Paulo Faria

Proponho uma interpretação das observações de Wittgenstein nas Investigações Filosóficas (§§ 134-6) sobre a doutrina da ‘forma proposicional geral’ exposta no Tractatus. Contra a leitura predominante, sustento que essas passagens contêm uma defesa, ao invés de uma rejeição sumária, do que eu alego ser o núcleo daquela doutrina. Recorro ao comentário de A. N. Prior ao § 134 das Investigações para salientar a estrutura anafórica do exemplo que dá Wittgenstein do uso, na linguagem ordinária, de uma variável proposicional. Encerro a discussão com um breve aceno à vulnerabilidade da fundação (grounding) de cadeias anafóricas.AbstractI offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philosophical Investigations (§§ 134-6) about the doctrine of a ‘general propositional form’ as it was presented in the Tractatus. Against the prevailing reading, I argue that these sections contain a vindication, rather than an out and out rejection, of what I claim to be the kernel of that doctrine. I make use of A. N. Prior’s gloss on § 134 of the Investigations to underscore the anaphoric structure of Wittgenstein’s example of the use, in ordinary language, of a propositional variable. I round up the discussion with a brief glance at the vulnerability of grounding of anaphoric chains.

Historicamente, as ciências da religião e a teologia construíram itinerários próprios, mas não indiferentes entre si. Ainda que a configuração das ciências da religião na Europa e na América do Norte acentue a sua autonomia, é notório, nos seus primeiros passos, o inevitável encontro com a teologia. No Brasil este encontro estendeu-se em quantidade e qualidade, motivado pela natural proximidade de questões, pelo contexto socioeclesial e, mais recentemente, por razões de ordem epistemológicas, oportunizando o reconhecimento civil público das duas ciências pelos órgãos competentes de governo. Isto significa que a teologia e as ciências da religião estão sob os mesmos deveres e direitos de qualquer outra área de conhecimento. A conquista dessa condição foi marcada por conflitos internos e externos, que foram pouco a pouco dissolvidos por debates carregados de tensão e maturidade, conduzidos com maestria pela vocação interdisciplinar característica das partes. Este artigo aponta momentos importantes da edificação da relação entre as ciências da religião e a teologia; os conflitos, resolvidos, e os que ainda permanecem; alguns desafios e tarefas comuns que visam aprofundar e tornar mais fecunda a relação construída.

COSTA, Alexandre da. Fundamentos da bioética: estudo sobre o pensamento de Hugo Tristram Engelhardt Jr. FERREIRA, Amauri Carlos. O imaginário religioso e modos de vida urbana: experiência e memória da Juventude Católica em Belo Horizonte – MG, anos 80. GONÇALVES, Davidson Sepini. O Panóptico de Jeremy Bentham: por uma leitura utilitarista. GÓIS, Aurino José. Parque Municipal de Belo Horizonte: público, apropriações e significados. FARIA, Paulo Antônio Couto. Teologia no limiar da filosofia: a modernidade e o encontro fé e razão na obra de Henrique Cláudio de Lima Vaz

Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that such was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility between content externalism and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect of such empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mental content is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should be able to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be. That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alternatively, we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investigation of rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustration and defense of that alternative

In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the 'a priority of our logical abilities'. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.

The paper discusses the relations between two putative epistemic principles, Reflexivity and Closure, with a view to assess whether the repudiation of the former, usually required by externalistic accounts of knowledge, necessitates the repudiation, as well, of the latter. A negative reply to that question is offered, which prompts the hypothesis that alleged counterexamples to Closure are artifacts of the rather peculiar conditions on which, in the course of a particular kind of epistemological inquiry, are introduced assumptions such as are characteristic of the methodological use of so-called skeptical “doubts”

Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell’s requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge – a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory.