualquier nueva subordinación a la metrópoli. La reacción de Carpentier venía a denunciar rotundamente las pretensiones de algunos intelectuales de Madrid de proponer a la capital de España como centro de la cultura hispánica, desplazando a un segundo plano el tradicional encanto sensual y vanguardista de París.

Aunque la secularización de la sociedad occidental determinó que muchos artistas modernos abandonasen todo lo que pudiera tener algún sentido religioso, ciertos creadores siguieron encontrando inspiración en el misterio de lo numinoso en algún momento de su carrera. El texto revisa la relación mantenida por importantes referentes del arte del siglo XX con un tipo de creación motivada más por lo transcendente, que por la subjetividad e inmanencia que caracterizó a la revolución artística moderna. La presencia de lo trascendente en la obra de artistas contemporáneos es un fenómeno generalmente evitado o silenciado por la historiografía artística y que sin embargo ha cobrado fuerza en los últimos tiempos a partir de la postmodernidad.